docs(k8s): ADR-0033 + the Talos deployment runbook (refs #25 )

ADR-0033 records why one values-driven chart rather than 30 subcharts, the four platform-forced deviations from compose, and the alternatives (kompose, bitnami subcharts, ingress-nginx, Helm hooks for ordering, a laptop-side registry). The runbook is the walkthrough as actually performed on a single-node Talos v1.14 VM under virt-manager, including the parts that bite: virt-manager ejecting the install ISO on first shutdown, Talos 1.14 moving the install disk into its own config document, the control-plane taint, and why the portals must be reached over localhost (crypto.subtle needs a secure context for PKCE).
feat(k8s): Helm chart for the whole stack on a single-node cluster (refs #25 )
2026-09-04 17:51:21 +02:00 · 2026-09-04 17:51:21 +02:00 · 2026-09-04 17:51:21 +02:00 · 2026-09-04 17:51:21 +02:00 · 2026-09-04 17:51:21 +02:00 · 2026-09-04 17:50:50 +02:00
71 changed files with 3417 additions and 245 deletions
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ export DOCKER_HOST := unix://$(PODMAN_SOCK)
 endif
 endif

-.PHONY: ci lint build unit mutation frontend integration verify verify-up verify-acl verify-nrc verify-projection verify-bff verify-domain verify-observability verify-tracing verify-metrics verify-objecttypen verify-objecten verify-registerrecord verify-objecten-notifications verify-notifications smoke up down local verify-local local-down changelog openzaak-up openzaak-smoke openzaak-seed openzaak-down stack-up stack-smoke stack-down keycloak-up keycloak-smoke keycloak-down flowable-up flowable-smoke flowable-down help
+.PHONY: ci lint build unit mutation frontend integration verify verify-up verify-acl verify-nrc verify-projection verify-bff verify-domain verify-observability verify-tracing verify-metrics verify-objecttypen verify-objecten verify-registerrecord verify-objecten-notifications verify-notifications smoke up down local verify-local local-down changelog openzaak-up openzaak-smoke openzaak-seed openzaak-down stack-up stack-smoke stack-down keycloak-up keycloak-smoke keycloak-down flowable-up flowable-smoke flowable-down k8s-lint k8s-registry k8s-images k8s-seed k8s-up k8s-reseed k8s-portals k8s-down k8s-purge help

 ## ci: run the full pipeline — lint, build, unit, mutation, frontend, verify (mirrors Gitea Actions)
 ## `verify` is the live-stack stage (full stack up once → ACL + notification checks).
@@ -71,8 +71,12 @@ build:

 ## unit: run unit tests (excludes the container-backed Integration lane)
 # TRX per test project (→ TestResults/) feeds the CI per-service summary (#136); harmless locally.
+# The CI reporting scripts are stdlib Python with their own assert-based self-checks (#161) — they
+# ride this lane so a broken job summary is caught by CI rather than by the next red pipeline.
 unit:
 	dotnet test $(SLN) -c Release --filter "Category!=Integration" --logger trx --results-directory TestResults
+	python3 infra/test_playwright_summary.py
+	python3 infra/test_portal_caddyfiles.py

 ## mutation: run the Stryker.NET ratchet on each service with branching logic (fails below baseline)
 # Stryker is pinned as a local dotnet tool (.config/dotnet-tools.json); `tool restore`
@@ -326,6 +330,91 @@ flowable-down:
 	docker compose -f $(FL_COMPOSE) down --volumes
 	-docker volume rm -f rr-fl-bpmn

+# ── Kubernetes (single-node Talos) ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+# The Helm chart in infra/helm/big-reference is a port of infra/docker-compose.yml
+# (ADR-0033). Full walkthrough: docs/runbooks/kubernetes-talos.md.
+#   TALOS_HOST   the address the BROWSER uses — pins Keycloak's issuer and the portals'
+#                OIDC authority. Use `localhost` with `make k8s-portals`: the OIDC
+#                library needs crypto.subtle, which browsers only expose on a secure
+#                context (https, or localhost) — see docs/runbooks/kubernetes-talos.md §5
+#   K8S_REGISTRY the registry both sides use for this repo's images (see k8s-registry)
+K8S_NS       ?= big
+K8S_CHART    := infra/helm/big-reference
+K8S_REGISTRY ?=
+TALOS_HOST   ?=
+# The images built from this repo — compose service name == image name == chart workload.
+K8S_IMAGES   := acl domain bff event-subscriber projection-api self-service openbaar behandel beheer
+
+## k8s-lint: render + schema-check the Helm chart (no cluster needed)
+k8s-lint:
+	helm lint $(K8S_CHART)
+	helm template big $(K8S_CHART) -n $(K8S_NS) --set images.registry=registry.invalid:5000 >/dev/null
+
+## k8s-registry: deploy the in-cluster image registry (NodePort 30500)
+k8s-registry:
+	kubectl apply -f infra/helm/registry.yaml
+	kubectl -n registry rollout status deploy/registry --timeout=180s
+
+## k8s-images: build this repo's images (via compose) and push them to $(K8S_REGISTRY)
+# `docker save | crane push` rather than `docker push`: the registry speaks plain
+# HTTP, which the Docker daemon refuses without a root-level insecure-registries
+# entry, while crane just takes --insecure. Install: see docs/runbooks/kubernetes-talos.md.
+k8s-images:
+	@command -v crane >/dev/null || { echo "crane not found — see docs/runbooks/kubernetes-talos.md §0" >&2; exit 2; }
+	@test -n "$(K8S_REGISTRY)" || { echo "set K8S_REGISTRY=<registry host:port>" >&2; exit 2; }
+	docker compose -f $(COMPOSE) build $(K8S_IMAGES)
+	@tar=$$(mktemp -t rr-img-XXXX.tar); \
+	for i in $(K8S_IMAGES); do \
+	  docker save register-referentie/$$i:dev -o $$tar; \
+	  crane push --insecure $$tar $(K8S_REGISTRY)/register-referentie/$$i:dev; \
+	done; rm -f $$tar
+
+## k8s-seed: create the ConfigMaps the chart mounts (upstream config + bootstrap scripts)
+k8s-seed:
+	bash infra/helm/seed-configmaps.sh $(K8S_NS)
+
+## k8s-up: seed the config and install/upgrade the release
+k8s-up: k8s-seed
+	@test -n "$(TALOS_HOST)" || { echo "set TALOS_HOST=<node ip>" >&2; exit 2; }
+	@test -n "$(K8S_REGISTRY)" || { echo "set K8S_REGISTRY=<registry the node can pull from>" >&2; exit 2; }
+	helm upgrade --install big $(K8S_CHART) -n $(K8S_NS) --create-namespace \
+	  --set host=$(TALOS_HOST) --set images.registry=$(K8S_REGISTRY) $(K8S_SET)
+	kubectl -n $(K8S_NS) get pods
+
+## k8s-reseed: re-run the bootstrap jobs (after a database was wiped, or after
+## changing a Job in the chart — Job pod templates are immutable, so a plain
+## `helm upgrade` is rejected)
+k8s-reseed:
+	kubectl -n $(K8S_NS) delete job -l app.kubernetes.io/component=init --ignore-not-found
+	$(MAKE) k8s-up
+	# The projection's schema is created on service start (Projection.ReadModel migrates in a
+	# hosted service), so a wiped database also needs these two restarted — otherwise they keep
+	# writing to a schema-less DB and fail with `relation "processed_notifications" does not exist`.
+	kubectl -n $(K8S_NS) rollout restart deploy/event-subscriber deploy/projection-api
+	kubectl -n $(K8S_NS) rollout status deploy/event-subscriber deploy/projection-api --timeout=180s
+
+## k8s-portals: forward the browser-facing services to localhost (Ctrl-C stops them all)
+# The portals' OIDC flow needs a *secure context* for crypto.subtle (PKCE), and browsers
+# only grant that to https or localhost — a NodePort on the VM's IP is neither. Forwarding
+# to localhost on the same port numbers keeps Keycloak's pinned issuer valid. Deploy with
+# TALOS_HOST=localhost for this to line up.
+k8s-portals:
+	@echo "self-service http://localhost:30140 · openbaar :30141 · behandel :30142 · beheer :30143 · keycloak :30180"
+	@trap 'kill 0' INT TERM; \
+	for f in self-service:30140:80 openbaar:30141:80 behandel:30142:80 beheer:30143:80 keycloak:30180:8080; do \
+	  svc=$${f%%:*}; rest=$${f#*:}; lport=$${rest%%:*}; rport=$${rest#*:}; \
+	  kubectl -n $(K8S_NS) port-forward --address 127.0.0.1 svc/$$svc $$lport:$$rport >/dev/null & \
+	done; wait
+
+## k8s-down: uninstall the release (database PVCs are kept)
+k8s-down:
+	helm uninstall big -n $(K8S_NS)
+
+## k8s-purge: uninstall AND drop the namespace, including the database volumes
+k8s-purge:
+	-helm uninstall big -n $(K8S_NS)
+	kubectl delete namespace $(K8S_NS) --ignore-not-found
+
 ## help: list available targets
 help:
 	@grep -E '^## ' $(MAKEFILE_LIST) | sed 's/^## //'
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+:80 {
+	# Same-origin API: behandelaars authenticate against the medewerker realm; the BFF validates it
+	# for /behandel/* (S-12c).
+	# `handle` blocks are mutually exclusive and matched most-specific-first, so the
+	# SPA fallback below can never swallow an API call — unlike a bare `try_files`,
+	# which Caddy sorts *before* reverse_proxy and would rewrite it to /index.html.
+	#
+	# No `resolver` stanza is needed: Caddy dials the upstream per
+	# request through the system resolver, so it starts before the BFF is up, picks up
+	# its restarts, and honours the DNS search domains in /etc/resolv.conf — which is
+	# what lets the bare `bff` name resolve on Kubernetes as well as under compose.
+	handle /behandel/* {
+		reverse_proxy bff:8080
+	}
+
+	# The Angular app. Client-side routing: an unknown path serves index.html.
+	handle {
+		root * /usr/share/caddy
+		try_files {path} /index.html
+		file_server
+	}
+}
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Multi-stage build for the behandel portal (Angular → nginx).
+# Multi-stage build for the behandel portal (Angular → Caddy).
 # Build context is the repo root (the app needs the pnpm workspace + libs). See infra/docker-compose.yml.
 FROM node:24-slim AS build
 WORKDIR /src
@@ -13,15 +13,12 @@ COPY apps/behandel apps/behandel
 COPY libs libs
 RUN pnpm nx build behandel

-FROM nginx:1.27-alpine AS runtime
-COPY apps/behandel/nginx.conf /etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf
-COPY --from=build /src/dist/apps/behandel/browser /usr/share/nginx/html
+FROM caddy:2-alpine AS runtime
+COPY apps/behandel/Caddyfile /etc/caddy/Caddyfile
+COPY --from=build /src/dist/apps/behandel/browser /usr/share/caddy
 # Compose-time OIDC config: the browser (Playwright, on the compose network) reaches Keycloak by
 # service name, so the token issuer matches the BFF's medewerker authority (host-consistent, ADR-0013).
-RUN printf '{ "authority": "http://keycloak:8080/realms/medewerker" }\n' > /usr/share/nginx/html/config.json
-# Make the reverse-proxy resolver engine-portable (Docker 127.0.0.11 vs podman aardvark); runs from
-# the nginx image's /docker-entrypoint.d before nginx starts.
-COPY apps/portal-nginx-resolver.sh /docker-entrypoint.d/40-resolver.sh
-RUN chmod +x /docker-entrypoint.d/40-resolver.sh
+# Kubernetes mounts a ConfigMap over this file with the node address instead (ADR-0033).
+RUN printf '{ "authority": "http://keycloak:8080/realms/medewerker" }\n' > /usr/share/caddy/config.json

 EXPOSE 80
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-server {
-  listen 80;
-  server_name _;
-  root /usr/share/nginx/html;
-  index index.html;
-
-  # Resolve the BFF via Docker's embedded DNS at request time (variable proxy_pass), so nginx starts
-  # even before the BFF is up and picks up restarts — instead of failing to load the config.
-  resolver 127.0.0.11 ipv6=off valid=30s;
-
-  # Same-origin API: proxy the behandel endpoint group to the bff service. The api-client uses
-  # relative URLs, so the browser calls this origin and nginx forwards to the BFF — no CORS, and the
-  # medewerker token (same-origin) is attached by the app's interceptor (ADR-0013).
-  location /behandel/ {
-    set $bff http://bff:8080;
-    proxy_pass $bff;
-    proxy_set_header Host $host;
-  }
-
-  # SPA fallback — Angular client-side routing.
-  location / {
-    try_files $uri $uri/ /index.html;
-  }
-}
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ export interface RuntimeConfig {

 /**
 * Route prefixes whose requests carry the medewerker token. These MUST match the **relative** URLs
- * the api-client actually calls (same-origin via the nginx proxy) — the interceptor matches on
+ * the api-client actually calls (same-origin via the Caddy proxy) — the interceptor matches on
 * `req.url`, which stays relative, so an absolute origin would never match and the token would go
 * unattached. Only `/behandel/` is secured; the app calls no other endpoint group.
 */
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import { of, throwError } from 'rxjs';
 import { BffApiV1Service, type WerkbakItem } from 'api-client';
 import { AuthService } from 'auth';
 import { axe } from 'vitest-axe';
-import { WerkbakPage } from './werkbak-page';
+import { WERKBAK_REFRESH_MS, WerkbakPage } from './werkbak-page';

 const sample: WerkbakItem[] = [
  { registrationId: 'reg-1', bsn: '123456782', status: 'InBehandeling' },
@@ -81,6 +81,94 @@ describe('WerkbakPage', () => {
    });
  });

+  it('picks up a newly submitted registration without a reload', async () => {
+    // S-26 (#162): a registration reaches Beoordelen asynchronously, after the citizen supplies
+    // documents — so the werkbak must refresh itself rather than wait for the behandelaar to reload.
+    vi.useFakeTimers();
+    try {
+      const getBehandelWerkbak = vi
+        .fn()
+        .mockReturnValueOnce(of([sample[0]]))
+        .mockReturnValue(of(sample));
+      const { providers } = setup({ getBehandelWerkbak });
+      const { detectChanges } = await render(WerkbakPage, { providers });
+
+      expect(screen.getByText('reg-1')).toBeTruthy();
+      expect(screen.queryByText('reg-2')).toBeNull();
+
+      vi.advanceTimersByTime(WERKBAK_REFRESH_MS);
+      detectChanges();
+
+      expect(getBehandelWerkbak).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+      expect(screen.getByText('reg-2')).toBeTruthy();
+      // A background refresh must not flash the loading state over the rows the behandelaar is reading.
+      expect(screen.queryByText(/bezig met laden/i)).toBeNull();
+    } finally {
+      vi.useRealTimers();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('keeps the rows on screen when a background refresh fails', async () => {
+    // A blip on a background poll must not replace the list with the load-failure alert; the next
+    // tick recovers. Only the first load speaks for whether the werkbak is readable at all.
+    vi.useFakeTimers();
+    try {
+      const getBehandelWerkbak = vi
+        .fn()
+        .mockReturnValueOnce(of(sample))
+        .mockReturnValue(throwError(() => new Error('503')));
+      const { providers } = setup({ getBehandelWerkbak });
+      const { detectChanges } = await render(WerkbakPage, { providers });
+
+      vi.advanceTimersByTime(WERKBAK_REFRESH_MS);
+      detectChanges();
+
+      expect(screen.getByText('reg-1')).toBeTruthy();
+      expect(screen.queryByText(/kon de werkbak niet laden/i)).toBeNull();
+    } finally {
+      vi.useRealTimers();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('stops refreshing once the page is destroyed', async () => {
+    vi.useFakeTimers();
+    try {
+      const { getBehandelWerkbak, providers } = setup();
+      const { fixture } = await render(WerkbakPage, { providers });
+
+      fixture.destroy();
+      vi.advanceTimersByTime(WERKBAK_REFRESH_MS * 3);
+
+      expect(getBehandelWerkbak).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    } finally {
+      vi.useRealTimers();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('clears a load failure once a refresh succeeds', async () => {
+    // Without this the werkbak stays stuck on the error until the behandelaar reloads — the very
+    // thing this slice removes. A recovered read must put the rows back.
+    vi.useFakeTimers();
+    try {
+      const getBehandelWerkbak = vi
+        .fn()
+        .mockReturnValueOnce(throwError(() => new Error('503')))
+        .mockReturnValue(of(sample));
+      const { providers } = setup({ getBehandelWerkbak });
+      const { detectChanges } = await render(WerkbakPage, { providers });
+
+      expect(screen.getByText(/kon de werkbak niet laden/i)).toBeTruthy();
+
+      vi.advanceTimersByTime(WERKBAK_REFRESH_MS);
+      detectChanges();
+
+      expect(screen.queryByText(/kon de werkbak niet laden/i)).toBeNull();
+      expect(screen.getByText('reg-1')).toBeTruthy();
+    } finally {
+      vi.useRealTimers();
+    }
+  });
+
  it('shows an empty state when the werkbak has no items', async () => {
    const { providers } = setup({ getBehandelWerkbak: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(of([])) });
    await render(WerkbakPage, { providers });
@@ -1,7 +1,15 @@
 import { Component, inject, signal } from '@angular/core';
+import { takeUntilDestroyed } from '@angular/core/rxjs-interop';
+import { interval } from 'rxjs';
 import { BffApiV1Service, type WerkbakItem } from 'api-client';
 import { UtrechtComponentsModule } from 'ui';

+/**
+ * How often an open werkbak re-reads itself (S-26/#162, ADR-0032). Exported so the spec advances the
+ * clock by exactly one interval instead of hard-coding the number.
+ */
+export const WERKBAK_REFRESH_MS = 5_000;
+
 /** The two decisions a behandelaar can make; the BFF validates these exact values (ADR-0013). */
 type Besluit = 'goedkeuren' | 'afwijzen';

@@ -10,6 +18,11 @@ type Besluit = 'goedkeuren' | 'afwijzen';
 * Flowable `Beoordelen` tasks, read through the domain) and decides each — goedkeuren or afwijzen. A
 * decision posts to the BFF, which applies the domain transition and completes the workflow task
 * (ADR-0013; S-12). After a decision the werkbak refreshes so the handled item drops off the list.
+ *
+ * The page also re-reads itself every {@link WERKBAK_REFRESH_MS} while it is open, so a registration
+ * that reaches beoordeling after the behandelaar opened the werkbak shows up on its own — no reload
+ * (S-26/#162). Polling rather than a pushed stream: nothing notifies the BFF either, so a stream
+ * would poll the domain in the BFF instead and add connection state for the same freshness (ADR-0032).
 */
@Component({
  selector: 'app-werkbak-page',
@@ -27,19 +40,37 @@ export class WerkbakPage {

  constructor() {
    this.load();
+    // ponytail: a fixed interval, polled while the page lives — it keeps refreshing in a background
+    // tab. Gate on `document.visibilityState` if the request volume ever matters.
+    interval(WERKBAK_REFRESH_MS)
+      .pipe(takeUntilDestroyed())
+      .subscribe(() => this.load({ background: true }));
  }

-  load(): void {
-    this.loading.set(true);
-    this.failed.set(false);
+  /**
+   * Read the werkbak. A `background` read is the interval refresh: it leaves the rows and the states
+   * the behandelaar is looking at alone until it has an answer — no loading flash on every tick, and
+   * a blip does not swap the list for the failure alert (the next tick recovers). Only a foreground
+   * read — on open, or after a decision — speaks for whether the werkbak is readable at all.
+   */
+  load(options: { background?: boolean } = {}): void {
+    const background = options.background ?? false;
+    if (!background) {
+      this.loading.set(true);
+      this.failed.set(false);
+    }
    this.bff.getBehandelWerkbak().subscribe({
      next: (rows: WerkbakItem[]) => {
        this.items.set(rows);
        this.loading.set(false);
        this.loaded.set(true);
+        // A read that came back is the answer, so a refresh also clears an earlier failure — the
+        // werkbak recovers on its own instead of showing the error until someone reloads.
+        this.failed.set(false);
      },
      // Surface the failure (e.g. 403 for a non-behandelaar) instead of swallowing it.
      error: () => {
+        if (background) return;
        this.items.set([]);
        this.loading.set(false);
        this.loaded.set(true);
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+:80 {
+	# Same-origin API: beheerders use the same medewerker realm as behandel (S-15a).
+	# `handle` blocks are mutually exclusive and matched most-specific-first, so the
+	# SPA fallback below can never swallow an API call — unlike a bare `try_files`,
+	# which Caddy sorts *before* reverse_proxy and would rewrite it to /index.html.
+	#
+	# No `resolver` stanza is needed: Caddy dials the upstream per
+	# request through the system resolver, so it starts before the BFF is up, picks up
+	# its restarts, and honours the DNS search domains in /etc/resolv.conf — which is
+	# what lets the bare `bff` name resolve on Kubernetes as well as under compose.
+	handle /beheer/* {
+		reverse_proxy bff:8080
+	}
+
+	# The Angular app. Client-side routing: an unknown path serves index.html.
+	handle {
+		root * /usr/share/caddy
+		try_files {path} /index.html
+		file_server
+	}
+}
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Multi-stage build for the beheer portal (Angular → nginx).
+# Multi-stage build for the beheer portal (Angular → Caddy).
 # Build context is the repo root (the app needs the pnpm workspace + libs). See infra/docker-compose.yml.
 FROM node:24-slim AS build
 WORKDIR /src
@@ -13,15 +13,12 @@ COPY apps/beheer apps/beheer
 COPY libs libs
 RUN pnpm nx build beheer

-FROM nginx:1.27-alpine AS runtime
-COPY apps/beheer/nginx.conf /etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf
-COPY --from=build /src/dist/apps/beheer/browser /usr/share/nginx/html
+FROM caddy:2-alpine AS runtime
+COPY apps/beheer/Caddyfile /etc/caddy/Caddyfile
+COPY --from=build /src/dist/apps/beheer/browser /usr/share/caddy
 # Compose-time OIDC config: the browser (Playwright, on the compose network) reaches Keycloak by
 # service name, so the token issuer matches the BFF's medewerker authority (host-consistent, ADR-0013).
-RUN printf '{ "authority": "http://keycloak:8080/realms/medewerker" }\n' > /usr/share/nginx/html/config.json
-# Make the reverse-proxy resolver engine-portable (Docker 127.0.0.11 vs podman aardvark); runs from
-# the nginx image's /docker-entrypoint.d before nginx starts.
-COPY apps/portal-nginx-resolver.sh /docker-entrypoint.d/40-resolver.sh
-RUN chmod +x /docker-entrypoint.d/40-resolver.sh
+# Kubernetes mounts a ConfigMap over this file with the node address instead (ADR-0033).
+RUN printf '{ "authority": "http://keycloak:8080/realms/medewerker" }\n' > /usr/share/caddy/config.json

 EXPOSE 80
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-server {
-  listen 80;
-  server_name _;
-  root /usr/share/nginx/html;
-  index index.html;
-
-  # Resolve the BFF via Docker's embedded DNS at request time (variable proxy_pass), so nginx starts
-  # even before the BFF is up and picks up restarts — instead of failing to load the config.
-  resolver 127.0.0.11 ipv6=off valid=30s;
-
-  # Same-origin API: proxy the beheer endpoint group to the bff service. The api-client uses
-  # relative URLs, so the browser calls this origin and nginx forwards to the BFF — no CORS, and the
-  # medewerker token (same-origin) is attached by the app's interceptor (ADR-0013).
-  location /beheer/ {
-    set $bff http://bff:8080;
-    proxy_pass $bff;
-    proxy_set_header Host $host;
-  }
-
-  # SPA fallback — Angular client-side routing.
-  location / {
-    try_files $uri $uri/ /index.html;
-  }
-}
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ export interface RuntimeConfig {

 /**
 * Route prefixes whose requests carry the medewerker token. These MUST match the **relative** URLs
- * the api-client actually calls (same-origin via the nginx proxy) — the interceptor matches on
+ * the api-client actually calls (same-origin via the Caddy proxy) — the interceptor matches on
 * `req.url`, which stays relative, so an absolute origin would never match and the token would go
 * unattached. Only `/beheer/` is secured; the app calls no other endpoint group.
 */
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+:80 {
+	# Same-origin API: the public register is anonymous, but still reads through the BFF (S-09).
+	# `handle` blocks are mutually exclusive and matched most-specific-first, so the
+	# SPA fallback below can never swallow an API call — unlike a bare `try_files`,
+	# which Caddy sorts *before* reverse_proxy and would rewrite it to /index.html.
+	#
+	# No `resolver` stanza is needed: Caddy dials the upstream per
+	# request through the system resolver, so it starts before the BFF is up, picks up
+	# its restarts, and honours the DNS search domains in /etc/resolv.conf — which is
+	# what lets the bare `bff` name resolve on Kubernetes as well as under compose.
+	handle /openbaar/* {
+		reverse_proxy bff:8080
+	}
+
+	# The Angular app. Client-side routing: an unknown path serves index.html.
+	handle {
+		root * /usr/share/caddy
+		try_files {path} /index.html
+		file_server
+	}
+}
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Multi-stage build for the openbaar portal (Angular → nginx).
+# Multi-stage build for the openbaar portal (Angular → Caddy).
 # Build context is the repo root (the app needs the pnpm workspace + libs). See infra/docker-compose.yml.
 FROM node:24-slim AS build
 WORKDIR /src
@@ -13,13 +13,9 @@ COPY apps/openbaar apps/openbaar
 COPY libs libs
 RUN pnpm nx build openbaar

-FROM nginx:1.27-alpine AS runtime
-COPY apps/openbaar/nginx.conf /etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf
-COPY --from=build /src/dist/apps/openbaar/browser /usr/share/nginx/html
+FROM caddy:2-alpine AS runtime
+COPY apps/openbaar/Caddyfile /etc/caddy/Caddyfile
+COPY --from=build /src/dist/apps/openbaar/browser /usr/share/caddy
 # No runtime config: the openbaar register is anonymous (no OIDC authority to inject).
-# Make the reverse-proxy resolver engine-portable (Docker 127.0.0.11 vs podman aardvark); runs from
-# the nginx image's /docker-entrypoint.d before nginx starts.
-COPY apps/portal-nginx-resolver.sh /docker-entrypoint.d/40-resolver.sh
-RUN chmod +x /docker-entrypoint.d/40-resolver.sh

 EXPOSE 80
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-server {
-  listen 80;
-  server_name _;
-  root /usr/share/nginx/html;
-  index index.html;
-
-  # Resolve the BFF via Docker's embedded DNS at request time (variable proxy_pass), so nginx starts
-  # even before the BFF is up and picks up restarts — instead of failing to load the config.
-  resolver 127.0.0.11 ipv6=off valid=30s;
-
-  # Same-origin API: proxy the anonymous openbaar endpoint group to the bff service. The api-client
-  # uses relative URLs, so the browser calls this origin and nginx forwards to the BFF — no CORS.
-  location /openbaar/ {
-    set $bff http://bff:8080;
-    proxy_pass $bff;
-    proxy_set_header Host $host;
-  }
-
-  # SPA fallback — Angular client-side routing.
-  location / {
-    try_files $uri $uri/ /index.html;
-  }
-}
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import { appRoutes } from './app.routes';

 /**
 * The openbaar register is a public, anonymous read: no DigiD, no auth interceptor. The app is served
- * same-origin as the BFF (nginx proxies /openbaar), so the api-client's relative calls stay same-origin.
+ * same-origin as the BFF (Caddy proxies /openbaar), so the api-client's relative calls stay same-origin.
 */
 export const appConfig: ApplicationConfig = {
  providers: [
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-# Point nginx's reverse-proxy `resolver` at THIS container's real DNS server.
-#
-# The portal nginx configs use a variable proxy_pass, which needs a `resolver` so the BFF hostname is
-# resolved at request time (nginx can start before the BFF is up). The config hardcodes Docker's
-# embedded DNS (127.0.0.11) — correct on Docker/Docker Desktop, but rootless podman uses a
-# network-specific address (aardvark, e.g. 10.89.0.1), so proxied calls 502 there. Read the actual
-# nameserver from /etc/resolv.conf and substitute it, so the reverse proxy works on any engine.
-#
-# Runs from the nginx image's /docker-entrypoint.d/ before nginx starts. On Docker the nameserver IS
-# 127.0.0.11, so the substitution is a no-op. Guarded (no `set -e`) so it's safe whether the nginx
-# entrypoint executes or sources it.
-ns="$(awk '/^nameserver/{print $2; exit}' /etc/resolv.conf 2>/dev/null)"
-if [ -n "$ns" ] && [ "$ns" != "127.0.0.11" ]; then
-  sed -i "s/resolver 127\.0\.0\.11/resolver $ns/" /etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf 2>/dev/null || true
-  echo "portal-nginx-resolver: set resolver to $ns"
-fi
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+:80 {
+	# Same-origin API: the api-client uses relative URLs, so the browser calls this origin and Caddy
+	# forwards to the BFF — no CORS, and the DigiD token is attached by the app interceptor
+	# (S-08d/ADR-0010).
+	# `handle` blocks are mutually exclusive and matched most-specific-first, so the
+	# SPA fallback below can never swallow an API call — unlike a bare `try_files`,
+	# which Caddy sorts *before* reverse_proxy and would rewrite it to /index.html.
+	#
+	# No `resolver` stanza is needed: Caddy dials the upstream per
+	# request through the system resolver, so it starts before the BFF is up, picks up
+	# its restarts, and honours the DNS search domains in /etc/resolv.conf — which is
+	# what lets the bare `bff` name resolve on Kubernetes as well as under compose.
+	handle /self-service/* {
+		reverse_proxy bff:8080
+	}
+	handle /openbaar/* {
+		reverse_proxy bff:8080
+	}
+
+	# The Angular app. Client-side routing: an unknown path serves index.html.
+	handle {
+		root * /usr/share/caddy
+		try_files {path} /index.html
+		file_server
+	}
+}
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Multi-stage build for the self-service portal (Angular → nginx).
+# Multi-stage build for the self-service portal (Angular → Caddy).
 # Build context is the repo root (the app needs the pnpm workspace + libs). See infra/docker-compose.yml.
 FROM node:24-slim AS build
 WORKDIR /src
@@ -13,15 +13,12 @@ COPY apps/self-service apps/self-service
 COPY libs libs
 RUN pnpm nx build self-service

-FROM nginx:1.27-alpine AS runtime
-COPY apps/self-service/nginx.conf /etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf
-COPY --from=build /src/dist/apps/self-service/browser /usr/share/nginx/html
+FROM caddy:2-alpine AS runtime
+COPY apps/self-service/Caddyfile /etc/caddy/Caddyfile
+COPY --from=build /src/dist/apps/self-service/browser /usr/share/caddy
 # Compose-time OIDC config: the browser (Playwright, on the compose network) reaches Keycloak by
 # service name, so the token issuer matches the BFF's authority (host-consistent, ADR-0010).
-RUN printf '{ "authority": "http://keycloak:8080/realms/digid" }\n' > /usr/share/nginx/html/config.json
-# Make the reverse-proxy resolver engine-portable (Docker 127.0.0.11 vs podman aardvark); runs from
-# the nginx image's /docker-entrypoint.d before nginx starts.
-COPY apps/portal-nginx-resolver.sh /docker-entrypoint.d/40-resolver.sh
-RUN chmod +x /docker-entrypoint.d/40-resolver.sh
+# Kubernetes mounts a ConfigMap over this file with the node address instead (ADR-0033).
+RUN printf '{ "authority": "http://keycloak:8080/realms/digid" }\n' > /usr/share/caddy/config.json

 EXPOSE 80
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-server {
-  listen 80;
-  server_name _;
-  root /usr/share/nginx/html;
-  index index.html;
-
-  # Resolve the BFF via Docker's embedded DNS at request time (variable proxy_pass), so nginx starts
-  # even before the BFF is up and picks up restarts — instead of failing to load the config.
-  resolver 127.0.0.11 ipv6=off valid=30s;
-
-  # Same-origin API: proxy the BFF endpoint groups to the bff service. The api-client uses relative
-  # URLs, so the browser calls this origin and nginx forwards to the BFF — no CORS, and the DigiD
-  # token (same-origin) is attached by the app's interceptor (S-08d/ADR-0010).
-  location /self-service/ {
-    set $bff http://bff:8080;
-    proxy_pass $bff;
-    proxy_set_header Host $host;
-  }
-  location /openbaar/ {
-    set $bff http://bff:8080;
-    proxy_pass $bff;
-    proxy_set_header Host $host;
-  }
-
-  # SPA fallback — Angular client-side routing.
-  location / {
-    try_files $uri $uri/ /index.html;
-  }
-}
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ export interface RuntimeConfig {

