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Author SHA1 Message Date
5a4331a416 Merge pull request 'feat(bff): BFF with one endpoint per portal + OIDC validation (closes #8)' (#64) from feat/8-bff into main
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Reviewed-on: #64
2026-07-01 09:32:44 +00:00
96d447832f docs(bff): demo note for the BFF front door (S-07) (refs #8)
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-01 11:15:39 +02:00
a07d8277d6 ci(bff): compose wiring, verify-bff live check, mutation baseline (refs #8)
Wire the bff service in compose (Keycloak authority + downstream domain/projection
URLs, depends_on domain/projection healthy + keycloak started). run-bff-check.sh
verifies the BFF end-to-end against the up stack: 401 without a token, 202 with a
real digid token minted via direct grant against keycloak:8080 (host-consistent
issuer, ADR-0010), and an anonymous public-safe openbaar register (never a bsn).
Wired as verify-bff (Makefile + verify chain + CI step). Stryker baseline for the
BFF's pure logic (OpenbaarProjection) at 100% (break 90); Program/HTTP adapters are
covered by the endpoint tests + verify-bff. CI uploads the bff mutation report.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-01 11:15:05 +02:00
69d6e80378 feat(bff): committed OpenAPI contract + drift guard (refs #8)
Document typed responses (202 SubmitAccepted / 400 / 401 on self-service; 200
OpenbaarEntry[] on openbaar) so the generated spec carries real schemas for S-08's
client. A document transformer clears the auto-populated servers block so the spec
is host-independent and deterministic. Commit services/bff/openapi.json and add a
test asserting it matches the served /openapi/v1.json (fails on drift).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-01 11:07:55 +02:00
5d32d4f15e test(bff): acceptance scenario for BFF access (valid/invalid tokens) (refs #8)
Use-case-level BDD (Reqnroll) driving the real BFF over HTTP with fake downstreams
and locally-minted tokens: a valid DigiD token is accepted and the bsn forwarded
to the domain; a tokenless submit is 401; the openbaar register is anonymous and
never exposes the bsn (ADR-0010). Real Keycloak validation is the verify-bff check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-01 11:03:37 +02:00
d767430ad7 feat(bff): implement self-service submit and openbaar lookup (refs #8)
POST /self-service/registrations requires a valid digid JWT, reads the bsn claim
and forwards it to the domain, returning 202. GET /openbaar/register is anonymous
and returns OpenbaarProjection.PublicView — rows filtered by q and mapped to the
public-safe id+status only (bsn/naam never exposed). JwtBearer validates
signature/issuer/expiry against the Keycloak digid authority (§8.3, ADR-0010).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-01 11:00:56 +02:00
751ca006a7 test(bff): endpoints, JWT auth and public-safe projection (refs #8)
Failing tests for the BFF walking-skeleton endpoints:
- POST /self-service/registrations rejects missing/malformed/wrong-key/expired
  tokens (401) and, with a valid digid token, forwards the bsn to the domain and
  returns 202 (WebApplicationFactory + a local test signing key, ADR-0010).
- GET /openbaar/register serves public-safe rows anonymously (never the bsn) and
  filters by q.
- OpenbaarProjection.PublicView (pure) filters by id and maps to id+status only.

Endpoints and PublicView are stubs so the tests compile and fail on their
assertions; the green commit implements them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-01 10:59:55 +02:00
fea806848b arch(bff): ADR-0010 BFF OIDC validation + downstream boundaries (refs #8, #63)
The BFF is the portals' only backend (§8.3): it validates Keycloak digid-realm
JWTs on POST /self-service/registrations (extracting bsn → domain), leaves
GET /openbaar/register anonymous (public lookup, S-09), and fans out to the
domain and projection over typed HTTP clients. Tests mint tokens with a test
signing key; real Keycloak validation is a live-stack verify-bff check. Records
the container OIDC issuer-mismatch wrinkle. OpenAPI is generated + committed for
the S-08 client.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-01 10:51:59 +02:00
24 changed files with 955 additions and 5 deletions

View File

@@ -79,6 +79,13 @@ jobs:
name: domain-mutation-report
path: services/domain/StrykerOutput/**/reports/mutation-report.html
if-no-files-found: warn
- uses: https://github.com/actions/upload-artifact@v3
if: always()
continue-on-error: true
with:
name: bff-mutation-report
path: services/bff/StrykerOutput/**/reports/mutation-report.html
if-no-files-found: warn
# One stage for every check that needs the live stack. On the single self-hosted
# runner jobs run sequentially, so booting OpenZaak once (instead of once per job)
@@ -101,6 +108,8 @@ jobs:
run: make verify-projection
- name: Domain → Flowable → ACL → OpenZaak
run: make verify-domain
- name: BFF → Keycloak + domain + projection
run: make verify-bff
# Log dump must precede teardown (which removes the containers).
- name: Dump container logs on failure
if: failure()

