arch(bff): ADR-0010 BFF OIDC validation + downstream boundaries (refs #8, #63)

The BFF is the portals' only backend (§8.3): it validates Keycloak digid-realm
JWTs on POST /self-service/registrations (extracting bsn → domain), leaves
GET /openbaar/register anonymous (public lookup, S-09), and fans out to the
domain and projection over typed HTTP clients. Tests mint tokens with a test
signing key; real Keycloak validation is a live-stack verify-bff check. Records
the container OIDC issuer-mismatch wrinkle. OpenAPI is generated + committed for
the S-08 client.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

docs/architecture/adr-0010-bff-oidc.md

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+# ADR-0010: The BFF validates Keycloak tokens and is the portals' only backend
+
+- **Status:** Accepted
+- **Date:** 2026-07-01
+- **Deciders:** Respellion engineering
+- **Relates to:** S-07 (#8); proposal #63; builds on ADR-0001 (loose coupling, §8.3), S-02 (#3, Keycloak realms), S-05 (#6, Domain Service), S-06 (#7, read projection)
+
+## Context
+
+S-07 (#8) adds the **BFF (Backend-for-Frontend)** — the single backend the Angular portals talk
+to (CLAUDE.md §8.3). For the walking skeleton it exposes two endpoints and fans out to services
+already built:
+
+- `POST /self-service/registrations` → Domain Service `POST /registrations` (S-05).
+- `GET /openbaar/register?q=…` → projection-api `GET /register` (S-06).
+
+It must validate tokens issued by Keycloak (S-02). This is an ADR-worthy moment (§14): a new
+dependency (JWT bearer authentication) and two new service boundaries (BFF→domain, BFF→projection).
+
+## Decision
+
+**The BFF is the portals' only backend; it validates Keycloak `digid`-realm JWTs on the
+self-service endpoint, leaves the openbaar lookup anonymous, and fans out to the domain and
+projection over typed HTTP clients.**
+
+- **Auth model.** `POST /self-service/registrations` requires a valid `digid`-realm bearer token;
+  the BFF reads the `bsn` claim and forwards it to the domain. Missing / invalid / expired token →
+  **401**. `GET /openbaar/register` is **anonymous** — the openbaar register is a public lookup
+  (S-09), so no token is required.
+- **Portals talk only to the BFF (§8.3).** They never call the Domain Service, ACL, projection, or
+  OpenZaak directly. The BFF orchestrates via typed `HttpClient`s whose base URLs come from config.
+  Downstream calls are unauthenticated on the internal network for the walking skeleton; a
+  service-to-service auth story (e.g. client-credentials) is a later slice, not this one.
+- **Validation is `Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer`** pointed at the Keycloak `digid`
+  realm authority. **New dependency justification:** it gives us standards-based OIDC/JWT validation
+  (signature, issuer, expiry, audience) maintained by the framework; rolling our own JWT validation
+  would be error-prone security code; the risk is a first-party ASP.NET Core package — minimal.
+- **Tests mint their own tokens.** `WebApplicationFactory` tests override the bearer options with a
+  **test signing key**, so valid / invalid / expired tokens are minted in-process without a live
+  Keycloak. Real Keycloak validation is exercised by a live-stack `verify-bff` check.
+- **OpenAPI is generated and committed** (`services/bff/openapi.json`) from .NET's built-in OpenAPI,
+  so S-08's Angular client is generated from the spec, never hand-written (§10).
+
+## Known wrinkle — container OIDC issuer mismatch
+
+Keycloak stamps tokens with an `iss` equal to its **browser-facing** URL (what the portal used to
+log in), which differs from the BFF's **in-container** authority (`http://keycloak:8080/realms/digid`).
+Strict issuer validation then rejects otherwise-valid tokens. Unit tests avoid this (test key).
+`verify-bff` handles it by aligning the configured authority/issuer with the token's `iss` (and, if
+needed, disabling metadata address rewriting). Recorded so it is not rediscovered each time.
+
+## Consequences
+
+- **Positive:** the walking skeleton gains its front door; §8.3 holds with all portal traffic going
+  through one backend; token validation is standard and testable without infra; the committed
+  OpenAPI unblocks S-08.
+- **Negative / deferred:**
+  - Downstream service-to-service auth is deferred (internal-network trust for now).
+  - The openbaar endpoint is anonymous; when public-safe field filtering tightens (S-09) it stays
+    anonymous but the projection query narrows.
+  - The issuer-mismatch handling is dev-oriented; a production reverse-proxy setup would align the
+    browser and internal issuer URLs instead.
+
+## Alternatives considered
+
+- **Token-gate the openbaar endpoint too** — rejected: the openbaar register is public by design
+  (S-09); requiring a login would contradict the slice's intent.
+- **Validate tokens by calling Keycloak's introspection endpoint per request** — rejected: adds a
+  network hop per call and a Keycloak dependency on the hot path; local JWT signature validation via
+  the realm's JWKS is the standard, faster choice.
+- **Hand-written JWT parsing** — rejected: security-sensitive code we shouldn't own when a
+  first-party validator exists.
+- **Generate the OpenAPI client by hand / keep the spec uncommitted** — rejected: §10 requires a
+  generated client from a committed spec.

mkdocs.yml

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ nav:
       - "ADR-0007: OpenZaak → NRC notification wiring": architecture/adr-0007-notification-wiring.md
       - "ADR-0008: Read projection store": architecture/adr-0008-read-projection-store.md
       - "ADR-0009: External-task job worker": architecture/adr-0009-external-task-job-worker.md
+      - "ADR-0010: BFF OIDC validation": architecture/adr-0010-bff-oidc.md
   - Working in Gitea: gitea-workflow.md
   - Demo script: demo-script.md
   - Runbooks: