POST /beoordeling/{id}/besluit always 404'd against a real OpenZaak: {id} is the
FE-facing case id from IZaakSource.ListCases, which under OpenZaakZaakSource is the
ZGW zaak's own uuid, not ApplicationStore's primary key. Resolve the case through
ListCases first (same seam the GET sibling already uses), then to the local Aanvraag
via its Referentie — the one identifier stable across both sources.
Adds ApplicationStore.GetByReferentie and a regression test that reproduces the
divergence with a decorating IZaakSource test double instead of a live OpenZaak.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
450 lines
30 KiB
Markdown
450 lines
30 KiB
Markdown
# OpenZaak / ZGW integration — how the BFF connects (& how to extend)
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How the BFF sources (and now creates) cases, and uploads/links documents, against a real
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**OpenZaak** (ZGW APIs) while the frontend stays unchanged. For the _why_, see
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[ADR-0005](architecture/0005-openzaak-behind-bff.md); this page is _how the seam is built and
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how to add the next slice_. Built in
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[WP-49](../project/backlog/WP-49-openzaak-zaken-read-seam.md) (read-only zaken),
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[WP-50](../project/backlog/WP-50-openzaak-create-zaak.md) (create-zaak), and
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[WP-51](../project/backlog/WP-51-openzaak-documenten.md) (Documenten/DRC upload + zaak link).
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## The one rule: OpenZaak sits behind the BFF, never in the browser
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The Angular app only ever sees the BFF's decision DTOs (BFF-lite, ADR-0001). All ZGW
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awkwardness — URL-as-identity, cross-service joins, JWT auth, pagination — is absorbed by the
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.NET BFF. Flipping the data source from local SQLite to OpenZaak is a **backend config change**
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with **zero frontend change and no api-client drift**.
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## The seam (data source by config)
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- `Data/IZaakSource.cs` — the cases READ + (WP-50) WRITE interface: `ListCases` and
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`CreateZaak`. Both return the existing DTOs, so each implementation owns its own mapping.
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`CreateZaak` also returns the zaak's URL (`ZaakUrl`, null under the local source) so WP-51
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can later link documents to it.
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- `Data/LocalZaakSource.cs` — **default**; reads the local SQLite `ApplicationStore`
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(offline, unchanged behaviour). `CreateZaak` is a pure passthrough of what the submit
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endpoint already computed locally — no external call.
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- `Zgw/OpenZaakZaakSource.cs` — the OpenZaak client; selected only when `Zgw:Enabled=true`.
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`CreateZaak` posts a Zaak, then a Status, then a Rol (see below).
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- `Data/IDocumentSource.cs` — the documents seam (WP-51), sibling of `IZaakSource`: `Upload`
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and `LinkToZaak`. `Data/LocalDocumentSource.cs` is the same `DocumentStore.Add`/`Link` calls
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the upload/submit endpoints used to make inline; `Zgw/OpenZaakDocumentSource.cs` also
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registers each upload as a DRC document and links it to a zaak once one exists.
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- Wiring (`Program.cs`): `if (Zgw:Enabled)` registers `OpenZaakZaakSource` +
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`OpenZaakDocumentSource`, else `LocalZaakSource` + `LocalDocumentSource`. The `/admin/cases`
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GET, the `/uploads` POST, and the `/applications/{id}/submit` POST all resolve their seam
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from DI — routes + DTOs untouched either way.
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## Create-zaak (WP-50) — the first write
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`POST /applications/{id}/submit` already persists the aanvraag locally (`ApplicationStore.Submit`
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— unconditionally, regardless of `Zgw:Enabled`, since draft/step/document bookkeeping stays
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local either way) and only THEN calls `zaken.CreateZaak(submitted, now)`. The submit endpoint
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never branches on `Zgw:Enabled` itself — DI already picked the implementation, so the endpoint
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just asks the seam for `(Referentie, Status, ZaakUrl)` and returns the first two, unchanged, in
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`SubmitApplicationResponse` (`ZaakUrl` is persisted via `ApplicationStore.SetZaakUrl` for
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WP-51's document link, not returned to the FE). Under the default (local) source this returns
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precisely what was just computed; under OpenZaak, three calls happen in order:
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1. **POST zaak** (`{ZrcBaseUrl}/zaken`) — `zaaktype` resolved from `Zgw:ZaaktypeUrls[aanvraag.Type]`
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(OpenZaak validates the URL by fetching it), `bronorganisatie`/`verantwoordelijkeOrganisatie`
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(RSIN) from config, `identificatie` set to the **same** reference `ApplicationStore.Submit`
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already generated — so the human-readable reference matches in both places, not two
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independently-generated ones.