View File

@@ -64,14 +64,14 @@ unit:
## mutation: run the Stryker.NET ratchet on each service with branching logic (fails below baseline)
# Stryker is pinned as a local dotnet tool (.config/dotnet-tools.json); `tool restore`
# makes `make mutation` work from a fresh clone. Each service owns its config + break
# threshold (the ratchet, CLAUDE.md §5): services/acl/stryker-config.json,
# services/event-subscriber/stryker-config.json and services/domain/stryker-config.json.
# threshold (the ratchet, CLAUDE.md §5): each services/<svc>/stryker-config.json.
# Scores never regress below baseline.
mutation:
dotnet tool restore
cd services/acl && dotnet stryker
cd services/event-subscriber && dotnet stryker
cd services/domain && dotnet stryker
cd services/bff && dotnet stryker
## smoke: seed config, bring the whole stack up, wait for health-checked services, tear down
# SEED populates the external config volumes first (upstream images used verbatim;
@@ -143,6 +143,11 @@ verify-projection:
verify-domain:
bash infra/run-domain-check.sh
## verify-bff: BFF end-to-end (S-07) against the up stack — token validation on self-service
## + anonymous public-safe openbaar register (ADR-0010).
verify-bff:
bash infra/run-bff-check.sh
## verify: local mirror of the CI verify-stack job — full stack up once, all checks,
## tear down (always). For fast single-concern local iteration use `integration`
## (oz-only) or `verify-notifications` (oz+nrc) instead.
@@ -154,7 +159,8 @@ verify:
&& bash infra/run-acl-integration.sh \
&& bash infra/run-notification-check.sh \
&& bash infra/run-projection-check.sh \
&& bash infra/run-domain-check.sh || rc=$$?; \
&& bash infra/run-domain-check.sh \
&& bash infra/run-bff-check.sh || rc=$$?; \
docker compose -f $(COMPOSE) down --volumes >/dev/null 2>&1; \
docker volume rm -f $(CFG_VOLS) >/dev/null 2>&1; \
exit $$rc'

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@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
# ADR-0010: The BFF validates Keycloak tokens and is the portals' only backend
- **Status:** Accepted
- **Date:** 2026-07-01
- **Deciders:** Respellion engineering
- **Relates to:** S-07 (#8); proposal #63; builds on ADR-0001 (loose coupling, §8.3), S-02 (#3, Keycloak realms), S-05 (#6, Domain Service), S-06 (#7, read projection)
## Context
S-07 (#8) adds the **BFF (Backend-for-Frontend)** — the single backend the Angular portals talk
to (CLAUDE.md §8.3). For the walking skeleton it exposes two endpoints and fans out to services
already built:
- `POST /self-service/registrations` → Domain Service `POST /registrations` (S-05).
- `GET /openbaar/register?q=…` → projection-api `GET /register` (S-06).
It must validate tokens issued by Keycloak (S-02). This is an ADR-worthy moment (§14): a new
dependency (JWT bearer authentication) and two new service boundaries (BFF→domain, BFF→projection).
## Decision
**The BFF is the portals' only backend; it validates Keycloak `digid`-realm JWTs on the
self-service endpoint, leaves the openbaar lookup anonymous, and fans out to the domain and
projection over typed HTTP clients.**
- **Auth model.** `POST /self-service/registrations` requires a valid `digid`-realm bearer token;
the BFF reads the `bsn` claim and forwards it to the domain. Missing / invalid / expired token →
**401**. `GET /openbaar/register` is **anonymous** — the openbaar register is a public lookup
(S-09), so no token is required.
- **Portals talk only to the BFF (§8.3).** They never call the Domain Service, ACL, projection, or
OpenZaak directly. The BFF orchestrates via typed `HttpClient`s whose base URLs come from config.
Downstream calls are unauthenticated on the internal network for the walking skeleton; a
service-to-service auth story (e.g. client-credentials) is a later slice, not this one.
- **Validation is `Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer`** pointed at the Keycloak `digid`
realm authority. **New dependency justification:** it gives us standards-based OIDC/JWT validation
(signature, issuer, expiry, audience) maintained by the framework; rolling our own JWT validation
would be error-prone security code; the risk is a first-party ASP.NET Core package — minimal.
- **Tests mint their own tokens.** `WebApplicationFactory` tests override the bearer options with a
**test signing key**, so valid / invalid / expired tokens are minted in-process without a live
Keycloak. Real Keycloak validation is exercised by a live-stack `verify-bff` check.
- **OpenAPI is generated and committed** (`services/bff/openapi.json`) from .NET's built-in OpenAPI,
so S-08's Angular client is generated from the spec, never hand-written (§10).
## Known wrinkle — container OIDC issuer mismatch
Keycloak stamps tokens with an `iss` equal to its **browser-facing** URL (what the portal used to
log in), which differs from the BFF's **in-container** authority (`http://keycloak:8080/realms/digid`).
Strict issuer validation then rejects otherwise-valid tokens. Unit tests avoid this (test key).
`verify-bff` handles it by aligning the configured authority/issuer with the token's `iss` (and, if
needed, disabling metadata address rewriting). Recorded so it is not rediscovered each time.
## Consequences
- **Positive:** the walking skeleton gains its front door; §8.3 holds with all portal traffic going
through one backend; token validation is standard and testable without infra; the committed
OpenAPI unblocks S-08.
- **Negative / deferred:**
- Downstream service-to-service auth is deferred (internal-network trust for now).
- The openbaar endpoint is anonymous; when public-safe field filtering tightens (S-09) it stays
anonymous but the projection query narrows.
- The issuer-mismatch handling is dev-oriented; a production reverse-proxy setup would align the
browser and internal issuer URLs instead.
## Alternatives considered
- **Token-gate the openbaar endpoint too** — rejected: the openbaar register is public by design
(S-09); requiring a login would contradict the slice's intent.
- **Validate tokens by calling Keycloak's introspection endpoint per request** — rejected: adds a
network hop per call and a Keycloak dependency on the hot path; local JWT signature validation via
the realm's JWKS is the standard, faster choice.
- **Hand-written JWT parsing** — rejected: security-sensitive code we shouldn't own when a
first-party validator exists.
- **Generate the OpenAPI client by hand / keep the spec uncommitted** — rejected: §10 requires a
generated client from a committed spec.

