verify-tracing flaked on verify-stack run 722 — FAIL — no single trace spanned ['bff', 'projection-api'] — and went green on a plain re-run of the same commit. The trace chain was not broken; Tempo could not ingest:
removing distributor_pool failing healthcheck addr=127.0.0.1:9095
reason="rpc error: code = DeadlineExceeded"
pusher failed to consume trace data err="context canceled" (x18)
The root cause is the mechanism of the data loss, not whatever caused the stall. Tempo runs single-binary, so the distributor and the ingester are the same process and the distributor's ingester pool holds exactly one, in-process, member. dskit nevertheless health-checks that member over loopback gRPC with a 1 s deadline (checkinterval: 15s, confirmed from the running image's /status/config). On the shared runner a transient stall blows the deadline, the only ingester is evicted from the pool, and every subsequent push fails until the next check interval — spans silently dropped.
With one in-process ingester the health check can never route around a failure. Its only possible effect is to discard data. So it is off:
This lands at the point where both candidate triggers named in #156 (GC pressure near mem_limit, CPU contention from the grown stack) turn into lost spans, so mem_limit: 400m is untouched — raising it on a memory-tight runner risks reintroducing the verify-e2e OOM of #144. It also does not paper over anything the way a longer TRACING_TIMEOUT would (#156's own note).
Second change: infra/tracing-check.py prints tempo_distributor_ingester_clients on its failure path. From the check's side, Tempo-dropped-spans and missing instrumentation look identical — that ambiguity is what cost a container-log dive on run 722. A recurrence now names itself.
Failing test committed before the implementation — N/A, and deliberately so. The trigger is runner load, so no deterministic red exists; the "red" is run 722's observed verify-tracing failure plus its Tempo logs. Same precedent as d5e5fa2 (#115, Playwright OOM) and 4aafd32 (#147, uWSGI caps). A test asserting the config says what the config says would add no gate: Tempo hard-fails on an unknown key (verified — field health_check_enabled not found in type client.PoolConfig), so a typo or a config rename on a Tempo bump already turns verify-up red.
Conventional Commits referencing the issue (refs #156).
CI green — the point of the change.
docker compose up health unaffected (Tempo is not in WAIT_SVCS; config-only change, same image).
Docs updated — ADR-0023 Consequences.
ADR — amended ADR-0023 rather than adding a new one: this is a consequence of that ADR's single-binary Tempo choice, not a new decision (one decision per ADR, §12).
Demo note — N/A, not user-visible.
Notes for reviewers
Verified locally against the built image (the flake itself is not locally reproducible — see the runner-load point above):
docker run --rm register-referentie/tempo:dev -config.file=/etc/tempo.yaml -config.verify=true → parses.
GET /status/config on the running container → healthcheckenabled: false (was true).
The new diagnostic reads tempo_distributor_ingester_clients off a live Tempo.
Worth knowing: that metric is legitimately 0 on an idle Tempo — the pool is populated lazily on first push. It only prints on the failure path of a check that has already generated traffic, so the reading is meaningful there, but don't read a bare 0 on a quiet stack as an eviction.
Follow-up left undone: if verify-tracing still flakes after this, the next suspect is the .NET OTLP exporter timeout (#156's last note), not Tempo's memory cap.
## What & why
`verify-tracing` flaked on `verify-stack` run 722 — `FAIL — no single trace spanned ['bff', 'projection-api']` — and went green on a plain re-run of the same commit. **The trace chain was not broken; Tempo could not ingest:**
```
removing distributor_pool failing healthcheck addr=127.0.0.1:9095
reason="rpc error: code = DeadlineExceeded"
pusher failed to consume trace data err="context canceled" (x18)
```
The root cause is the *mechanism* of the data loss, not whatever caused the stall. Tempo runs **single-binary**, so the distributor and the ingester are the same process and the distributor's ingester pool holds exactly one, in-process, member. dskit nevertheless health-checks that member over loopback gRPC with a **1 s** deadline (`checkinterval: 15s`, confirmed from the running image's `/status/config`). On the shared runner a transient stall blows the deadline, the only ingester is evicted from the pool, and every subsequent push fails until the next check interval — spans silently dropped.