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2. **POST status** (`{ZrcBaseUrl}/statussen`) — `statustype` resolved via a Catalogi GET
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(`statustypen?zaaktype=...`, lowest `volgnummer`); marks the zaak as freshly opened.
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3. **POST rol** (`{ZrcBaseUrl}/rollen`) — `roltype` resolved via a Catalogi GET
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(`roltypen?zaaktype=...&omschrijvingGeneriek=initiator`); `betrokkeneIdentificatie.inpBsn`
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set to the aanvraag's owner (BSN) — the acting citizen resolved by the identity seam (WP-53).
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The created zaak's `identificatie` becomes the returned `Referentie`; its status maps to the
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same coarse `InBehandeling` shape `ZgwZaakMapper` already uses for a freshly-opened zaak
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(`ZgwZaakMapper.ToCreatedStatusDto`).
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ponytail shortcut still standing: "first statustype/roltype Catalogi returns" rather than a
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fully-configured per-type map — fine while a zaaktype has exactly one initial status and
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initiator role. The "no compensating transaction" gap this section used to flag here is closed
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by WP-60 — see "Write resilience" below.
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## Write resilience (WP-60)
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The local write (`ApplicationStore.Submit`, `DocumentStore.Add`/`Link`) and its paired ZGW
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write aren't transactional — this section covers what happens when the ZGW half fails after the
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local half already committed, closing the one gap the sections above used to flag as needing
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"retry/reconciliation or an outbox" before this integration could be called production-ready.
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Deliberately **not** an outbox: three write paths, each triggered by exactly one interactive
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request, don't justify a persisted queue (which would also need to carry the acting citizen's
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BSN for the JWT's audit claims — PII in a new table) — see WP-60 for the full reasoning.
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- **Bounded retry, in `ZgwHttpClient`.** Every ZGW call gets up to 3 attempts (200ms, doubling)
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on transport-shaped failures — 429/502/503/504/408, connection errors, timeouts — with a
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fresh request and JWT per attempt (a sent request/content can't be resent). **500 is
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deliberately not retried**: it can follow a partial commit on the two non-idempotent POSTs
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(`/statussen`, `/rollen`), so retrying risks a duplicate write. The create-zaak/document POSTs
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are additionally safe to retry because OpenZaak enforces uniqueness on
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(`bronorganisatie`, `identificatie`) — and WP-50/51 already set `identificatie` to the
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locally-generated reference/document id, so a retry after a lost response 400s instead of
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duplicating.
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- **The local write is never rolled back.** Un-submitting a local aanvraag after a partial ZGW
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failure (e.g. the zaak POST succeeded but `/statussen` didn't) would let the citizen resubmit
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under a _new_ reference, orphaning the first zaak — worse than leaving it flagged.
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- **A caught ZGW failure is flagged, not silent.** `Program.cs`'s submit endpoint wraps
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`CreateZaak` and `LinkToZaak` in separate try/catches (separate so a create-zaak failure
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doesn't also skip the still-local document link) and, on catch, logs the error, sets
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`Aanvraag.ZgwError` (non-null = "the ZGW side of this submit didn't complete"), and records a
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`zgw:divergence` audit row (same `AuthzAuditStore` trail every other decision uses, visible at
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`/beheer/audit`) — see `RecordZgwDivergence`. The endpoint still returns 200 with the local
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reference/status: that's truthful (the reference _is_ what would become the zaak's
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`identificatie`) and never branches on `Zgw:Enabled` (an offline `LocalZaakSource` never
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throws, so the catch is dead code there). The besluit endpoint (WP-66, see below) wraps
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`IZaakSource.RecordBesluit` in the same try/catch → `RecordZgwDivergence` shape — the second
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write pair this section's "Repair" bullet used to anticipate.
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- **The document upload path flags differently.** `OpenZaakDocumentSource.Upload` catches its
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own ZGW failure (config gap or transport) and logs it, but doesn't set a separate flag column
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— `DocumentStore.Get(id).DrcUrl == null` is already the meaningful "not registered in ZGW yet"
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detector `LinkToZaak` skips on, so no second mechanism is needed for that half.