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,43 @@ copy-pasteable walkthrough against a local `make up` stack.
---
## S-07 — BFF: the portals' single backend
**Outcome:** the BFF validates Keycloak `digid` tokens on the self-service submit (forwarding the
bsn to the domain) and serves the openbaar register anonymously with only public-safe fields — the
front door the portals (S-08/S-09) will talk to.
**The path:** portal → BFF `POST /self-service/registrations` (token-gated) → domain; and
BFF `GET /openbaar/register` (anonymous) → projection-api. See ADR-0010.
```bash
# 1. Bring the full stack up.
make up
# 2. Drive the BFF end-to-end (401 without a token, 202 with a real digid token, anonymous openbaar).
make verify-bff # → "OK — BFF: 401 without token, 202 with a digid token, anonymous ..."
# 3. Try it by hand (BFF on host port 8080).
# a) A digid access token for the mock user jan-burger (bsn 123456782):
tok=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8180/realms/digid/protocol/openid-connect/token \
-d grant_type=password -d client_id=big-portal -d username=jan-burger -d password=test123 \
| python3 -c "import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)['access_token'])")
# b) Submit — without the token it is 401; with it, 202:
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "no token -> %{http_code}\n" -X POST http://localhost:8080/self-service/registrations
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "with token-> %{http_code}\n" -X POST http://localhost:8080/self-service/registrations \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $tok"
# c) The openbaar register is anonymous and exposes only id + status (never the bsn):
curl -fsS http://localhost:8080/openbaar/register | jq
```
> The self-service token is validated against Keycloak's `digid` realm; the openbaar lookup needs no
> token (S-09). The generated contract lives at `services/bff/openapi.json` — S-08's client is built
> from it.
---
## S-05 — BIG Domain Service: submit a registration
**Outcome:** submitting a registration starts a Flowable process; the external-task worker

View File

@@ -344,6 +344,13 @@ services:
context: ../services/bff
dockerfile: Dockerfile
image: register-referentie/bff:dev
environment:
# The BFF is the portals' only backend; it validates digid tokens and fans out (ADR-0010).
# Keycloak (start-dev) derives the issuer from the request host, so the BFF authority and the
# verify token request both use keycloak:8080 to keep the issuer consistent.
Keycloak__Authority: http://keycloak:8080/realms/digid
Downstream__Domain__BaseUrl: http://domain:8080/
Downstream__Projection__BaseUrl: http://projection-api:8080/
ports:
- "8080:8080"
healthcheck:
@@ -352,6 +359,13 @@ services:
timeout: 3s
retries: 5
start_period: 10s
depends_on:
domain:
condition: service_healthy
projection-api:
condition: service_healthy
keycloak:
condition: service_started
networks: [cg]
# ── Read projection (S-06) ────────────────────────────────────────────────

58
infra/run-bff-check.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
#
# Verify the BFF end-to-end (S-07) against an ALREADY-RUNNING full stack. The BFF is the portals'
# only backend (§8.3): it validates Keycloak digid tokens on the self-service submit and serves the
# openbaar register anonymously with only public-safe fields (ADR-0010).
#
# Checks, in-network (services reached by container IP; Keycloak by its service name so the token's
# host-derived issuer matches the BFF's authority — see the compose bff env and ADR-0010):
# 1. POST /self-service/registrations without a token -> 401
# 2. mint a real digid access token (direct grant) and POST it -> 202 (forwarded to the domain)
# 3. GET /openbaar/register (anonymous) -> 200 JSON array, never a bsn
#
# Does NOT manage the stack lifecycle (the caller owns bring-up + teardown). Plain docker primitives.
set -euo pipefail
ip() { docker inspect -f '{{range .NetworkSettings.Networks}}{{.IPAddress}}{{end}}' "$1"; }
bff="$(docker ps -q --filter 'name=[-_]bff[-_]' | head -1)"
kc="$(docker ps -q --filter 'name=keycloak' | head -1)"
[ -n "$bff" ] || { echo "ERROR: no running bff container — bring the stack up first" >&2; exit 1; }
[ -n "$kc" ] || { echo "ERROR: no running keycloak container — bring the stack up first" >&2; exit 1; }
net="$(docker inspect -f '{{range $k,$_ := .NetworkSettings.Networks}}{{$k}}{{"\n"}}{{end}}' "$bff" | head -1)"
bff_ip="$(ip "$bff")"
echo ">> bff=$bff_ip network=$net"
# Helper: run curl inside a throwaway container on the stack network (reaches services by name/IP).
net_curl() { docker run --rm --network "$net" curlimages/curl:latest "$@"; }
echo ">> 1. self-service submit without a token must be 401"
code="$(net_curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -X POST "http://$bff_ip:8080/self-service/registrations" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{}')"
echo " -> $code"; [ "$code" = "401" ] || { echo "FAIL: expected 401, got $code" >&2; exit 1; }
echo ">> 2. minting a digid token (direct grant) via keycloak:8080 (host-consistent issuer)"
token=""
for _ in $(seq 1 20); do
token="$(net_curl -s -X POST "http://keycloak:8080/realms/digid/protocol/openid-connect/token" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' \
--data-urlencode 'grant_type=password' --data-urlencode 'client_id=big-portal' \
--data-urlencode 'username=jan-burger' --data-urlencode 'password=test123' \
| sed -n 's/.*"access_token":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p')"
[ -n "$token" ] && break
sleep 3
done
[ -n "$token" ] || { echo "FAIL: could not obtain a digid access token" >&2; exit 1; }
echo " -> got a token"
echo ">> 2b. self-service submit with the token must be 202"
code="$(net_curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -X POST "http://$bff_ip:8080/self-service/registrations" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $token" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{}')"
echo " -> $code"; [ "$code" = "202" ] || { echo "FAIL: expected 202, got $code" >&2; docker logs "$bff" 2>&1 | tail -15 >&2; exit 1; }
echo ">> 3. openbaar register (anonymous) must be 200 JSON, never a bsn"
body="$(net_curl -s "http://$bff_ip:8080/openbaar/register")"
echo "$body" | grep -q '^\[' || { echo "FAIL: openbaar did not return a JSON array: $body" >&2; exit 1; }
if echo "$body" | grep -q '"bsn"'; then echo "FAIL: openbaar leaked a bsn field" >&2; exit 1; fi
echo "OK — BFF: 401 without token, 202 with a digid token, anonymous public-safe openbaar register"

