Commit Graph
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
ehoandClaude Sonnet 5 8560746d15 refactor: strip WP-/RB- ticket refs from backend (RD-19)
The backend half of the sweep RD-18 did for the front end. git blame
holds the provenance and stays correct when the code moves; the
comment names a closed ticket and tells the reader nothing the
sentence around it does not.

public/letter.css and LetterHtml.golden.html change together, because
the renderer inlines the CSS and the golden file snapshots the
result.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-04 21:48:08 +02:00
ehoandClaude Opus 5 fbd27ed641 fix(privacy): mask the BSN recorded as the document audit Actor (RB-04)
DocumentStore wrote one audit row per upload and per user delete carrying the
acting citizen's raw BSN as AuditEntry.Actor, persisted to SQLite — on a
store whose own doc comment says it holds metadata only, never file content
"or other PII". Same shape as RB-02, in a second store.

Masked at the two citizen call sites rather than inside Audit, because the
third actor is the literal "admin" and MaskTail("admin", 3) is "**min";
masking centrally would mean guessing which actors are BSNs and which are
role names. Audit's doc comment now states that actors arrive redacted.

StoredDocument.Owner is untouched: it is the authorization key that
DeleteOwned, ForeignIds and RB-01's content check all compare against, so the
BSN stays where it is load-bearing and leaves the trail where it was only
decoration. No endpoint exposes AuditLog, so no response shape changes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-27 10:54:07 +02:00
ehoandClaude Opus 5 a2e935d1d8 fix(uploads): authorize the document-content and status endpoints (RB-01)
GET /uploads/{documentId}/content took only (string documentId) — no
HttpContext, so no authorization was possible. It streams diploma and
identity scans, protected by GUID unguessability alone, while DELETE on the
same resource has always been owner-scoped. GET /uploads/status had the same
shape and confirmed whether any client-chosen localId exists, plus its
documentId.

Both now take HttpContext. Content is readable by the owning
ZorgverlenerCaller or a caller passing Authz.CanBeoordelen — matched on the
caller kind rather than branched on a boolean, because ctx.Zorgverlener()
throws for a MedewerkerCaller and the behandelportal's beoordeling screen is
a legitimate reader. Status is scoped to ctx.Zorgverlener().Bsn via a new
owner parameter on DocumentStore.ByLocalIds (one call site).

404, not 403, on both: a foreign document id must not be distinguishable
from one that never existed, and a foreign localId reads back as "unknown".

Residual, recorded in the implementation note: both callers reach the URL as
a plain browser navigation (<a href> / previewUrl), which carries no identity
header and no interceptor, so StubIdentityProvider resolves it to the seeded
citizen. That is BIO-002 and belongs to RB-09; the links keep working today
only because one citizen owns every document in the POC.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-27 10:48:04 +02:00