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- **Repair.** No automated reconcile job exists yet — a flagged zaak is repairable on demand
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because its (would-be) `identificatie` always equals the aanvraag's `Referentie`, so a future
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admin action can `GET /zaken?identificatie=...` and either adopt the existing zaak or retry
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`CreateZaak`/`RecordBesluit`. WP-66 landed as the second write pair without needing an outbox —
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a real deployment is still the trigger to re-ask that question, not slice count on its own.
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## Documenten / DRC upload + zaak link (WP-51)
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`POST /uploads` and `POST /applications/{id}/submit` route through `IDocumentSource` the same
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way submit routes through `IZaakSource`: the local write (`DocumentStore.Add`/`Link`) always
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happens first — it stays the record of truth for preview/download/audit regardless of
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`Zgw:Enabled` — and `OpenZaakDocumentSource` additionally does the DRC side-effect:
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1. **Upload** — POST `enkelvoudiginformatieobjecten` (`{DrcBaseUrl}`) with the file's base64
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content, `informatieobjecttype` resolved from `Zgw:InformatieobjecttypeUrls[categoryId]`
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(the document analogue of `ZaaktypeUrls`), `identificatie` set to the local document id. The
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returned DRC url is persisted (`DocumentStore.SetDrcUrl`) so the link step below doesn't
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need to re-upload.
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2. **Link to zaak** — once `IZaakSource.CreateZaak` has returned a `ZaakUrl` (persisted via
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`ApplicationStore.SetZaakUrl`), submit calls `documents.LinkToZaak(documentIds, zaakUrl)`,
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which POSTs a `zaakinformatieobjecten` (`{ZrcBaseUrl}`) per document that has a `DrcUrl`.
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Documents uploaded before a zaak existed (or under a config gap) have no `DrcUrl` yet and
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are silently skipped — same "nothing extra to link" behaviour as the local source.
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`ZgwHttpClient` (shared GET/POST-with-bearer-JWT plumbing) was factored out of
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`OpenZaakZaakSource` once `OpenZaakDocumentSource` needed the identical boilerplate.
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`vertrouwelijkheidaanduiding` is driven by a per-document-type stamdata table (WP-59,
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`Stamdata/documentconfidentialiteit.json`, ADR-0004), falling back to `"openbaar"` for any
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category absent from it. Unlike the zaak side, an upload's ZGW failure (past
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`DocumentStore.Add`) is caught and logged rather than persisted as a separate flag column —
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see "Write resilience" below for why the two write paths differ.
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## Besluit write (WP-66)
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`POST /beoordeling/{id}/besluit` (the behandelportal's decision endpoint, WP-65b) routes its
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ZGW side-effect through `IZaakSource.RecordBesluit` the same way submit routes through
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`CreateZaak`: the local write (`ApplicationStore.RecordBesluit`) always happens first and stays
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the record of truth, then `OpenZaakZaakSource` additionally POSTs a new `statussen` entry to the
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aanvraag's zaak (`Aanvraag.ZaakUrl`, set by `CreateZaak`).
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There is no Besluiten (BRC) call here — the harness's catalogus (WP-56) provisions only a
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begin/eind `statustype` pair per zaaktype (`Ontvangen`/`Afgehandeld`), not one per decision
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outcome, so a real Besluiten API integration would need its own `besluittype` provisioning
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first (still "later" in the table above). Instead this reuses the exact statustype-resolution
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pattern `CreateZaak` already has (`FirstStatustypeUrlAsync`), just picking the highest
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`volgnummer` (`LastStatustypeUrlAsync`) instead of the lowest, and carries the besluit
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(`Goedkeuren`/`Afwijzen`/`MeerInfoOpvragen`) plus the behandelaar's toelichting in the status's
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free-text `statustoelichting` field so the outcome is still visible on the ZGW side.
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`RecordBesluit` is a no-op if the aanvraag never got a zaak (`Zgw:Enabled` was off at submit
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time, or the create diverged) — same "nothing to do" skip `LinkToZaak` uses for a null
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`zaakUrl`. `LocalZaakSource.RecordBesluit` is a no-op outright — the local decision already IS
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the record of truth there. `caller` is the acting `MedewerkerCaller` (WP-62), so the minted ZGW
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JWT's audit claims reflect the behandelaar, not a static identity.