View File

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ nav:
- "ADR-0007: OpenZaak → NRC notification wiring": architecture/adr-0007-notification-wiring.md
- "ADR-0008: Read projection store": architecture/adr-0008-read-projection-store.md
- "ADR-0009: External-task job worker": architecture/adr-0009-external-task-job-worker.md
- "ADR-0010: BFF OIDC validation": architecture/adr-0010-bff-oidc.md
- Working in Gitea: gitea-workflow.md
- Demo script: demo-script.md
- Runbooks:

View File

@@ -6,4 +6,10 @@
<ImplicitUsings>enable</ImplicitUsings>
</PropertyGroup>
<ItemGroup>
<!-- OIDC/JWT validation of Keycloak-issued tokens (ADR-0010) and OpenAPI generation. -->
<PackageReference Include="Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer" Version="10.0.8" />
<PackageReference Include="Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi" Version="10.0.8" />
</ItemGroup>
</Project>

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
using System.Net.Http.Json;
namespace Bff.Api;
/// <summary>What the self-service submit returns to the portal (the domain's registration id + status).</summary>
public sealed record SubmitAccepted(string RegistrationId, string Status);
/// <summary>A projection row as the projection-api serves it. <c>Bsn</c>/<c>NaamPlaceholder</c> are
/// read but never surfaced by the openbaar endpoint (public-safe filtering, ADR-0010/S-09).</summary>
public sealed record ProjectionEntry(string Id, string Status, string? Bsn, string? NaamPlaceholder);
/// <summary>A public-safe openbaar register row — only non-sensitive fields leave the BFF.</summary>
public sealed record OpenbaarEntry(string Id, string Status);
/// <summary>Port to the Domain Service (§8.3: the BFF is the portals' only backend; it fans out).</summary>
public interface IDomainClient
{
Task<SubmitAccepted> SubmitRegistrationAsync(string bsn, CancellationToken ct = default);
}
/// <summary>Port to the read projection.</summary>
public interface IProjectionClient
{
Task<IReadOnlyList<ProjectionEntry>> GetRegisterAsync(CancellationToken ct = default);
}
/// <summary>Calls the Domain Service's <c>POST /registrations</c>.</summary>
public sealed class DomainClient(HttpClient http) : IDomainClient
{
public async Task<SubmitAccepted> SubmitRegistrationAsync(string bsn, CancellationToken ct = default)
{
using var response = await http.PostAsJsonAsync("registrations", new { bsn }, ct);
response.EnsureSuccessStatusCode();
var dto = await response.Content.ReadFromJsonAsync<DomainResponse>(ct)
?? throw new InvalidOperationException("The Domain Service returned an empty registration response.");
return new SubmitAccepted(dto.RegistrationId, dto.Status);
}
private sealed record DomainResponse(string RegistrationId, string Status, string? ZaakUrl);
}
/// <summary>Calls the projection-api's <c>GET /register</c>.</summary>
public sealed class ProjectionClient(HttpClient http) : IProjectionClient
{
public async Task<IReadOnlyList<ProjectionEntry>> GetRegisterAsync(CancellationToken ct = default)
=> await http.GetFromJsonAsync<List<ProjectionEntry>>("register", ct) ?? [];
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
namespace Bff.Api;
/// <summary>
/// The public view of the read projection: filters rows by the openbaar search term and maps each to
/// a public-safe <see cref="OpenbaarEntry"/> (only <c>id</c> + <c>status</c> — bsn/naam never leave the
/// BFF). Pure so it is unit- and mutation-tested directly (ADR-0010).
/// </summary>
public static class OpenbaarProjection
{
public static IReadOnlyList<OpenbaarEntry> PublicView(IReadOnlyList<ProjectionEntry> entries, string? q)
{
var filtered = string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(q)
? entries
: entries.Where(e => e.Id.Contains(q, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase));
return [.. filtered.Select(e => new OpenbaarEntry(e.Id, e.Status))];
}
}