With one in-process ingester the health check can **never** route around a failure. Its only possible effect is to discard data. So it is off:
```yaml
ingester_client:
pool_config:
healthcheckenabled: false
```
This lands at the point where *both* candidate triggers named in #156 (GC pressure near `mem_limit`, CPU contention from the grown stack) turn into lost spans, so **`mem_limit: 400m` is untouched** — raising it on a memory-tight runner risks reintroducing the `verify-e2e` OOM of #144. It also does not paper over anything the way a longer `TRACING_TIMEOUT` would (#156's own note).
Second change: `infra/tracing-check.py` prints `tempo_distributor_ingester_clients` on its failure path. From the check's side, Tempo-dropped-spans and missing instrumentation look identical — that ambiguity is what cost a container-log dive on run 722. A recurrence now names itself.
Closes #156
## Definition of Done
- [x] Linked Gitea issue (#156).
- [ ] **Failing test committed before the implementation — N/A, and deliberately so.** The trigger is runner load, so no deterministic red exists; the "red" is run 722's observed `verify-tracing` failure plus its Tempo logs. Same precedent as d5e5fa2 (#115, Playwright OOM) and 4aafd32 (#147, uWSGI caps). A test asserting the config says what the config says would add no gate: Tempo hard-fails on an unknown key (verified — `field health_check_enabled not found in type client.PoolConfig`), so a typo or a config rename on a Tempo bump already turns `verify-up` red.
- [x] Conventional Commits referencing the issue (`refs #156`).
- [ ] CI green — the point of the change.
- [x] `docker compose up` health unaffected (Tempo is not in `WAIT_SVCS`; config-only change, same image).
- [x] Docs updated — ADR-0023 Consequences.
- [x] ADR — amended **ADR-0023** rather than adding a new one: this is a consequence of that ADR's single-binary Tempo choice, not a new decision (one decision per ADR, §12).
- [x] Demo note — N/A, not user-visible.
## Notes for reviewers
Verified locally against the built image (the flake itself is not locally reproducible — see the runner-load point above):
1. `docker run --rm register-referentie/tempo:dev -config.file=/etc/tempo.yaml -config.verify=true` → parses.
2. `GET /status/config` on the running container → `healthcheckenabled: false` (was `true`).
3. The new diagnostic reads `tempo_distributor_ingester_clients` off a live Tempo.
Worth knowing: that metric is legitimately `0` on an idle Tempo — the pool is populated lazily on first push. It only prints on the failure path of a check that has already generated traffic, so the reading is meaningful there, but don't read a bare `0` on a quiet stack as an eviction.
Follow-up left undone: if `verify-tracing` still flakes after this, the next suspect is the .NET OTLP exporter timeout (#156's last note), not Tempo's memory cap.
`verify-tracing` flaked on run 722: `FAIL — no single trace spanned ['bff',
'projection-api']`, green on a plain re-run of the same commit. Not a broken trace
chain — Tempo could not ingest:
removing distributor_pool failing healthcheck addr=127.0.0.1:9095
reason="rpc error: code = DeadlineExceeded"
pusher failed to consume trace data err="context canceled" (x18)
Root cause is the mechanism of the data loss, not whatever caused the stall. Tempo
runs single-binary, so distributor and ingester are the *same process* and the
distributor's ingester pool holds exactly one, in-process, member. dskit still
health-checks it over loopback gRPC with a 1s deadline; on the shared runner a
transient stall blows that, the only ingester is dropped from the pool, and every
push fails until the next 15s check interval — spans silently lost. With one
in-process ingester the check can never route around a failure, so it can only ever
discard data.
Fix: `ingester_client.pool_config.healthcheckenabled: false`. This addresses both
candidate triggers (GC pressure near `mem_limit`, CPU contention) at the point where
they turn into lost data, so `mem_limit: 400m` stays untouched — raising it would
risk reintroducing the verify-e2e OOM of #144 on a memory-tight runner.
Also print `tempo_distributor_ingester_clients` on the check's failure path: a
recurrence then names Tempo-dropped-spans instead of costing another container-log
dive, since from the check's side that is indistinguishable from missing
instrumentation.
Verified against the built image: config parses (`-config.verify`), the effective
`/status/config` reports `healthcheckenabled: false`, and the diagnostic reads the
metric off a live Tempo.