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## The ZGW client (`backend/src/BigRegister.Api/Zgw/`)
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- `ZgwOptions.cs` — bound from the `Zgw` appsettings section: `Enabled`, per-service base URLs
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(`ZrcBaseUrl`, `ZtcBaseUrl`, `DrcBaseUrl`), `ClientId`, `Secret`, `UserId`,
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`UserRepresentation`. The five ZGW APIs are separate base URLs; slices 1–3 need Zaken (ZRC),
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Catalogi (ZTC), and Documenten (DRC).
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- `ZgwTokenProvider.cs` — mints an **HS256 JWT per call** (`iss`/`client_id`/`iat`/`user_id`/
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`user_representation`). No refresh flow — OpenZaak expires tokens 1h past `iat`, so per-call
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minting is the recommended pattern. Hand-rolled (no `Microsoft.IdentityModel.*` dependency).
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- `ZgwHttpClient.cs` — shared GET/POST-with-bearer-JWT plumbing used by both
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`OpenZaakZaakSource` and `OpenZaakDocumentSource`. Every request also carries
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`Accept-Crs`/`Content-Crs: EPSG:4326` — every ZGW call must declare a coordinate reference
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system even when no geometry is involved, or a real OpenZaak 412s ("Content-Crs header
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ontbreekt"). This was missing until WP-54's live harness caught it — the stub-handler tests
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never modelled the header, so it had shipped silently since WP-49/50.
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- `ZgwZaakMapper.cs` — the anti-corruption map: ZGW Zaak → `ApplicationSummaryDto`. This is
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where **URL identity** becomes the trailing uuid; `Type` takes the internal aanvraag-type
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key (`AanvraagTypeFor`, below) — a real bug (found via a live behandelportal walkthrough,
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fixed post-WP-66) had this carrying OpenZaak's human zaaktype label instead, which the FE's
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`AANVRAAG_TYPES` trust boundary always rejected.
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- `OpenZaakZaakSource.cs` — follows `{count,next,previous,results}` pagination, maps each
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zaak's zaaktype URL back to the internal key via `Zgw:ZaaktypeUrls` (`AanvraagTypeFor` — a
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local lookup, no Catalogi round-trip), attaches `Authorization: Bearer <jwt>`.
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- `OpenZaakDocumentSource.cs` — DRC upload + zaak-link (WP-51), same auth/JSON pattern.
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- `NotificatieDto.cs` + the `POST /api/v1/zgw/notificaties` endpoint (`Program.cs`, WP-52) — the
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**inbound** NRC webhook, not a source/mapper: see the dedicated section below.
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## Notificaties (NRC) webhook — inbound, WP-52
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Unlike ZRC/ZTC/DRC (which the BFF calls outbound as a client), the Notificaties API calls
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**this BFF** — OpenZaak POSTs a `NotificatieDto`-shaped body to `POST /api/v1/zgw/notificaties`
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on every event on a subscribed kanaal. Auth is inverted too: no per-call JWT, just a fixed
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shared secret compared in constant time (`CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals`) against
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`ZgwOptions.NotificatieAuthorization` — an unconfigured (empty) secret rejects every call,
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never accepts. Every attempt (accept or reject) is written to the same `AuthzAuditStore` the
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authz gate uses (`action="zgw:notificatie"`, `resource=hoofdObject` — a URL, not PII, `role="nrc"`)
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via the store directly, since there's no `Principal` for an NRC caller to run through the
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`AuditAuthz` helper.
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There is no cache to invalidate today (`/admin/cases` and every other read already goes straight
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to `IZaakSource` per call), so a valid notification's only visible effect right now is the audit
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row proving the round-trip works end-to-end. Add real invalidation at the `// ponytail:` marker
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in `Program.cs` if a cache is ever introduced.
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**A real deployment provisioning is out-of-band, one-time config against a live OpenZaak — not
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app code.** OpenZaak does not serve the Notificaties API itself — it's a separate application
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(`open-notificaties`, its own image/DB/celery stack). Register the `abonnement` once (e.g. via
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Open Notificaties' admin UI or a `POST` to its Abonnementen API) pointing at this BFF's public
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URL:
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```jsonc
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{
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"callbackUrl": "https://<this-bff>/api/v1/zgw/notificaties",
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"auth": "<same value as Zgw:NotificatieAuthorization>",
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"kanalen": [{ "filters": {}, "naam": "zaken" }],
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}
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```
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`auth` is sent verbatim as the `Authorization` header on every callback (the NRC's
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`auth_type=api_key` default) — no `Bearer` prefix, matching this endpoint's plain string
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compare.