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,72 @@
using System.Security.Claims;
using Bff.Api;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer;
var builder = WebApplication.CreateBuilder(args);
var keycloakAuthority = builder.Configuration["Keycloak:Authority"]
?? throw new InvalidOperationException("Missing configuration 'Keycloak:Authority'");
var domainBaseUrl = builder.Configuration["Downstream:Domain:BaseUrl"]
?? throw new InvalidOperationException("Missing configuration 'Downstream:Domain:BaseUrl'");
var projectionBaseUrl = builder.Configuration["Downstream:Projection:BaseUrl"]
?? throw new InvalidOperationException("Missing configuration 'Downstream:Projection:BaseUrl'");
// Validate Keycloak-issued tokens (ADR-0010). Audience validation is off for the walking skeleton —
// Keycloak's audience mapping is a later hardening; signature/issuer/expiry are validated.
builder.Services.AddAuthentication(JwtBearerDefaults.AuthenticationScheme)
.AddJwtBearer(options =>
{
options.Authority = keycloakAuthority;
options.RequireHttpsMetadata = false;
options.TokenValidationParameters.ValidateAudience = false;
});
builder.Services.AddAuthorization();
// The BFF is the portals' only backend; it fans out to the domain and projection (§8.3).
builder.Services.AddHttpClient<IDomainClient, DomainClient>(c => c.BaseAddress = new Uri(domainBaseUrl));
builder.Services.AddHttpClient<IProjectionClient, ProjectionClient>(c => c.BaseAddress = new Uri(projectionBaseUrl));
builder.Services.AddHealthChecks();
// Clear the auto-populated `servers` block so the committed spec is stable regardless of the host
// the doc was generated from (the client sets its own base URL). Keeps the drift guard deterministic.
builder.Services.AddOpenApi(options =>
options.AddDocumentTransformer((document, _, _) =>
{
document.Servers?.Clear();
return Task.CompletedTask;
}));
var app = builder.Build();
app.MapGet("/", () => "BFF placeholder");
app.UseAuthentication();
app.UseAuthorization();
app.MapHealthChecks("/health");
app.MapOpenApi();
// Self-service submit: requires a valid digid token; the bsn comes from the token, not the body,
// and is forwarded to the domain (ADR-0010). Returns 202 — the zaak is opened asynchronously (S-05).
app.MapPost("/self-service/registrations", async (ClaimsPrincipal user, IDomainClient domain, CancellationToken ct) =>
{
var bsn = user.FindFirstValue("bsn");
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(bsn))
return Results.BadRequest("The token carries no bsn claim.");
var accepted = await domain.SubmitRegistrationAsync(bsn, ct);
return Results.Accepted($"/self-service/registrations/{accepted.RegistrationId}", accepted);
})
.RequireAuthorization()
.Produces<SubmitAccepted>(StatusCodes.Status202Accepted)
.Produces(StatusCodes.Status400BadRequest)
.Produces(StatusCodes.Status401Unauthorized);
// Openbaar register: an anonymous public lookup that exposes only public-safe fields (S-09).
app.MapGet("/openbaar/register", async (string? q, IProjectionClient projection, CancellationToken ct) =>
{
var entries = await projection.GetRegisterAsync(ct);
return Results.Ok(OpenbaarProjection.PublicView(entries, q));
})
.Produces<IReadOnlyList<OpenbaarEntry>>(StatusCodes.Status200OK);
app.Run();