 /**
 * Route prefixes whose requests carry the DigiD token. These MUST match the **relative** URLs the
- * api-client actually calls (same-origin via the nginx proxy) — the interceptor matches on `req.url`,
+ * api-client actually calls (same-origin via the Caddy proxy) — the interceptor matches on `req.url`,
 * which stays relative, so an absolute origin would never match and the token would go unattached.
 * `/openbaar/` is deliberately excluded: it is the anonymous public register.
 */
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+# ADR-0031 — MFA on the medewerker realm, with a fixture TOTP secret
+
+- **Status:** Accepted
+- **Date:** 2026-09-03
+- **Slice:** S-15c (Gitea #132)
+
+## Context
+
+Staff (behandelaar, teamlead, beheerder) act on citizens' registrations and on the ACL's
+default-fill: the highest-privilege logins in the platform. The medewerker realm protected
+them with a password alone, while the citizen realms (digid, eherkenning, eidas) mock
+brokers that carry their own assurance levels. A reference application that demonstrates a
+government architecture should show MFA on the staff realm.
+
+Two things had to be decided: **how** to enforce OTP in a realm export, and **how the
+automated checks and a human demo obtain a code** — the e2e drives a real browser login and
+`make keycloak-smoke` drives a real password grant, so neither can scan a QR.
+
+## Decision
+
+**Enforce OTP by giving every seeded medewerker a TOTP credential**, rather than replacing
+Keycloak's browser flow with a copy whose OTP execution is `REQUIRED`.
+
+Keycloak's stock `browser` and `direct grant` flows both contain a *conditional OTP*
+subflow that fires when the user has an OTP credential. Seeding the credential therefore
+turns the challenge on for every seeded user, in both flows, without duplicating ~40 lines
+of flow JSON into the export. `CONFIGURE_TOTP` is additionally set as a **default required
+action**, so a medewerker created later must enrol before their first login.
+
+**The seeded secret is a fixed, committed fixture** (`BIGMEDEWERKEROTPSEED`) shared by all
+medewerkers. Codes are then computable: `infra/keycloak/check_realms.py` (Python, stdlib
+`hmac`) and `tests/e2e/medewerker-login.ts` (Node `crypto`) each implement RFC 6238 in
+about six lines — no OTP dependency on either side, and no enrolment step in the tests.
+
+## Consequences
+
+- A password alone no longer yields a token on the medewerker realm; `check_realms.py`
+  asserts that refusal, so the enforcement cannot silently regress.
+- Every medewerker login in the e2e goes through `loginMedewerker()`, which submits the OTP
+  form. New staff specs must use it.
+- **The secret is public.** It is a demo fixture and worthless outside this synthetic
+  stack, in the same class as the committed `test123` passwords and the mock DigiD broker.
+  A real deployment enrols per-user authenticators (or federates to DigiD Machtigen /
+  eHerkenning at the required assurance level) and seeds no credentials at all.
+- Enforcement is *effectively* realm-wide but *technically* per-user: the conditional
+  subflow is what fires. A medewerker whose OTP credential were removed would fall back to
+  the required action at next login (enrol, then challenge) rather than skipping MFA — an
+  acceptable equivalence for this purpose, and the reason the required action is set.
+- Reversal is a one-file edit: drop the `otp` credentials and the `requiredActions` block.
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+# ADR-0032: The werkbak refreshes itself by polling, not by a pushed stream
+
+- **Status:** Accepted
+- **Date:** 2026-09-04
+- **Deciders:** Respellion engineering
+- **Slice:** #162 (proposal #163). The issue titles it S-26; that id already belongs to
+  the self-service resume slice (#111), so #162 is the identifier that counts.
+
+## Context
+
+The werkbak (S-12) is a read of the open Flowable `Beoordelen` tasks: portal → BFF
+`GET /behandel/werkbak` → domain `Werkbak` query → workflow engine, each task enriched
+from its aggregate. A registration reaches `Beoordelen` **asynchronously**, only once the
+citizen supplies its documents and the DMN routes it (S-10a) — so it appears in a werkbak
+that is already open, and until now a behandelaar had to reload the page to see it.
+
+Three forces shape the mechanism:
+
+- **Nothing notifies anyone.** The trigger lives in Flowable. The domain does not publish
+  task events, and there is no bus between the domain and the BFF.
+- **The BFF is stateless** and sits behind each portal's reverse proxy.
+- **This is the repo's first live-updating view**, so the choice sets a precedent.
+
+## Decision
+
+**The werkbak page re-reads the existing BFF endpoint on a fixed interval
+(`WERKBAK_REFRESH_MS`, 5 s) while it is open. No new endpoint, dependency or server-side
+state.**
+
+The refresh is a *background* read: it leaves the rows and the loading/failure states
+untouched until it has an answer, so a tick never flashes a spinner over rows a
+behandelaar is reading and a single failed poll never swaps the list for the error alert.
+A read that comes back also clears an earlier failure, so the view recovers on its own —
+the same reload this slice set out to remove would otherwise be needed to escape a
+transient error. Only a foreground read (on open, after a decision) speaks for whether the
+werkbak is readable at all.
+
+### Why not SSE or WebSockets
+
+Neither buys freshness here, because **nothing notifies the BFF either**:
+
+- **SSE** (`text/event-stream`) would mean a new streaming endpoint whose handler polls the
+  domain and forwards diffs — the same latency, plus connection lifecycle, proxy
+  buffering, and auth on a long-lived connection.
+- **WebSocket/SignalR** adds a dependency (CLAUDE.md §13) and makes the BFF stateful and
+  sticky-session-bound. A genuine push path would *also* need the domain to publish task
+  events. Warranted by high-frequency, bidirectional or fan-out-heavy traffic; the werkbak
+  is none of those.
+
+Polling meets the acceptance ("a registration can be seen in the werkbak once it is ready
+for review") in a handful of lines inside one component.
+
+- ponytail ceiling: a fixed 5 s interval, per open page, that keeps polling in a
+  background tab. Each tick costs one Flowable task query plus a store read per open task.
+- Upgrade path: publish task events from the domain, then swap the component's `interval`
+  for a stream. The endpoint contract and the component's rendering stay as they are;
+  gate on `document.visibilityState` first if request volume is the concern.
+
+## Consequences
+
+**Positive**
+
+- The outcome is delivered with no new endpoint, dependency, or server-side state, and no
+  service boundary moves.
+- Self-healing: a transient read failure no longer strands the view until a manual reload.
+- The e2e got *simpler* — the happy path waits for the werkbak row without reloading the
+  page, which is itself the live-refresh assertion.
+
+**Negative / costs**
+
+- Staleness is bounded by one interval (≤5 s) rather than instant.
+- One `GET /behandel/werkbak` per open werkbak per interval, including in hidden tabs.
+- The precedent is polling; a future view with genuinely high-frequency updates will have
+  to revisit this (see the upgrade path above).
+
+## Coupling rules touched (CLAUDE.md §8)
+
+None. The poll reuses the existing portal → BFF → domain read path: §8.3 (portals talk
+only to the BFF) and §8.2 (only the Workflow Client talks to Flowable) are unchanged.
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+# ADR-0033: Kubernetes deployment is one values-driven Helm chart, not a chart per service
+
+- **Status:** Accepted
+- **Date:** 2026-09-04
+- **Deciders:** Respellion engineering
+- **Slice:** _(none yet — raised directly as a deployment-target request; see
+  "Process note" at the end)_
+
+## Context
+
+The stack is defined once, in `infra/docker-compose.yml`: 30-odd containers made of six
+upstream Common Ground modules (OpenZaak, Open Notificaties, Objecten, Objecttypen,
+Keycloak, Flowable), their databases and workers, five .NET services, four portals, six
+one-shot bootstrap containers, and an observability backplane (off by default here). Compose is the
+CI-canonical stack: `make verify` and every `verify-*` script drive it.
+
+We now also want the stack on Kubernetes — first target a **single-node Talos VM on a
+laptop**. Four properties of this particular stack shape the answer:
+
+- **The upstream images are used verbatim** and read their configuration from a mounted
+  directory (`setup_configuration/data.yaml`, Keycloak realm exports, BPMN/DMN). Compose
+  streams those files into external volumes (`infra/seed-config.sh`) because bind mounts
+  don't reach sibling containers on the CI runner. Kubernetes needs the same files as
+  ConfigMaps — from *somewhere*.
+- **Django's `URLValidator` rejects single-label hosts.** Compose works around it by
+  handing the ACL and the seeds a container *IP* (ADR-0009, ADR-0020, ADR-0029, and the
+  `objecten.local` network alias). In Kubernetes a Service FQDN is already multi-label, so
+  the workaround has a natural replacement — but the hosts have to line up exactly, since
+  Objecten reflects the request Host into the URLs it publishes to NRC.
+- **The OIDC issuer must be one string** for both the browser and the BFF (ADR-0010).
+  `infra/host-browser.yml` already solved this for a host browser: pin `KC_HOSTNAME`, keep
+  backchannel discovery in-cluster, and mount a `config.json` per portal.
+- **Nothing here is highly available.** One replica of everything, on one node.
+
+## Decision
+
+**One chart — `infra/helm/big-reference` — whose `values.yaml` is a near-literal
+transcription of the compose file, rendered by three generic templates (Deployment, Job,
+Service) over a `workloads` map.** Adding a service is a values edit.
+
+Consequences of that shape, each chosen deliberately:
+
+- **Config files are not copied into the chart.** `infra/helm/seed-configmaps.sh` creates
+  the ConfigMaps from the files that already live in the repo — the Kubernetes sibling of
+  `infra/seed-config.sh`. The chart therefore needs `make k8s-seed` before `helm install`,
+  which is the same two-step dance compose already has.
+- **Bootstrap one-shots become Jobs, with no ordering mechanism.** Every one is idempotent
+  (ADR-0020); each waits for the TCP ports it needs via a busybox init container and