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**The dev harness (WP-58) skips the NRC entirely** — see "Notifications-enabled profile"
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below.
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## Identity — the acting citizen (WP-53)
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Everything above used to hardcode a single owner (`DocumentStore.DemoOwner`) and a single static
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ZGW audit identity (`ZgwOptions.UserId`/`UserRepresentation`). WP-53 replaced both with one
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per-request `CallerIdentity` (subject BSN + display name + role, `Domain/Authorization/
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CallerIdentity.cs`):
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- **Resolution**: an `IIdentityProvider` runs once per request (middleware in `Program.cs`,
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right after the correlation-id middleware) into `HttpContext.Items`, read back everywhere via
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`ctx.Caller()`. `StubIdentityProvider` (the only implementation today, **not a security
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boundary**) reads the existing `X-Role` header (unchanged — mirrors the FE's `?role=` toggle)
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plus a new `X-Subject` header for the BSN, defaulting to the single seeded citizen — so every
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request that doesn't send `X-Subject` (which is every request today; the FE never sends it)
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behaves exactly as before this WP. A production provider swaps in real OIDC/DigiD claims
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without touching a single consumer.
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- **`Authz.ResolvePrincipal(ctx)` kept its exact signature** — it now reads `ctx.Caller().Role`
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instead of the header directly, so its ~15 call sites across `Program.cs` needed no changes.
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- **Ownership**: every endpoint that used to pass `DocumentStore.DemoOwner` to a store
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(`ApplicationStore`, `DocumentStore`, `BriefStore`) now passes `ctx.Caller().Bsn`.
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- **The ZGW JWT** (`ZgwTokenProvider`) grew a `Mint(CallerIdentity)` overload alongside the
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original parameterless `Mint()`: citizen-scoped calls (create-zaak, upload, zaak-link, the
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citizen's own case list) mint with the caller's BSN/name as `user_id`/`user_representation`;
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calls not tied to one citizen (the admin cross-owner list, Catalogi metadata lookups) keep
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minting with the BFF's own system identity from `ZgwOptions`. `ZgwHttpClient.GetAsync`/
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`PostAsync` take an optional `CallerIdentity?` that picks which `Mint` overload runs.
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- **Citizen-scoped reads**: `IZaakSource` gained `ListMyCases(CallerIdentity, now)` alongside the
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existing admin-only `ListCases(now)`. `LocalZaakSource` filters `ApplicationStore.List(bsn)`
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(unchanged local behaviour); `OpenZaakZaakSource` appends ZGW's
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`rol__betrokkeneIdentificatie__natuurlijkPersoon__inpBsn=<bsn>` query filter to `GET
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{ZrcBaseUrl}/zaken`. `GET /applications` (the citizen's own dashboard) now routes through this
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instead of calling `ApplicationStore` directly — the last "reads a static store directly" gap
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the ACL caveat below used to flag for a citizen-facing endpoint.
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**WP-62 split `CallerIdentity` into the two actor kinds ADR-0002 §3 requires** — a
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`ZorgverlenerCaller` (citizen, the WP-53 shape above) or a `MedewerkerCaller` (backoffice
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employee: `MedewerkerId` + `Rollen`, no BSN), backend-only, unused by any frontend until WP-64.
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`StubIdentityProvider` selects the medewerker kind when `X-Medewerker` is present (its value is
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the medewerkerId; `X-Rollen` is a comma-separated rollen list, defaulting to `Behandelaar`) —
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takes precedence over `X-Subject`; absent, every request today, falls through to the
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zorgverlener path unchanged. `CallerIdentity.SubjectId` (BSN or medewerkerId) is what
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`ZgwTokenProvider.Mint` now reads instead of `.Bsn` directly, so the ZGW JWT's `user_id` is
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correct for either kind with no further change (WP-66's besluit write mints this for free). The
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ownership-scoping seams (`ctx.Zorgverlener()`, `IDocumentSource.Upload`, `IZaakSource
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.ListMyCases`) are narrowed to `ZorgverlenerCaller` — a medewerker hitting a citizen-scoped SSP
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endpoint is a 500 today (unreachable, since no consumer sends `X-Medewerker` yet; WP-64 upgrades
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it to a 403 once real backoffice traffic exists). `Authz.CanBeoordelen(CallerIdentity)` is the
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first medewerker capability (rol-based, `MedewerkerRol.Behandelaar`), shipped only as a decision
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flag, never a rollen matrix.