View File

@@ -5,5 +5,12 @@
"Microsoft.AspNetCore": "Warning"
}
},
"AllowedHosts": "*"
"AllowedHosts": "*",
"Keycloak": {
"Authority": "http://localhost:8180/realms/digid"
},
"Downstream": {
"Domain": { "BaseUrl": "http://localhost:8130/" },
"Projection": { "BaseUrl": "http://localhost:8120/" }
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
using System.Text;
using Bff.Api;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Hosting;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Testing;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.TestHost;
using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;
using Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols.OpenIdConnect;
using Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens;
namespace Bff.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Test host for the BFF. It swaps the downstream clients for in-memory fakes and reconfigures the
/// JWT bearer to validate against a local test key (no live Keycloak) — so token validation is
/// exercised in-process with tokens the tests mint (ADR-0010).
/// </summary>
internal sealed class BffFactory : WebApplicationFactory<Program>
{
public static readonly SymmetricSecurityKey TestSigningKey =
new(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes("bff-test-signing-key-that-is-at-least-256-bits-long!"));
public FakeDomainClient Domain { get; } = new();
public FakeProjectionClient Projection { get; } = new();
protected override void ConfigureWebHost(IWebHostBuilder builder)
{
builder.UseSetting("Keycloak:Authority", "https://keycloak.invalid/realms/digid");
builder.UseSetting("Downstream:Domain:BaseUrl", "http://domain.invalid/");
builder.UseSetting("Downstream:Projection:BaseUrl", "http://projection.invalid/");
builder.ConfigureTestServices(services =>
{
services.AddSingleton<IDomainClient>(Domain);
services.AddSingleton<IProjectionClient>(Projection);
services.Configure<JwtBearerOptions>(JwtBearerDefaults.AuthenticationScheme, options =>
{
// Validate locally against the test key; never reach out for OIDC metadata.
options.Authority = null;
options.MetadataAddress = null!;
options.RequireHttpsMetadata = false;
options.Configuration = new OpenIdConnectConfiguration();
options.TokenValidationParameters = new TokenValidationParameters
{
ValidateIssuer = false,
ValidateAudience = false,
ValidateLifetime = true,
ValidateIssuerSigningKey = true,
IssuerSigningKey = TestSigningKey,
ClockSkew = TimeSpan.Zero,
};
});
});
}
}
/// <summary>Captures the bsn the BFF forwarded and returns a canned acceptance.</summary>
internal sealed class FakeDomainClient : IDomainClient
{
public string? SubmittedBsn { get; private set; }
public SubmitAccepted Result { get; set; } = new("reg-123", "Ingediend");
public Task<SubmitAccepted> SubmitRegistrationAsync(string bsn, CancellationToken ct = default)
{
SubmittedBsn = bsn;
return Task.FromResult(Result);
}
}
/// <summary>Serves a configurable set of projection rows.</summary>
internal sealed class FakeProjectionClient : IProjectionClient
{
public List<ProjectionEntry> Entries { get; } = [];
public Task<IReadOnlyList<ProjectionEntry>> GetRegisterAsync(CancellationToken ct = default)
=> Task.FromResult<IReadOnlyList<ProjectionEntry>>(Entries);
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
using System.Runtime.CompilerServices;
using System.Text.Json;
namespace Bff.Tests;
/// <summary>
/// Guards the committed OpenAPI contract (<c>services/bff/openapi.json</c>) against drift: it must
/// equal the document the running BFF serves. S-08's Angular client is generated from this file, so a
/// stale spec is a bug. To regenerate: run the BFF and save <c>/openapi/v1.json</c> over the file.
/// </summary>
public class OpenApiSpecTests
{
[Fact]
public async Task Committed_openapi_spec_matches_the_served_document()
{
using var factory = new BffFactory();
var served = await factory.CreateClient().GetStringAsync("/openapi/v1.json");
var committed = await File.ReadAllTextAsync(SpecPath());
Assert.Equal(Canonical(committed), Canonical(served));
}
// Reformat both sides identically so the comparison is about content, not whitespace.
private static string Canonical(string json)
{
using var doc = JsonDocument.Parse(json);
return JsonSerializer.Serialize(doc.RootElement, new JsonSerializerOptions { WriteIndented = true });
}
// The committed spec sits at services/bff/openapi.json — one level up from this test file.
private static string SpecPath([CallerFilePath] string thisFile = "")
=> Path.Combine(Path.GetDirectoryName(thisFile)!, "..", "openapi.json");
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
using System.Net;
using System.Net.Http.Json;
using Bff.Api;
namespace Bff.Tests;
public class OpenbaarEndpointTests
{
[Fact]
public async Task Serves_public_safe_rows_anonymously()
{
using var factory = new BffFactory();
factory.Projection.Entries.Add(new ProjectionEntry("abc-111", "INGEDIEND", "123456782", "Jan"));
// No Authorization header — the openbaar register is a public lookup (ADR-0010/S-09).
var response = await factory.CreateClient().GetAsync("/openbaar/register");
Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.OK, response.StatusCode);
var body = await response.Content.ReadAsStringAsync();
Assert.Contains("abc-111", body);
Assert.Contains("INGEDIEND", body);
// The bsn must never appear in a public response.
Assert.DoesNotContain("123456782", body);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Filters_by_the_query_parameter()
{
using var factory = new BffFactory();
factory.Projection.Entries.Add(new ProjectionEntry("abc-111", "INGEDIEND", null, null));
factory.Projection.Entries.Add(new ProjectionEntry("def-222", "INGEDIEND", null, null));
var rows = await factory.CreateClient()
.GetFromJsonAsync<List<OpenbaarEntry>>("/openbaar/register?q=abc");
Assert.Equal("abc-111", Assert.Single(rows!).Id);
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
using Bff.Api;
namespace Bff.Tests;
public class OpenbaarProjectionTests
{
private static readonly ProjectionEntry[] Sample =
[
new("abc-111", "INGEDIEND", "123456782", "Jan"),
new("def-222", "INGEDIEND", "987654321", "Piet"),
];
[Fact]
public void Maps_every_row_to_public_safe_fields_when_no_query()
{
var view = OpenbaarProjection.PublicView(Sample, null);
Assert.Equal(2, view.Count);
Assert.Equal("abc-111", view[0].Id);
Assert.Equal("INGEDIEND", view[0].Status);
}
[Fact]
public void Public_view_exposes_only_id_and_status()
{
// OpenbaarEntry structurally carries only Id + Status — bsn/naam can never leak.
var props = typeof(OpenbaarEntry).GetProperties().Select(p => p.Name).ToArray();
Assert.Equal(["Id", "Status"], props);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("abc", 1)]
[InlineData("ABC", 1)]
[InlineData("2", 1)]
[InlineData("zzz", 0)]
public void Filters_by_id_containing_the_query_case_insensitively(string q, int expected)
{
var view = OpenbaarProjection.PublicView(Sample, q);
Assert.Equal(expected, view.Count);
}
[Fact]
public void Blank_query_is_treated_as_no_filter()
{
Assert.Equal(2, OpenbaarProjection.PublicView(Sample, " ").Count);
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
using System.Net;
using System.Net.Http.Headers;
using System.Net.Http.Json;
namespace Bff.Tests;
public class SelfServiceEndpointTests
{
private static HttpRequestMessage Submit(string? bearer)
{
var request = new HttpRequestMessage(HttpMethod.Post, "/self-service/registrations")
{
Content = JsonContent.Create(new { }),
};
if (bearer is not null)
request.Headers.Authorization = new AuthenticationHeaderValue("Bearer", bearer);
return request;
}
[Fact]
public async Task Rejects_a_request_without_a_token()
{
using var factory = new BffFactory();
var client = factory.CreateClient();
var response = await client.SendAsync(Submit(bearer: null));
Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.Unauthorized, response.StatusCode);
Assert.Null(factory.Domain.SubmittedBsn);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("not-a-jwt")]
public async Task Rejects_a_malformed_token(string bearer)
{
using var factory = new BffFactory();
var response = await factory.CreateClient().SendAsync(Submit(bearer));
Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.Unauthorized, response.StatusCode);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Rejects_a_token_signed_with_the_wrong_key()
{
using var factory = new BffFactory();
var response = await factory.CreateClient().SendAsync(Submit(TestTokens.WrongKey("123456782")));
Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.Unauthorized, response.StatusCode);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Rejects_an_expired_token()
{
using var factory = new BffFactory();
var response = await factory.CreateClient().SendAsync(Submit(TestTokens.Expired("123456782")));
Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.Unauthorized, response.StatusCode);
}
[Fact]
public async Task Accepts_a_valid_token_and_forwards_the_bsn_to_the_domain()
{
using var factory = new BffFactory();
var client = factory.CreateClient();
var response = await client.SendAsync(Submit(TestTokens.Valid("123456782")));
Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.Accepted, response.StatusCode);
Assert.Equal("123456782", factory.Domain.SubmittedBsn);
var body = await response.Content.ReadFromJsonAsync<SubmitAcceptedDto>();
Assert.Equal("reg-123", body!.RegistrationId);
}
private sealed record SubmitAcceptedDto(string RegistrationId, string Status);
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
using System.Text;
using Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens;
using Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens;
namespace Bff.Tests;
/// <summary>Mints JWTs for the BFF tests — signed with the factory's test key (valid) or otherwise
/// (a wrong key / expired) to exercise the bearer validation the BFF configures.</summary>
internal static class TestTokens
{
public static string Valid(string bsn) => Create(bsn, BffFactory.TestSigningKey, expired: false);
public static string Expired(string bsn) => Create(bsn, BffFactory.TestSigningKey, expired: true);
public static string WrongKey(string bsn) => Create(
bsn,
new SymmetricSecurityKey(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes("a-different-signing-key-256-bits-long-indeed-yes!")),
expired: false);
private static string Create(string bsn, SymmetricSecurityKey key, bool expired)
{
var handler = new JsonWebTokenHandler();
return handler.CreateToken(new SecurityTokenDescriptor
{
Claims = new Dictionary<string, object> { ["bsn"] = bsn },
Expires = DateTime.UtcNow.AddMinutes(expired ? -5 : 30),
SigningCredentials = new SigningCredentials(key, SecurityAlgorithms.HmacSha256),
});
}
}