+  Kubernetes retries the rest. `make k8s-reseed` re-runs them.
+- **The four Django services apply their own `setup_configuration`** —
+  `args: [sh, -c, "/setup_configuration.sh && exec /start.sh"]` — instead of getting a
+  separate `*-init` Job like compose. Both of those image scripts run
+  `manage.py migrate`, and compose serialises them with
+  `depends_on: service_completed_successfully`; Kubernetes has no such edge, so a Job and
+  its web pod migrate the same database concurrently and Django dies with
+  *"relation zgw_consumers_service already exists"*. Running the two steps in order inside
+  the one container leaves exactly one migrator per database, and deletes four workloads.
+- **`args`, never `command`.** Compose's `command:` replaces the image's CMD; Kubernetes'
+  `command:` replaces its ENTRYPOINT. Transcribing one to the other silently broke every
+  upstream image that relies on its entrypoint — postgres ran as root and refused to
+  start, Keycloak tried to exec `start-dev` as a binary. The chart now `fail`s at render
+  time if a workload sets `command`, because the symptom (a crashloop three layers down)
+  is nothing like the cause.
+- **Published ports are NodePorts.** No ingress controller, no LoadBalancer, no TLS. The
+  four portals are the exception in *use*, not in wiring: PKCE needs `crypto.subtle`, which
+  browsers expose only in a secure context, so a portal has to be reached over `localhost`
+  (`make k8s-portals` forwards them) or eventually over HTTPS. `.Values.host` is therefore
+  "the address the browser uses", not "the node's address" — it pins Keycloak's issuer and
+  each portal's `config.json`, and both must agree with the URL bar (ADR-0010).
+- **Databases are `emptyDir` by default**, so the stack comes up on a cluster with no CSI
+  driver; setting `persistence.storageClass` switches every database to a PVC.
+- **Only two hosts become FQDNs** — OpenZaak (for the ACL and the zaaktype seed) and
+  Objecten (for the ACL's register writes), the two that Django validates as URLs.
+  Everything else keeps the short compose service name, because the upstream
+  `setup_configuration` files name those and Objecten matches an objecttype URL against the
+  one it was configured with. The portals used to be a third case — nginx's `resolver` never
+  appends search domains, so the bare `bff` upstream could not resolve on Kubernetes — which
+  ADR-0034 removed by serving them with Caddy, whose resolver honours `/etc/resolv.conf`.
+- **Compose stays CI-canonical.** The chart is a second deployment target, not a
+  replacement; the acceptance, verify and e2e lanes are unchanged.
+
+### Alternatives considered
+
+- **A chart per service, or an umbrella of 30 subcharts.** The conventional layout, and
+  roughly 1,500 lines of near-identical YAML for a stack where 28 of 30 workloads are
+  "one pod, one image, some env". It buys independent versioning we don't want (the stack
+  is demoed as a whole) and costs the eye-diffability against the compose file that keeps
+  the two stacks honest.
+- **`kompose convert`.** One-shot generation, no ongoing artefact to maintain — but it
+  drops exactly the parts that carry the design (init ordering, the config volumes, the
+  issuer pinning) and produces output nobody owns.
+- **Bitnami PostgreSQL/Redis subcharts.** Six more dependencies (CLAUDE.md §13) and a
+  second way of expressing the same three-line database.
+- **ingress-nginx with hostname routing.** Needs a controller, `/etc/hosts` entries and a
+  matching issuer host; NodePorts need none of it and reuse the mechanism
+  `infra/host-browser.yml` already proves.
+- **A registry on the laptop** (the obvious home for images built there). Talos cannot
+  side-load an image, so a registry is required either way — but reaching one on the host
+  means opening an inbound port on firewalld's `libvirt` zone, which needs root, and
+  pushing to it over plain HTTP means an `insecure-registries` entry in the Docker daemon,
+  which needs root again. `infra/helm/registry.yaml` runs the registry *in* the cluster on
+  a NodePort instead: pushing laptop → node is outbound and unfiltered, the node pulls from
+  its own NodePort, and `docker save | crane push --insecure` needs no daemon
+  configuration. Cost: one more (throwaway, `emptyDir`) workload, and a re-push if its pod
+  is replaced.
+- **Helm hooks (`pre-install`/`post-install`) for bootstrap ordering.** Hooks run after
+  `--wait`, which would deadlock: OpenZaak's readiness needs the migrations that the hook
+  is supposed to run. Idempotent Jobs plus retries need no such sequencing.
+
+- ponytail ceiling: single-node assumptions are baked in — one replica per workload,
+  `Recreate` rollouts, ReadWriteOnce volumes, no PodDisruptionBudgets, no resource
+  requests or limits (a laptop VM schedules everything or nothing), plain HTTP.
+  Upgrade path for a real cluster: add requests/limits per workload (the field is already
+  passed through), swap NodePorts for an Ingress with TLS, and give the databases a real
+  StorageClass — none of which changes the workload graph.
+
+## Consequences
+
+**Positive**
+
+- One file to read to see what the cluster runs, and it lines up with the compose file
+  line for line.
+- The compose IP workarounds disappear: cluster DNS supplies multi-label hosts.
+- `make k8s-lint` renders and schema-checks the whole stack without a cluster.
+- The config inputs have exactly one home (the repo) for both stacks — no fork to drift.
+
+**Negative / costs**
+
+- A second deployment description to keep in step with compose. Nothing enforces that
+  today; a drift check belongs in CI (follow-up).
+- `helm install` alone is not enough — the ConfigMaps must be seeded first, and a missing
+  one surfaces as `ContainerCreating`, not as a clear error.
+- Generic templates mean a values typo can render valid-but-wrong YAML; `k8s-lint` catches
+  schema errors, not intent.
+- The verify/e2e lanes do not run against the chart, so the Kubernetes path is verified by
+  hand (docs/runbooks/kubernetes-talos.md §5) rather than by CI.
+- The chart deviates from compose in four places now (args, self-configuring Django pods,
+  FQDN hosts, NodePorts). Each is forced by the platform and commented where it appears,
+  but it is four more things that can drift.
+
+## Coupling rules touched (CLAUDE.md §8)
+
+None. The chart deploys the same graph: portals reach only the BFF (§8.3), only the ACL
+holds ZGW credentials (§8.1), only the Workflow Client talks to Flowable (§8.2), each
+service keeps its own database (§8.5). No workload gained a peer it didn't have in compose.
+
+## Verified
+
+Brought up from scratch on a single-node Talos v1.14.0 VM (6 vCPU / 10 GB, virtio disk)
+under virt-manager: 29 pods ready and four bootstrap Jobs complete in under three minutes,
+with zero restarts, using ~4.4 GB of the VM's 10 GB. The smoke test in the runbook's §5
+walks the whole path — portal proxy → BFF → domain → Flowable → ACL → OpenZaak + Objecten →
+NRC → event-subscriber → projection → public register — plus a werkbak read with an
+MFA'd medewerker token. The browser flow itself was driven with Playwright against
+`http://localhost:30140`: secure context, PKCE, Keycloak form, login, no console errors.
+
+## Process note
+
+CLAUDE.md §14 wants the ADR proposal issue opened before the code, and §7 wants a slice
+issue behind the work. This landed the other way round — chart first, on request. The
+issue and the CI drift check are the outstanding follow-ups.
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+# ADR-0034: The portals are served by Caddy, not nginx
+
+- **Status:** Accepted
+- **Date:** 2026-09-04
+- **Deciders:** Respellion engineering
+- **Slice:** _(none yet — raised directly alongside the Kubernetes deployment, ADR-0033)_
+
+## Context
+
+Each portal ships as one image that does two jobs: serve the built Angular app, and
+reverse-proxy *its own* BFF endpoint group so the browser calls a single origin (no CORS,
+and the DigiD/medewerker token rides along — ADR-0010, ADR-0013). Until now that was nginx
+with a hand-written `nginx.conf` per app.
+
+Two workarounds had accumulated around nginx's resolver, both for the same root cause:
+**nginx resolves a variable `proxy_pass` upstream itself**, using only the `resolver`
+directive, and never the search domains in `/etc/resolv.conf`.
+
+1. `resolver 127.0.0.11` (Docker's embedded DNS) is wrong on rootless podman, which uses a
+   network-specific aardvark address — so `apps/portal-nginx-resolver.sh` rewrote the
+   directive at container start by reading the pod's actual nameserver.
+2. On Kubernetes the bare `bff` name cannot resolve at all without the `svc.cluster.local`
+   search domain, so the same script gained a `BFF_HOST` override that the Helm chart set
+   per portal (ADR-0033).
+
+Both existed only to tell the proxy how to resolve one hostname.
+
+## Decision
+
+**Serve the portals with `caddy:2-alpine` and a small `Caddyfile` per app, replacing the
+nginx runtime stage, the four `nginx.conf` files, and the resolver workaround.**
+
+Caddy dials its upstream per request through Go's resolver, which reads
+`/etc/resolv.conf` — nameserver *and* search domains. So `reverse_proxy bff:8080` resolves
+correctly under Docker, rootless podman and Kubernetes with no per-engine configuration,
+and it still starts before the BFF exists and picks up its restarts (the property the
+variable `proxy_pass` was there to buy). `apps/portal-nginx-resolver.sh`, its unit test and
+the chart's `BFF_HOST` env are deleted.
+
+The Caddyfile uses `handle` blocks rather than a bare `try_files`:
+
+```
+handle /behandel/* { reverse_proxy bff:8080 }
+handle { root * /usr/share/caddy; try_files {path} /index.html; file_server }
+```
+
+`handle` blocks are mutually exclusive and matched most-specific-first. This matters:
+Caddy's default directive order puts rewrites (`try_files`) *before* `reverse_proxy`, so a
+top-level `try_files {path} /index.html` would rewrite every API path to `/index.html`
+before the proxy ever saw it — the SPA fallback would silently eat the API. The `handle`
+form makes the routing explicit instead of relying on directive-order trivia.
+
+`infra/test_portal_caddyfiles.py` (in `make unit`) asserts each portal proxies exactly its
+own endpoint groups and keeps the SPA fallback. The four files are near-identical, so a
+copy-paste slip is cheap to make and expensive to find: proxying another portal's group