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## The five ZGW APIs (context for later slices)
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| API | Component | Used by |
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| ------------ | --------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| Zaken | ZRC | slice 1 (read), WP-50 (create) |
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| Catalogi | ZTC | WP-50/66 (statustype/roltype/resultaattype for create + besluit) |
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| Documenten | DRC | WP-51 (upload + zaak↔document link) |
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| Besluiten | BRC | later (formal decisions) |
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| Notificaties | NRC | WP-52 (live status via webhooks, not polling) |
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## How to add the next slice
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1. **Read** — extend `IZaakSource` (or add a sibling interface, like `IDocumentSource`, WP-51)
|
||
with the new operation; implement it on both the local store and the OpenZaak source. Keep
|
||
the return type the existing DTO so the FE never changes.
|
||
2. **Write** (create-zaak WP-50, DRC upload/link WP-51) — a create/upload needs a type URL
|
||
from Catalogi (OpenZaak validates it by fetching), then usually a follow-up call (`status` +
|
||
`rol` for a zaak; `zaakinformatieobject` for a document). Route it through the existing
|
||
submit/mutation seam.
|
||
3. **Enforce server-side** for anything the FE gates — a config value the FE echoes is never
|
||
the authority (ADR-0001).
|
||
|
||
## Coupling
|
||
|
||
Low and one-directional. Consumer coupling is near zero — `IZaakSource`/`IDocumentSource` are
|
||
each injected at one endpoint, and the FE is fully decoupled by the DTO. The producer side is
|
||
contained in `Zgw/`: add a slice by adding a source method + a mapper case, not by touching the
|
||
FE or the contract. Watch the **sync-over-async** `ponytail:` note in `OpenZaakZaakSource` (and
|
||
its `OpenZaakDocumentSource` sibling) — make the read/write paths async if OpenZaak becomes the
|
||
default.
|
||
|
||
## Run against real OpenZaak (WP-54)
|
||
|
||
Everything above was, until WP-54, only proven against fixtures + a stub `HttpMessageHandler` —
|
||
no live OpenZaak. `backend/openzaak/` is a **separate**, opt-in docker-compose harness (never
|
||
merged into the root `docker-compose.yml`, which stays FE+BFF-only) that brings up a real
|
||
OpenZaak, seeds a minimal catalogus/zaaktype/zaak via a bootstrap script, and backs one
|
||
xunit test (`OpenZaakIntegrationTests.cs`, tagged `Category=Integration`) that points the BFF at
|
||
it with `Zgw:Enabled=true`. See `backend/openzaak/README.md` for the exact commands; the test is
|
||
excluded from the default `dotnet test` run and from CI (`--filter Category!=Integration`) since
|
||
it only passes with the harness up.
|
||
|
||
This is also where the `Content-Crs`/`Accept-Crs` header gap above was found: a real OpenZaak
|
||
enforces ZGW's geo-header requirement in a way no stub-based test could catch, since a stub
|
||
never rejects an unexpected (or missing) header. That is the harness's whole point — proving
|
||
the seam against real protocol behaviour, not just the shapes we already assumed.
|
||
|
||
### Notifications-enabled profile (WP-58)
|
||
|
||
The base harness above runs with `NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED: 'true'` (no celery worker) — fine for
|
||
proving the read/write ZGW seam, but it means a write to a notified resource never actually
|
||
delivers anything. `docker-compose.openzaak.notificaties.yml` is an opt-in overlay that adds the
|
||
one celery worker OpenZaak needs to deliver a notification, and flips that flag off. The two
|
||
changes are inseparable: the moment `NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED` is false, OpenZaak's
|
||
`NotificationsConfig` must have a client configured or every write to a notified resource 500s
|
||
and rolls back (`NOTIFICATIONS_GUARANTEE_DELIVERY` defaults true) — so `bootstrap-notificaties.sh`
|
||
configures that client in the same step.