104
services/bff/openapi.json Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
{
"openapi": "3.1.1",
"info": {
"title": "Bff.Api | v1",
"version": "1.0.0"
},
"paths": {
"/self-service/registrations": {
"post": {
"tags": [
"Bff.Api"
],
"responses": {
"202": {
"description": "Accepted",
"content": {
"application/json": {
"schema": {
"$ref": "#/components/schemas/SubmitAccepted"
}
}
}
},
"400": {
"description": "Bad Request"
},
"401": {
"description": "Unauthorized"
}
}
}
},
"/openbaar/register": {
"get": {
"tags": [
"Bff.Api"
],
"parameters": [
{
"name": "q",
"in": "query",
"schema": {
"type": "string"
}
}
],
"responses": {
"200": {
"description": "OK",
"content": {
"application/json": {
"schema": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/components/schemas/OpenbaarEntry"
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
},
"components": {
"schemas": {
"OpenbaarEntry": {
"required": [
"id",
"status"
],
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"id": {
"type": "string"
},
"status": {
"type": "string"
}
}
},
"SubmitAccepted": {
"required": [
"registrationId",
"status"
],
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"registrationId": {
"type": "string"
},
"status": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
}
},
"tags": [
{
"name": "Bff.Api"
}
]
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{
"stryker-config": {
"solution": "Bff.slnx",
"test-projects": ["Bff.Tests/Bff.Tests.csproj"],
"reporters": ["progress", "html"],
"mutate": [
"!**/Program.cs",
"!**/DownstreamClients.cs"
],
"thresholds": {
"high": 95,
"low": 90,
"break": 90
}
}
}

View File

@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
<ItemGroup>
<PackageReference Include="coverlet.collector" Version="6.0.4" />
<!-- The BFF acceptance scenario drives the real HTTP endpoints in-process (ADR-0010). -->
<PackageReference Include="Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Testing" Version="10.0.8" />
<PackageReference Include="Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk" Version="17.14.1" />
<PackageReference Include="Reqnroll.xUnit" Version="3.3.4" />
<PackageReference Include="xunit" Version="2.9.3" />
@@ -20,6 +22,7 @@
<ProjectReference Include="..\..\services\acl\Acl.Infrastructure\Acl.Infrastructure.csproj" />
<ProjectReference Include="..\..\services\event-subscriber\EventSubscriber.Application\EventSubscriber.Application.csproj" />
<ProjectReference Include="..\..\services\domain\Big.Application\Big.Application.csproj" />
<ProjectReference Include="..\..\services\bff\Bff.Api\Bff.Api.csproj" />
</ItemGroup>
</Project>

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@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
# language: en
# Drives S-07 (#8). The BFF is the portals' only backend (§8.3): it validates Keycloak digid tokens
# on the self-service submit and serves the openbaar register anonymously with only public-safe
# fields (ADR-0010). Tokens are minted with a local test key; real Keycloak validation is verify-bff.
Feature: Toegang via de BFF
Als portaal wil ik uitsluitend via de BFF met de backend praten
zodat tokenvalidatie en veilige velden centraal geregeld zijn.
Scenario: Indienen met een geldig token wordt doorgezet naar het domein
Given a zorgprofessional with a valid DigiD token for BSN "123456782"
When they submit a registration via the BFF
Then the BFF accepts it and forwards BSN "123456782" to the domain
Scenario: Indienen zonder token wordt geweigerd
Given a caller without a token
When they submit a registration via the BFF
Then the BFF rejects it as unauthorized
Scenario: Het openbaar register is anoniem en toont geen BSN
Given the projection contains a zaak "abc-111" for BSN "123456782"
When the openbaar register is queried anonymously
Then the response lists "abc-111" without exposing the BSN