+hands a browser an endpoint its token isn't for, and the failure surfaces as a 401 three
+services away.
+
+### Alternatives considered
+
+- **Keep nginx.** Zero migration, and it works — but the resolver workaround stays, and it
+  had already grown a second head for Kubernetes. Both heads are nginx-specific.
+- **Keep nginx, hard-code the FQDN.** Would need a different config per deployment target
+  (compose vs Kubernetes), which is exactly the fork the chart was written to avoid.
+- **Drop the proxy and use CORS.** Turns the same-origin design (ADR-0010) inside out:
+  CORS preflights, an explicit origin allowlist in the BFF, and a token attached
+  cross-origin. Not a serving decision — an architectural regression.
+- **Kubernetes Ingress in front of the portals.** Solves nothing about compose, adds a
+  controller, and the portals would still need something to serve static files.
+
+- ponytail ceiling: plain HTTP on `:80`, no compression, no cache headers beyond Caddy's
+  defaults, and Caddy's automatic HTTPS deliberately unused (there is no hostname to get a
+  certificate for). Upgrade path: `encode zstd gzip` and a cache policy for immutable
+  Angular bundles; a real hostname makes TLS a one-line `Caddyfile` change, which is the
+  main reason this is worth having in place.
+
+## Consequences
+
+**Positive**
+
+- One resolver behaviour across compose, podman and Kubernetes; a script, a unit test and a
+  chart env var are deleted rather than maintained.
+- The images gain `curl` for free (the alpine nginx image had only busybox `wget`), which
+  the compose healthchecks can use.
+- Routing intent is readable: one `handle` block per endpoint group, one for the app.
+- TLS later is a one-line change instead of a new component.
+
+**Negative / costs**
+
+- A new runtime dependency in four images (CLAUDE.md §13): Caddy replaces nginx rather than
+  joining it, so the count is unchanged, but it is a less familiar config language for
+  anyone who has only read nginx configs.
+- The images grew: 90.6 MB against nginx's 75.7 MB, because `caddy:2-alpine` carries a
+  bigger static binary than nginx's. Measured, not estimated.
+- Caddy's directive-order rule is a genuine footgun (see above); the `handle` form and the
+  Caddyfile comments exist to keep the next person out of it.
+- Any operational note that says "the portal's nginx" is now wrong; the ones in `docs/` were
+  updated with this ADR.
+
+## Coupling rules touched (CLAUDE.md §8)
+
+None. §8.3 is unchanged and unchanged in kind: the portals still talk only to the BFF, and
+the proxy is still the thing that makes that same-origin.
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+# FDS-architectuur — Open Register
+
+Deze map bevat de architectuurbesluiten en de engineer-documentatie voor de FDS-kant van deze
+referentie-applicatie: deelnemen aan het Federatief Datastelsel als **afnemer**.
+
+De strategische inzet, de slices en de portfoliostatus staan in het Innovation Lab-repo,
+`Respellion/innovation-lab`, onder `projects/open-register-fd/`. Daar staan ook de
+architectuurblauwdruk, de FDS gap-analyse en de privacy-views.
+
+## Documenten
+
+| Document | Waarvoor |
+|---|---|
+| [`c4-component-view.md`](c4-component-view.md) | Componentview op niveau 3: ports en adapters, en welke views nog waarde toevoegen |
+| [`slice-1-proposal.md`](slice-1-proposal.md) | Het bouwbare eerste increment; plak dit in een `poc-voorstel`-issue |
+| `adr/` | De geaccepteerde architectuurbesluiten, ADR-0001 tot en met ADR-0006. Zie de tabel hieronder. |
+
+## Architecture Decision Records
+
+Een ADR legt een besluit vast dat **vaststaat**, met de context en de gevolgen, zodat het niet stil
+opnieuw wordt uitgevochten. Statuswaarden: `proposed` → `accepted` → (`vervangen door ADR-NNNN` |
+`deprecated`).
+
+Een geaccepteerde ADR wijzigen betekent een nieuwe ADR schrijven die de oude vervangt. Wij
+herschrijven de historie nooit.
+
+ADRs liggen naast governance. Acceptatie volgt de asynchrone bezwaarronde uit
+`Respellion/innovation-lab`, `operating-model/operating-model.md`, sectie *Besluitvorming*.
+
+| ADR | Besluit | Status |
+|---|---|---|
+| [0001](adr/0001-acl-at-every-register-boundary.md) | Anti-Corruption Layer op elke registergrens | accepted |
+| [0002](adr/0002-fsc-for-connectivity.md) | FSC voor connectiviteit tussen organisaties, geen ruwe REST | accepted |
+| [0003](adr/0003-pbac-via-opa.md) | Policy-based access control via OPA, FTV-klaar | accepted |
+| [0004](adr/0004-bounded-cache.md) | Begrensde cache; registers blijven systeem van registratie | accepted |
+| [0005](adr/0005-ldv-verwerkingenlog.md) | Verwerkingenlog via event-emissie, in lijn met LDV | accepted |
+| [0006](adr/0006-module-boundary-and-reuse.md) | Modulegrens en hergebruikstrategie: in-process → .NET-module → OpenMetadata-feed → gateway op verzoek | accepted |
+
+## Nummering
+
+Deze reeks staat los van de ADR-reeks over de referentie-applicatie zelf, die in
+[`../`](../adr-0001-loose-coupling.md) loopt van `adr-0001-loose-coupling` tot en met
+`adr-0010-bff-oidc`. Vandaar de eigen map `fds/`: beide reeksen beginnen bij 0001, en de nummers
+zouden anders over de volle breedte botsen.
+
+In de MkDocs-navigatie staan deze zes daarom als **FDS ADR-000N**, zodat de zijbalk ze niet met de
+reeks van de applicatie verwart.
+
+Nieuwe FDS-ADR: kopieer [`adr/template.md`](adr/template.md), neem het volgende nummer, en open een
+pull request.
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# ADR-0001: Anti-Corruption Layer op elke registergrens
+
+- **Status:** accepted
+- **Datum:** 2026-06-13
+- **Deciders:** Lab Circle (Build, Lead Link)
+- **Vervangt / vervangen door:** —
+
+## Context
+
+De applicatie bevraagt meerdere registers: BRP, NHR/KVK, en ZGW via OpenZaak. Hun vocabulaires en
+schema's verschillen van elkaar en van ons domein. Zij veranderen ook zelf mee met de FDS-standaarden.
+
+Lekt registervocabulaire het domeinmodel in, dan werkt elke wijziging aan de registerzijde door in de
+bedrijfslogica. Het domein wordt dan een lappendeken van vreemde begrippen in plaats van ubiquitous
+language.
+
+## Besluit
+
+Elk register is bereikbaar via een Anti-Corruption Layer: **één adapter per register**, die een
+**port** vervult die het domein definieert.
+
+Adapters doen alleen vertalen en velden versmallen. Zij bevatten geen bedrijfslogica. Het domein
+spreekt `Persoon` en `Organisatie`, en nooit veldnamen uit BRP of NHR.
+
+## Gevolgen
+
+**Positief:** verloop in registers en FDS-standaarden blijft bij de adapter. Het domein blijft stabiel
+en testbaar. Adapters zijn onafhankelijk vervangbaar, en dat is precies wat de FSC-wissel uit
+ADR-0002 goedkoop maakt. Het patroon generaliseert naar een herbruikbare ACL-template per register,
+een Foundations-kandidaat.
+
+**Negatief en kosten:** één vertaalmap per register om te schrijven en te onderhouden, plus een extra
+indirectie die engineers moeten respecteren in plaats van omzeilen.
+
+**Vervolgwerk:** extraheer de ACL-template zodra de tweede adapter bestaat (slice 3).
+
+## Overwogen alternatieven
+
+- **Registers direct aanroepen uit de applicatieservices** — afgewezen: dit koppelt bedrijfscode aan
+  registerschema's en aan versies van FDS-standaarden.
+- **Eén generieke registeradapter** — afgewezen: registers verschillen genoeg dat een generieke
+  abstractie zou gaan lekken of opzwellen. Adapters per register zijn duidelijker.
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# ADR-0002: FSC voor connectiviteit tussen organisaties, geen ruwe REST
+
+- **Status:** accepted
+- **Datum:** 2026-06-13
+- **Deciders:** Lab Circle, Upstream Liaison
+- **Vervangt / vervangen door:** —
+
+## Context
+
+Registerbevragingen kruisen een organisatiegrens naar systemen van bronhouders met
+persoonsgegevens. Het FDS noemt Federatieve Service Connectiviteit (FSC, de opvolger van NLX) als de
+richting voor connectiviteit: wederzijdse authenticatie op organisatieniveau, autorisatie
+gecontroleerd tegen een contract en gehandhaafd bij de bron, en symmetrische transactielogging.
+
+Een ruwe REST-client met mTLS geeft ons geen van de contractadministratie, delegatie of onafhankelijke
+tweezijdige verantwoording die een FG of auditor nodig heeft.
+
+## Besluit
+
+Het FSC Client-component stuurt alle registerbevragingen via een **FSC outway**, de
+EUPL-referentie-implementatie. De ACL-adapter hangt af van de FSC Client, en niet van een HTTP-client.
+
+FSC-zaken — contracten, identiteiten, delegatie — leven in dit component, achter de Register Port.
+
+## Gevolgen
+
+**Positief:** de autorisatie wordt bij de bron gehandhaafd, en niet op gezag van de aanroeper
+vertrouwd. Onweerlegbaar loggen aan beide uiteinden maakt onafhankelijke afstemming tegen ons LDV-log
+mogelijk. Delegatie wordt expliciet meegedragen. Wij lopen in lijn met de FDS-richting, vóór er een
+verplichting is.
+
+**Negatief en kosten:** FSC is operationeel zwaarder dan een REST-aanroep — beheer van certificaten en
+identiteiten, plus een outway die op De Werf moet draaien. De vergelijking FSC tegenover DSP loopt
+binnen het FDS nog, dus sommige details kunnen schuiven.
+
+**Vervolgwerk:** valideer het contract- en logginggedrag van de huidige fsc-nlx-implementatie
+(slice 2). Herzie dit als het FDS voor DSP kiest; ADR-0001 houdt die wissel beperkt tot één component.
+
+## Overwogen alternatieven
+
+- **Ruwe REST met mTLS** — afgewezen: geen contractlaag, geen tweezijdig log, en het wijkt af van het
+  FDS.
+- **Wachten tot het FDS FSC tegenover DSP heeft beslist** — afgewezen: de naad uit ADR-0001 laat ons nu
+  adopteren en later aanpassen. Wachten geeft het voordeel van vroege expertise weg.
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# ADR-0003: Policy-based access control via OPA, FTV-klaar
+
+- **Status:** accepted
+- **Datum:** 2026-06-13
+- **Deciders:** Lab Circle, FG (geconsulteerd)
+- **Vervangt / vervangen door:** —
+
+## Context
+
+Elke bevraging van persoonsgegevens uit BRP of NHR is een verwerking die een grondslag en een
+begrensde doelbinding nodig heeft. Toegangsregels moeten handhaafbaar en auditeerbaar zijn, en
+wijzigbaar zonder de bedrijfscode opnieuw uit te rollen.
+
+De Federatieve Toegangsverlening (FTV) van het FDS beweegt naar policy-based access control, maar is
+nog geen afgeronde standaard.
+
+## Besluit
+
+Introduceer een Policy Decision Point met Open Policy Agent (OPA). De applicatieservices roepen de
+PDP aan — via een Authorisation Port en een PDP Client — **vóór elke registerbevraging**, en geven