|
||
|
||
A real Notificaties API (NRC) is a separate application this harness doesn't stand up (see the
|
||
"Notificaties webhook" section above) — reproducing it here (its own DB + celery + a real
|
||
`abonnement`/kanaal registration) would roughly triple the harness for a benefit this dev loop
|
||
doesn't need: there's only ever one subscriber (this repo's own BFF). Instead
|
||
`bootstrap-notificaties.sh` points OpenZaak's `NotificationsConfig` straight at the BFF's webhook
|
||
via a `zgw_consumers.Service` (`auth_type=api_key`, so the configured secret is sent verbatim as
|
||
the `Authorization` header — exactly what the endpoint's plain string-compare expects). Same
|
||
delivery proof (`write → OpenZaak's celery worker → a real HTTP POST → the BFF's audit trail`),
|
||
far less to stand up and keep alive. A real deployment with more than one subscriber, or that
|
||
needs kanaal-filtered fan-out, needs a real NRC + `abonnement` — this harness's shortcut doesn't
|
||
model that.
|
||
|
||
The overlay's `celery` worker joins the repo root's own `docker compose up` network (by name,
|
||
`api`) to reach the BFF — `host.docker.internal:host-gateway` was tried first, but this
|
||
environment's rootless Podman doesn't route container→host-port traffic through it (DNS
|
||
resolves, every TCP connect times out); container-to-container is the reliable path regardless
|
||
of Docker vs. Podman. That means the notifications profile needs the repo root's `docker compose
|
||
up` (or an equivalent `api` container on that network) running too, with
|
||
`Zgw__NotificatieAuthorization` set:
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
docker compose run --rm -d --name atomic-design-poc-api-1 --service-ports \
|
||
-e Zgw__NotificatieAuthorization='<a secret>' api # repo root
|
||
|
||
cd backend/openzaak
|
||
docker compose -f docker-compose.openzaak.yml -f docker-compose.openzaak.notificaties.yml up -d
|
||
./bootstrap-catalogus.sh
|
||
BFF_AUTH='<the same secret>' ./bootstrap-notificaties.sh
|
||
BFF_AUTH='<the same secret>' ./verify-notificatie.sh # proves a real delivery, end to end
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Verified live in-session: the preflight in `bootstrap-notificaties.sh` proved the BFF's auth gate
|
||
both ways (204 with the secret, 401 without/wrong), `verify-notificatie.sh` found the delivered
|
||
`zgw:notificatie`/`allow` audit row for the PATCHed zaak, and re-running both scripts against the
|
||
already-configured client stayed idempotent (no errors, no duplicate `Service` rows).
|
||
|
||
## Config
|
||
|
||
```jsonc
|
||
// appsettings.json — off by default (POC runs offline on the local store)
|
||
"Zgw": {
|
||
"Enabled": true,
|
||
"ZrcBaseUrl": "https://open-zaak.example/zaken/api/v1",
|
||
"ZtcBaseUrl": "https://open-zaak.example/catalogi/api/v1",
|
||
"DrcBaseUrl": "https://open-zaak.example/documenten/api/v1",
|
||
"ClientId": "big-register", "Secret": "<from a secret store>",
|
||
"UserId": "<session user>", "UserRepresentation": "<session name>",
|
||
// WP-50 (create-zaak): RSINs + the aanvraag-type → zaaktype URL map.
|
||
"Bronorganisatie": "<RSIN>", "VerantwoordelijkeOrganisatie": "<RSIN>",
|
||
"ZaaktypeUrls": {
|
||
"registratie": "https://open-zaak.example/catalogi/api/v1/zaaktypen/<uuid>",
|
||
"herregistratie": "https://open-zaak.example/catalogi/api/v1/zaaktypen/<uuid>",
|
||
"intake": "https://open-zaak.example/catalogi/api/v1/zaaktypen/<uuid>"
|
||
},
|
||
// WP-51 (Documenten): upload category → informatieobjecttype URL map.
|
||
"InformatieobjecttypeUrls": {
|
||
"identiteit": "https://open-zaak.example/catalogi/api/v1/informatieobjecttypen/<uuid>",
|
||
"diploma": "https://open-zaak.example/catalogi/api/v1/informatieobjecttypen/<uuid>"
|
||
},
|
||
// WP-52 (Notificaties): NRC base URL — a SEPARATE host/app from OpenZaak itself
|
||
// (documentation/provisioning only, no outbound call) + the shared secret NRC must send
|
||
// back on every webhook POST.