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@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
using System.Net;
using System.Net.Http.Headers;
using System.Net.Http.Json;
using Acceptance.Support;
using Bff.Api;
using Reqnroll;
using Xunit;
namespace Acceptance.Steps;
/// <summary>Bindings for <c>BffToegang.feature</c> (S-07). Drives the real BFF over HTTP with a
/// fake domain + projection and locally-minted tokens (ADR-0010). One host per scenario.</summary>
[Binding]
public sealed class BffToegangSteps : IDisposable
{
private readonly BffAcceptanceHost _host = new();
private HttpClient _client = null!;
private string? _token;
private HttpResponseMessage? _response;
[Given("a zorgprofessional with a valid DigiD token for BSN \"(.*)\"")]
public void GivenAValidToken(string bsn)
{
_token = BffAcceptanceHost.MintToken(bsn);
_client = _host.CreateClient();
}
[Given("a caller without a token")]
public void GivenNoToken() => _client = _host.CreateClient();
[Given("the projection contains a zaak \"(.*)\" for BSN \"(.*)\"")]
public void GivenTheProjectionContains(string zaakId, string bsn)
{
_host.Projection.Entries.Add(new ProjectionEntry(zaakId, "INGEDIEND", bsn, null));
_client = _host.CreateClient();
}
[When("they submit a registration via the BFF")]
public async Task WhenTheySubmit()
{
var request = new HttpRequestMessage(HttpMethod.Post, "/self-service/registrations")
{
Content = JsonContent.Create(new { }),
};
if (_token is not null)
request.Headers.Authorization = new AuthenticationHeaderValue("Bearer", _token);
_response = await _client.SendAsync(request);
}
[When("the openbaar register is queried anonymously")]
public async Task WhenTheOpenbaarRegisterIsQueried()
=> _response = await _client.GetAsync("/openbaar/register");
[Then("the BFF accepts it and forwards BSN \"(.*)\" to the domain")]
public void ThenAcceptedAndForwarded(string bsn)
{
Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.Accepted, _response!.StatusCode);
Assert.Equal(bsn, _host.Domain.SubmittedBsn);
}
[Then("the BFF rejects it as unauthorized")]
public void ThenUnauthorized()
{
Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.Unauthorized, _response!.StatusCode);
Assert.Null(_host.Domain.SubmittedBsn);
}
[Then("the response lists \"(.*)\" without exposing the BSN")]
public async Task ThenListsWithoutBsn(string zaakId)
{
Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.OK, _response!.StatusCode);
var body = await _response.Content.ReadAsStringAsync();
Assert.Contains(zaakId, body);
Assert.DoesNotContain("123456782", body);
}
public void Dispose()
{
_response?.Dispose();
_client?.Dispose();
_host.Dispose();
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
using System.Text;
using Bff.Api;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Hosting;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Testing;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.TestHost;
using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;
using Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens;
using Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols.OpenIdConnect;
using Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens;
namespace Acceptance.Support;
/// <summary>Hosts the real BFF in-process for the acceptance scenario, with fake downstreams and a
/// local test signing key so tokens can be minted without a live Keycloak (ADR-0010).</summary>
public sealed class BffAcceptanceHost : WebApplicationFactory<Program>
{
private static readonly SymmetricSecurityKey TestKey =
new(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes("acceptance-bff-signing-key-at-least-256-bits-long!!"));
public CapturingDomainClient Domain { get; } = new();
public StubProjectionClient Projection { get; } = new();
public static string MintToken(string bsn) => new JsonWebTokenHandler().CreateToken(new SecurityTokenDescriptor
{
Claims = new Dictionary<string, object> { ["bsn"] = bsn },
Expires = DateTime.UtcNow.AddMinutes(30),
SigningCredentials = new SigningCredentials(TestKey, SecurityAlgorithms.HmacSha256),
});
protected override void ConfigureWebHost(IWebHostBuilder builder)
{
builder.UseSetting("Keycloak:Authority", "https://keycloak.invalid/realms/digid");
builder.UseSetting("Downstream:Domain:BaseUrl", "http://domain.invalid/");
builder.UseSetting("Downstream:Projection:BaseUrl", "http://projection.invalid/");
builder.ConfigureTestServices(services =>
{
services.AddSingleton<IDomainClient>(Domain);
services.AddSingleton<IProjectionClient>(Projection);
services.Configure<JwtBearerOptions>(JwtBearerDefaults.AuthenticationScheme, options =>
{
options.Authority = null;
options.MetadataAddress = null!;
options.RequireHttpsMetadata = false;
options.Configuration = new OpenIdConnectConfiguration();
options.TokenValidationParameters = new TokenValidationParameters
{
ValidateIssuer = false,
ValidateAudience = false,
ValidateLifetime = true,
ValidateIssuerSigningKey = true,
IssuerSigningKey = TestKey,
ClockSkew = TimeSpan.Zero,
};
});
});
}
}
/// <summary>Records the bsn the BFF forwarded.</summary>
public sealed class CapturingDomainClient : IDomainClient
{
public string? SubmittedBsn { get; private set; }
public Task<SubmitAccepted> SubmitRegistrationAsync(string bsn, CancellationToken ct = default)
{
SubmittedBsn = bsn;
return Task.FromResult(new SubmitAccepted("reg-acc-1", "Ingediend"));
}
}
/// <summary>Serves configurable projection rows.</summary>
public sealed class StubProjectionClient : IProjectionClient
{
public List<ProjectionEntry> Entries { get; } = [];
public Task<IReadOnlyList<ProjectionEntry>> GetRegisterAsync(CancellationToken ct = default)
=> Task.FromResult<IReadOnlyList<ProjectionEntry>>(Entries);
}