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What & why
verify-tracingflaked onverify-stackrun 722 —FAIL — no single trace spanned ['bff', 'projection-api']— and went green on a plain re-run of the same commit. The trace chain was not broken; Tempo could not ingest:The root cause is the mechanism of the data loss, not whatever caused the stall. Tempo runs single-binary, so the distributor and the ingester are the same process and the distributor's ingester pool holds exactly one, in-process, member. dskit nevertheless health-checks that member over loopback gRPC with a 1 s deadline (
checkinterval: 15s, confirmed from the running image's/status/config). On the shared runner a transient stall blows the deadline, the only ingester is evicted from the pool, and every subsequent push fails until the next check interval — spans silently dropped.With one in-process ingester the health check can never route around a failure. Its only possible effect is to discard data. So it is off:
This lands at the point where both candidate triggers named in #156 (GC pressure near
mem_limit, CPU contention from the grown stack) turn into lost spans, somem_limit: 400mis untouched — raising it on a memory-tight runner risks reintroducing theverify-e2eOOM of #144. It also does not paper over anything the way a longerTRACING_TIMEOUTwould (#156's own note).Second change:
infra/tracing-check.pyprintstempo_distributor_ingester_clientson its failure path. From the check's side, Tempo-dropped-spans and missing instrumentation look identical — that ambiguity is what cost a container-log dive on run 722. A recurrence now names itself.Closes #156
Definition of Done
verify-tracingfailure plus its Tempo logs. Same precedent asd5e5fa2(#115, Playwright OOM) and4aafd32(#147, uWSGI caps). A test asserting the config says what the config says would add no gate: Tempo hard-fails on an unknown key (verified —field health_check_enabled not found in type client.PoolConfig), so a typo or a config rename on a Tempo bump already turnsverify-upred.refs #156).docker compose uphealth unaffected (Tempo is not inWAIT_SVCS; config-only change, same image).Notes for reviewers
Verified locally against the built image (the flake itself is not locally reproducible — see the runner-load point above):
docker run --rm register-referentie/tempo:dev -config.file=/etc/tempo.yaml -config.verify=true→ parses.GET /status/configon the running container →healthcheckenabled: false(wastrue).tempo_distributor_ingester_clientsoff a live Tempo.Worth knowing: that metric is legitimately
0on an idle Tempo — the pool is populated lazily on first push. It only prints on the failure path of a check that has already generated traffic, so the reading is meaningful there, but don't read a bare0on a quiet stack as an eviction.Follow-up left undone: if
verify-tracingstill flakes after this, the next suspect is the .NET OTLP exporter timeout (#156's last note), not Tempo's memory cap.`verify-tracing` flaked on run 722: `FAIL — no single trace spanned ['bff', 'projection-api']`, green on a plain re-run of the same commit. Not a broken trace chain — Tempo could not ingest: removing distributor_pool failing healthcheck addr=127.0.0.1:9095 reason="rpc error: code = DeadlineExceeded" pusher failed to consume trace data err="context canceled" (x18) Root cause is the mechanism of the data loss, not whatever caused the stall. Tempo runs single-binary, so distributor and ingester are the *same process* and the distributor's ingester pool holds exactly one, in-process, member. dskit still health-checks it over loopback gRPC with a 1s deadline; on the shared runner a transient stall blows that, the only ingester is dropped from the pool, and every push fails until the next 15s check interval — spans silently lost. With one in-process ingester the check can never route around a failure, so it can only ever discard data. Fix: `ingester_client.pool_config.healthcheckenabled: false`. This addresses both candidate triggers (GC pressure near `mem_limit`, CPU contention) at the point where they turn into lost data, so `mem_limit: 400m` stays untouched — raising it would risk reintroducing the verify-e2e OOM of #144 on a memory-tight runner. Also print `tempo_distributor_ingester_clients` on the check's failure path: a recurrence then names Tempo-dropped-spans instead of costing another container-log dive, since from the check's side that is indistinguishable from missing instrumentation. Verified against the built image: config parses (`-config.verify`), the effective `/status/config` reports `healthcheckenabled: false`, and the diagnostic reads the metric off a live Tempo.