|
||
"NrcBaseUrl": "https://open-notificaties.example/api/v1",
|
||
"NotificatieAuthorization": "<same value registered in the abonnement's `auth` field>"
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
## Anti-corruption layer — two nested boundaries (what to learn)
|
||
|
||
This setup is an anti-corruption layer (ACL) **twice over**, and seeing them as a pair is the
|
||
lesson worth taking away:
|
||
|
||
1. **The BFF guards everything against upstream systems.** OpenZaak's foreign model —
|
||
URL-as-identity, a `zaaktype` that is a URL _into another service_, `{count,next,previous,
|
||
results}` pagination, HS256 JWT auth — never leaves the BFF. `ZgwZaakMapper` translates it
|
||
into the BFF's own `ApplicationSummaryDto`; `IZaakSource` makes the boundary swappable
|
||
(`LocalZaakSource` vs `OpenZaakZaakSource` return the _same_ DTO).
|
||
2. **The Angular app guards itself against the BFF.** `infrastructure/` is the only layer that
|
||
touches the network (lint-enforced); every response crosses a `parse*` (`Result`) trust
|
||
boundary + a `toDomain` mapper before any domain/UI code sees it (ADR-0001, ARCHITECTURE §6).
|
||
|
||
The DTO at `/api/v1` is the membrane between them — which is why wiring OpenZaak touched **zero
|
||
frontend code and produced zero api-client drift**. That was the proof the ACL held.
|
||
|
||
Principles this demonstrates:
|
||
|
||
- **An ACL is a _mapping_, not a passthrough.** A DTO that is the upstream shape renamed is
|
||
corruption with extra steps; the valuable ACLs here (`ZgwZaakMapper`, the `parse*`/`toDomain`
|
||
pairs) actively translate a foreign model into a local one.
|
||
- **Put the ACL where trust changes, and make it the _only_ place.** One choke point per
|
||
boundary — the `Zgw/` folder + `IZaakSource` server-side, `infrastructure/` client-side.
|
||
- **Decision DTOs and the ACL are complementary.** BFF-lite (server decides, FE renders) is an
|
||
ACL against _business-rule_ drift, layered on the ACL against _data-shape_ drift.
|
||
- **A real seam is swap-testable offline.** Because the ACL returns a stable DTO, the ZGW
|
||
client is unit-testable with fixtures + a stub handler — no live OpenZaak.
|
||
- **Mark the honest edges.** The `ponytail:` sync-over-async note and the "coarse status map"
|
||
comment in `ZgwZaakMapper` show where the ACL is deliberately thin — an ACL need not be
|
||
complete on day one, but its shortcuts should be visible.
|
||
|
||
Caveat: `IZaakSource` covers the cases **read (admin + citizen-scoped) + create** path
|
||
(WP-49/50/53), `IDocumentSource` covers **upload + zaak-link** (WP-51), the inbound
|
||
`POST /zgw/notificaties` webhook (WP-52) closes the read/write/document/notify arc, and WP-53
|
||
threaded a real per-request `CallerIdentity` through all of it (ownership + the ZGW audit
|
||
claims), and WP-54 added a docker OpenZaak harness + opt-in integration test proving the seam
|
||
against a live instance (and, in doing so, caught the missing `Content-Crs`/`Accept-Crs`
|
||
headers noted above). Other BFF endpoints (reference data like `SeedData`'s BRP/DUO mimics)
|
||
still read static stores directly — ACL-ready (the DTO seam exists) but not yet swappable, and
|
||
not part of this arc. That closes the phase-9 OpenZaak/ZGW arc (WP-49..54).
|
||
|
||
## See also
|
||
|
||
- [ADR-0005 — OpenZaak behind the BFF](architecture/0005-openzaak-behind-bff.md) — the decision.
|
||
- [ADR-0001 — BFF-lite + decision DTOs](architecture/0001-bff-lite-decision-dtos.md) — why the FE doesn't change.
|
||
- [WP-49](../project/backlog/WP-49-openzaak-zaken-read-seam.md) (this), WP-50/51 (CRUD arc so far), WP-52 (notificaties), WP-53 (identity seam + citizen-scoping), [WP-54](../project/backlog/WP-54-openzaak-integration-harness.md) (integration harness).
|
||
- `backend/src/BigRegister.Api/Zgw/` — the client; `Data/IZaakSource.cs`/`Data/IDocumentSource.cs` — the seams; `backend/openzaak/` — the live-OpenZaak test harness (WP-54).
|
||
- [ZGW standard (VNG)](https://vng-realisatie.github.io/gemma-zaken/) · [OpenZaak auth docs](https://open-zaak.readthedocs.io/en/stable/client-development/authentication.html).
|