+rol, doel en grondslag mee.
+
+Policies schrijven wij als code, **geversioneerd in Gitea**, en zij gaan via review naar productie. De
+PDP staat zo gepositioneerd dat wij bij de komst van FTV alleen het policy-dialect opnieuw uitdrukken,
+zonder de architectuurgrens te verplaatsen.
+
+## Gevolgen
+
+**Positief:** doelbinding en grondslag worden gehandhaafd, en niet alleen gedocumenteerd. De FG kan de
+werkelijke regels in versiebeheer lezen, waardoor het verwerkingenregister en de gehandhaafde policy
+naar elkaar toe groeien. Toegangswijzigingen zijn reviewbaar en gedateerd.
+
+**Negatief en kosten:** BRP-autorisatiebesluiten correct modelleren is juridisch werk, geen
+engineering. De PDP maakt de handhaving betrouwbaar, niet de policy juist. Daarnaast komt er een
+component bij om te exploiteren.
+
+**Vervolgwerk:** een promotiepijplijn voor policies in Gitea Actions. Policies opnieuw uitdrukken zodra
+FTV stabiliseert. Een FG-review van de policy-set vóórdat er echte persoonsgegevens in komen.
+
+## Overwogen alternatieven
+
+- **Rolcontroles in de applicatiecode** — afgewezen: niet auditeerbaar, niet wijzigbaar zonder deploy,
+  en het verspreidt toegangslogica over de codebase.
+- **Wachten op FTV** — afgewezen: de PBAC-vorm is al duidelijk. Nu OPA, later het FTV-dialect.
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+# ADR-0004: Begrensde cache; registers blijven systeem van registratie
+
+- **Status:** accepted
+- **Datum:** 2026-06-13
+- **Deciders:** Lab Circle, FG (geconsulteerd)
+- **Vervangt / vervangen door:** —
+
+## Context
+
+*Data bij de bron* verbiedt het behandelen van registerdata als lokale bron van waarheid. Maar BRP of
+NHR bij elke interactie bevragen is onpraktisch en vergroot de blootstelling.
+
+Persoonsgegevens zijn de data die wij het minst willen opbouwen. Een onbegrensde cache wordt stil een
+schaduwregister, met een onbeheerde bewaarverplichting als gevolg.
+
+## Besluit
+
+Een **begrensde cache** staat achter een Cache Port, beheerd door een Cache Manager. Vier grenzen
+gelden.
+
+| Grens | Wat die betekent |
+|---|---|
+| **Tijd** | Een TTL die aan het doel hangt |
+| **Omvang** | Alleen de werkset van een actieve zaak |
+| **Gezag** | Antwoordt nooit wat de bron niet zou antwoorden; geen systeem van registratie |
+| **Adresseerbaarheid** | Gesleuteld op subject, zodat verwijderen op verzoek kan |
+
+Purge-triggers: het verstrijken van de TTL, het sluiten van de zaak, en een verwijderingsverzoek.
+
+## Gevolgen
+
+**Positief:** de prestaties van een lokale kopie, zonder een onbevoegd register te worden. Bewaartermijn
+en het recht op verwijdering zijn echte operaties, geen hoop. Dit is consistent met zowel
+AVG-dataminimalisatie als FDS-data-bij-de-bron.
+
+**Negatief en kosten:** de mapping van doel naar TTL is een beleidsbesluit, samen met de FG en de
+autorisatievoorwaarden, en geen engineeringconstante. Die is dus makkelijk fout te krijgen. Daarnaast
+komt de complexiteit van cache-invalidatie erbij.
+
+**Vervolgwerk:** definieer het beleid voor doel naar TTL met de FG. Maak een toestandsdiagram voor de
+levensloop van een cache-entry. Documenteer de aanvaardbare veroudering per register.
+
+## Overwogen alternatieven
+
+- **Geen cache; altijd de bron bevragen** — afgewezen: onpraktische latency en belasting, en meer
+  blootstelling per aanroep.
+- **Een onbegrensde of algemene cache** — afgewezen: die wordt een schaduwregister, precies de
+  faalvorm waar de AVG en het FDS beide tegen duwen.
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# ADR-0005: Verwerkingenlog via event-emissie, in lijn met LDV
+
+- **Status:** accepted
+- **Datum:** 2026-06-13
+- **Deciders:** Lab Circle, FG (geconsulteerd)
+- **Vervangt / vervangen door:** —
+
+## Context
+
+AVG art. 30 vereist een register van verwerkingsactiviteiten. De FDS-bouwsteen Logboek
+Dataverwerkingen (LDV) wijst naar een gestandaardiseerd verwerkingslog dat de burger kan bevragen.
+
+Database-CDC met Debezium legt *datawijzigingen* vast, en niet *verwerkingsgebeurtenissen met
+doelbinding*. Het is dus geen verwerkingenlog.
+
+## Besluit
+
+Elke registeradapter stuurt een **verwerkingsactiviteit-event** naar een eigen Redpanda-topic, via een
+Verwerking Port en een LDV Emitter. Het event bevat: subjectcategorie, register, velden, doel en
+doelbinding, grondslag, bevragende rol, en tijdstempel. **Nooit de opgehaalde waarden.**
+
+Een projectie maakt het log bevraagbaar. De emissie is asynchroon, maar niet over te slaan: de adapter
+die de Register Port vervult, is dezelfde code die het event uitstuurt.
+
+## Gevolgen
+
+**Positief:** het spoor voor art. 30 en LDV ontstaat als neveneffect van de bevraging, dus het kan niet
+uit de pas lopen met de werkelijkheid. Het is af te stemmen tegen de tweezijdige logs van FSC
+(ADR-0002). Het is onderscheidend in een tender.
+
+**Negatief en kosten:** een topic en een projectie om te exploiteren. Het ontsluiten van het log naar
+de burger valt buiten de huidige scope; wij produceren het log. Het eventschema vraagt governance.
+
+**Vervolgwerk:** definieer het schema van het verwerkingsevent. Bouw de bevraagbare projectie. Sluit
+aan op de LDV-standaard zodra die volwassen wordt; dit is een upstream-kandidaat.
+
+## Overwogen alternatieven
+
+- **Debezium-CDC hergebruiken als log** — afgewezen: dat legt datawijzigingen vast, en geen verwerking
+  met doelbinding. Verkeerde semantiek.
+- **Synchroon loggen in het aanroeppad** — afgewezen: dat koppelt de latency van de bevraging aan het
+  log. Asynchroon maar niet over te slaan geeft zowel snelheid als garantie.
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+# ADR-0006: Modulegrens en hergebruikstrategie voor de governed-access spine
+
+- **Status:** accepted
+- **Datum:** 2026-06-13
+- **Deciders:** Lab Circle (Lead Link, Build, Upstream Liaison)
+- **Vervangt / vervangen door:** —
+
+## Context
+
+De compliance-spine uit slice 1 bestaat uit de PDP-controle (ADR-0003), gegoverneerd uitgaand verkeer
+via FSC (ADR-0002), emissie van het verwerkingenlog (ADR-0005), en de begrensde cache (ADR-0004),
+allemaal achter ports (ADR-0001). Die spine is mogelijk breder herbruikbaar dan alleen in de
+referentie-applicatie.
+
+Er spelen twee hergebruikvragen: welke verpakkingsvorm kiezen wij, en hoe verhoudt de spine zich tot
+andere omgevingen zoals het OpenMetadata-datagovernanceproject?
+
+Twee verduidelijkingen bepalen het besluit.
+
+1. **OpenMetadata is geen afnemer.** In het datagovernanceproject is het de catalogus- en
+   lineage-laag over (synthetische) data. Het bevraagt geen BRP of NHR. FSC of de begrensde cache
+   daarin inbouwen zou zinloos zijn. De juiste aansluiting is **integratie van de output van de
+   spine**, en niet het inbouwen van de spine.
+2. **FSC en de begrensde cache zijn zaken die alleen een afnemer aangaan.** "Maak het herbruikbaar"
+   mag deze niet uitsmeren over componenten die geen registerdata bevragen.
+
+Nu al een taalonafhankelijke gateway bouwen — vóórdat er een tweede, niet-.NET afnemer bestaat — zou
+de valkuil van speculatieve architectuur herhalen, die wij voor de capability-laag al hebben
+afgewezen.
+
+## Besluit
+
+Wij nemen een **vraaggestuurde reeks van vier stappen** aan. Elke stap hangt af van echte behoefte, en
+niet van verwachte behoefte.
+
+| Stap | Wat | Wanneer |
+|---|---|---|
+| 1 | **In-process bewijzen.** Bouw de spine als gewone componenten achter ports, binnen de .NET register-applicatie. Nog geen extractie. Doel: de compliance-invarianten één keer echt valideren. | Slice 1 |
+| 2 | **Extraheren als .NET-module.** Zodra een tweede .NET-afnemer in zicht is, haal de spine eruit als een geversioneerde .NET-library of SDK. Dit is de ACL-template-extractie die het charter al plant. Herbruikbaar voor .NET-afnemers, en dat is genoeg voor register-reference en zijn broertjes. | Slice 3 |
+| 3 | **De feed LDV naar OpenMetadata aansluiten.** Route verwerkingsevents uit de LDV-emitter naar OpenMetadata als access- en usage-metadata bij het geclassificeerde asset: wie las welk persoonsgegevensveld, met welk doel, hoe vaak. Optioneel laten classificatietags uit OpenMetadata terugstromen om veldminimalisatie in de ACL aan te sturen. Dit is de concrete brug tussen beide anchor-projecten: integratie, geen inbouw. | Na stap 2 |
+| 4 | **Alleen op verzoek een taalonafhankelijke gateway bouwen.** Heeft een echte niet-.NET afnemer gegoverneerde registertoegang nodig, verpak de spine dan als zelfstandige sidecar of proxy met een dunne lokale API, met PDP, FSC-egress en LDV erachter. Niet eerder. | Op verzoek |
+
+## Gevolgen
+
+**Positief:** eigen software blijft minimaal. Hergebruik volgt op validatie in plaats van eraan vooraf
+te gaan. Beide anchor-projecten krijgen een concreet, benoemd integratiepunt (stap 3). Zaken die
+alleen een afnemer aangaan, blijven ingesloten.
+
+**Negatief en kosten:** de .NET-module uit stap 2 dient geen niet-.NET afnemers. Dat aanvaarden wij,
+omdat stap 4 dat geval dekt zodra het echt is. Stap 3 vraagt een afgesproken schema voor het
+verwerkingsevent, stabiel genoeg voor OpenMetadata om te consumeren.
+
+**Vervolgwerk:**
+
+1. Neem stap 3 als expliciet integratiepunt op in beide projectpagina's in het Innovation Lab-repo:
+   `projects/open-register-fd/README.md` en `projects/openmetadata/README.md`.
+2. Herzie de trigger van stap 4 bij elke portfolio-review. Bouw niet vooruit.
+3. Regel governance op het schema van het verwerkingsevent; dat is een gedeelde afhankelijkheid van
+   stap 1 en stap 3.
+
+## Overwogen alternatieven
+
+- **De taalonafhankelijke gateway vooraf bouwen** — afgewezen: speculatieve architectuur voordat er een
+  tweede afnemer bestaat. De latency en de operationele kosten zijn niet te rechtvaardigen.
+- **De spine in OpenMetadata inbouwen** — afgewezen: OpenMetadata is geen afnemer. Dit is een
+  categoriefout.
+- **De spine permanent in-process houden, zonder extractie** — afgewezen: dat geeft het hergebruik
+  tussen projecten en applicaties weg, en dat is een kerndoel van de Open Register-inzet.
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# ADR-NNNN: <titel>
+
+- **Status:** proposed
+- **Datum:** JJJJ-MM-DD
+- **Deciders:** <rollen>
+- **Vervangt / vervangen door:** —
+
+## Context
+
+<De krachten die spelen: het probleem, de beperkingen, de FDS- en AVG-drijfveren. Waarom er nu een
+besluit nodig is.>
+
+## Besluit
+
+<De keuze, eenvoudig gesteld.>
+
+## Gevolgen
+
+**Positief:** <wat dit oplevert>
+
+**Negatief en kosten:** <wat het kost, en wat wij aanvaarden>
+
+**Vervolgwerk:** <welk werk dit oproept>
+
+## Overwogen alternatieven
+
+<De afgewezen opties, en waarom.>
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+# C4-componentview — register-applicatie en capability-laag
+
+> Niveau 3, de componentview. Deze view zoomt in op de container van de .NET register-applicatie uit
+> het L2-containerdiagram. Zij verbindt het geheel op componentniveau — domein, ports, adapters en de
+> FDS-capability-componenten — en toont waar elk onderdeel externe tooling raakt.
+>
+> De hexagonale structuur is expliciet: het domein hangt alleen af van **ports** (interfaces). Elke
+> concrete capability is een **adapter** die aan een port is gebonden.
+>
+> De containerview (L2), de blauwdruk en de privacy-datastroomviews staan in het Innovation Lab-repo,
+> `Respellion/innovation-lab`, onder `projects/open-register-fd/`.
+
+```mermaid
+C4Component
+    title Componentview — register-applicatie (.NET) en de FDS-capability-laag
+
+    Person(user, "Behandelaar", "Behandelt zaken")
+    Container(spa, "Frontend", "Angular + NL Design System", "Zaakinterface")
+
+    Container_Boundary(app, "Register-applicatie (.NET, hexagonaal)") {
+        Component(api, "API / application services", ".NET", "Orkestreert use cases; verklaart doelbinding per vraag")
+        Component(domain, "Domeinmodel", ".NET / DDD", "Ubiquitous language; geen registervocabulaire")
+
+        Component(portReg, "Register Port", "interface", "De vraag van het domein: Personen / Organisaties")
+        Component(portPol, "Authorisation Port", "interface", "mag-deze-verwerking-doorgaan?")
+        Component(portLog, "Verwerking Port", "interface", "leg de verwerkingsgebeurtenis vast")
+        Component(portTm, "Terugmelding Port", "interface", "meld een vermoedelijke fout")
+        Component(portCache, "Cache Port", "interface", "doelgebonden lezen, schrijven en verwijderen")
+
+        Component(aclBrp, "BRP-adapter", ".NET", "Vertaalt domein<->BRP; minimale velden")
+        Component(aclKvk, "NHR/KVK-adapter", ".NET", "Vertaalt domein<->NHR; UBO-bewust")
+        Component(pdpClient, "PDP Client", ".NET -> OPA", "Roept de policy engine; geeft doel en grondslag mee")
+        Component(ldvEmit, "LDV Emitter", ".NET", "Bouwt het verwerkingsevent; publiceert naar Redpanda")
+        Component(fscClient, "FSC Client", ".NET", "Stuurt contractuele aanroepen via de outway")
+        Component(cacheMgr, "Cache Manager", ".NET", "TTL en verwijderen op subjectsleutel")
+        Component(tmHandler, "Terugmelding Handler", ".NET -> Flowable", "Start het terugmeldproces")
+        Component(procClient, "Process Client", ".NET -> Flowable", "Uitvoering van BPMN en DMN")
+    }
+
+    System_Ext(opa, "OPA (PDP)", "Policies geversioneerd in Gitea")
+    System_Ext(fsc, "FSC Outway", "EUPL-referentie-implementatie")
+    System_Ext(flowable, "Flowable", "BPMN + DMN")
+    ContainerDb_Ext(cache, "Begrensde cache", "PostgreSQL")
+    System_Ext(redpanda, "Redpanda", "LDV-topic + CDC")
+    System_Ext(brp, "BRP", "via FSC inway")
+    System_Ext(kvk, "NHR / KVK", "via FSC inway")
+    System_Ext(kanidm, "Kanidm", "OIDC")
+
+    Rel(user, spa, "Gebruikt")
+    Rel(spa, api, "REST/JSON")
+    Rel(kanidm, api, "OIDC", "authenticatie")
+    Rel(api, domain, "Roept aan")
+    Rel(api, portPol, "Controleert vóór de bevraging")
+    Rel(api, portReg, "Vraagt data")
+    Rel(api, portTm, "Dient melding in")
+    Rel(api, procClient, "Voert proces uit")
+
+    Rel(portPol, pdpClient, "gebonden aan")
+    Rel(pdpClient, opa, "besluitverzoek")
+
+    Rel(portReg, aclBrp, "gebonden aan")
+    Rel(portReg, aclKvk, "gebonden aan")
+    Rel(aclBrp, fscClient, "via")
+    Rel(aclKvk, fscClient, "via")
+    Rel(aclBrp, portLog, "stuurt event")
+    Rel(aclKvk, portLog, "stuurt event")
+    Rel(aclBrp, portCache, "leest en schrijft")
+    Rel(aclKvk, portCache, "leest en schrijft")
+    Rel(fscClient, fsc, "contractuele aanroep")
+    Rel(fsc, brp, "mTLS + contract")
+    Rel(fsc, kvk, "mTLS + contract")
+
+    Rel(portLog, ldvEmit, "gebonden aan")
+    Rel(ldvEmit, redpanda, "publiceert")
+    Rel(portCache, cacheMgr, "gebonden aan")
+    Rel(cacheMgr, cache, "slaat op")
+    Rel(portTm, tmHandler, "gebonden aan")
+    Rel(tmHandler, flowable, "start proces")
+    Rel(procClient, flowable, "voert uit")
+```
+
+## Hoe je dit leest
+
+1. **De ports zijn de naad.** Het domein en de application services hangen af van de vijf interfaces,
+   en nooit van adapters. FSC wisselen voor DSP, of OPA voor de latere FTV-client, verandert een
+   adapter — geen port, en niet het domein. Dit is de clock-speed boundary, concreet gemaakt.
+2. **De compliance-componenten zijn adapters, geen domeinlogica.** De PDP-client, de LDV-emitter, de
+   FSC-client en de cache manager staan allemaal aan de adapterzijde. Een bevraging kan er fysiek niet
+   langs, omdat de adapter die de Register Port vervult dezelfde code is die het LDV-event uitstuurt
+   en via FSC routeert.
+3. **Slechts twee componenten raken de registers**: de BRP-adapter en de NHR/KVK-adapter. Beide
+   bereiken ze uitsluitend via de FSC-client. Er is geen vierde pad.
+
+## Componenten tegenover verplichtingen
+
+| Component | Omvang eigen bouw | Verplichting die het afdekt |
+|---|---|---|
+| Domeinmodel | het product | correctheid van de bedrijfsregels |
+| BRP- en NHR-adapters | dun | dataminimalisatie: vertalen en velden versmallen |
+| PDP Client | klein | handhaven van grondslag en doelbinding |
+| LDV Emitter | klein | verwerkingenlog (AVG art. 30 en LDV) |
+| FSC Client | klein | geautoriseerde, gelogde connectiviteit |
+| Cache Manager | klein | grenzen aan bewaring, en verwijdering |
+| Terugmelding Handler | klein | de terugmeldplicht van de afnemer |
+
+---
+
+## Aanvullende views die voor engineers waarde hebben
+
+De diagrammen tot hier verklaren *structuur* en *compliance-intentie*. Engineers die dit bouwen,
+hebben er nog een aantal nodig. Wij tekenen geen view voordat er iets echt is om te beschrijven, dus
+elke regel noemt de trigger.
+
+| # | View | Wat het toevoegt | Trigger |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| 1 | **Deploymentview** (C4 deployment, topologie) | Waar elke container op De Werf draait: k3s-namespaces, welke services sidecar zijn en welke een eigen pod (is OPA een sidecar of centraal? waar eindigt de FSC outway?), netwerkpolicies tussen de vlakken van de vertrouwensgrens, en beheer van secrets en mTLS-certificaten voor FSC. Hier worden de privacy*grenzen* echte firewall- en netwerkregels. | Vóór de eerste deploy met meerdere services. **Hoogste waarde als volgende.** |
+| 2 | **Sequences voor de niet-gelukkige paden** | Wij hebben het gelukkige pad. Engineers hebben de lastige nodig: PDP-*deny* midden in een transactie, een verlopen of ingetrokken FSC-contract, een register-timeout terwijl er een verouderde cache-entry ligt, en een gedeeltelijk NHR-antwoord waarbij een UBO-veld is achtergehouden. Dit bepaalt de foutafhandeling, en hier verstoppen de compliance-randgevallen zich. | Direct na slice 1. |
+| 3 | **Domeinmodel en ERD** | De bounded contexts en aggregates in het domein, plus het cacheschema: welke persoonsgegevens blijven staan, op welke sleutel, en met welke purge-kolom. Dit is tegelijk het artefact dat de FG beoordeelt voor bewaartermijnen. | Zodra het domein in slice 1 stabiliseert. |
+| 4 | **Dataclassificatie- en catalogusview** | Elk veld dat een grens kruist, getagd — persoonsgegeven? bijzondere categorie? UBO-beperkt? — en gemapt op zijn classificatie in OpenMetadata. Dit stuurt de GDPR-scrubbingregels en de lineage-tags. | Beter *uit* OpenMetadata gegenereerd zodra die gevuld is, dan met de hand getekend. |
+| 5 | **Toestandsdiagram: levensloop van een cache-entry** | `fetched` → `valid` (binnen TTL) → `stale` → `purged` (TTL verstreken \| zaak gesloten \| verwijderingsverzoek). Klein, maar het pint de bewaarsemantiek vast die "begrensde cache" nu alleen in prose beschrijft. | Samen met ADR-0004-vervolgwerk. |
+| 6 | **BPMN-view: de terugmelding-workflow** | Het Flowable-proces zelf: ingediend → verstuurd naar bronhouder → bevestigd → opgelost of afgewezen. Dit is uitvoerbaar BPMN, dus het diagram en de implementatie zijn hetzelfde artefact. | Wanneer de terugmelding-slice start. |
+| 7 | **Threat model en vertrouwensgrensview** (STRIDE-stijl) | Dreigingen over de vertrouwensgrens leggen: tokendiefstal, cache poisoning, replay tegen FSC, policy bypass, en manipulatie van logs. Past natuurlijk bij de FSC-zoom, en is het anker van het securitygesprek. | Vóór het verwerken van echte persoonsgegevens. |
+| 8 | **CI/CD- en policy-promotieview** | Hoe OPA-policies en BPMN/DMN-modellen van een pull request naar draaiende configuratie gaan. "Toegangsbeheer is configuratie in Gitea" geldt alleen als er een pijplijn is die review en promotie handhaaft. | Samen met het vervolgwerk uit ADR-0003. |
+
+**Voorstel voor de volgende twee.** De **deploymentview**, omdat die de privacygrenzen omzet in
+handhaafbare netwerkpolicy. En de **sequences voor de niet-gelukkige paden**, omdat compliance daar
+werkelijk breekt.
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+# POC-voorstel — slice 1: walking skeleton (één register, gegoverneerde bevraging)
+
+> Klaar om in een `poc-voorstel`-issue te plakken, met de labels `build` en `poc`. Dit is het bouwbare
+> eerste increment dat de architectuurdocumenten beschrijven. Het bewijst met opzet de
+> *compliance-spine* end-to-end op de dunst mogelijke functionaliteit.
+
+## Probleem en strategische vraag
+
+Kunnen wij een registerbevraging demonstreren die *structureel* gegoverneerd is — onmogelijk uit te
+voeren zonder gehandhaafde grondslag en een automatische regel in het verwerkingenlog — op onze
+soevereine stack?
+
+Dit is de geloofwaardigheidstoets achter de hele Open Register-inzet (slice 1 van het charter) en
+achter de FDS gap-analyse.
+
+## Hypothese
+
+Wij verwachten dat het doorverbinden van één registerbevraging door de volledige capability-spine —
+Register Port → ACL-adapter → PDP-controle → FSC-aanroep → LDV-emissie → begrensde cache — de claim
+"compliance is structureel" bewijst.
+
+Wij weten dat wij het goed hebben als een geautomatiseerde test aantoont dat een bevraging **niet** kan
+voltooien als de PDP weigert, en **altijd** een LDV-event oplevert als de PDP toestaat.
+
+## Scope ter grootte van één blok
+
+**Wel in scope**
+
+| Onderdeel | Wat |
+|---|---|
+| Register | **NHR/KVK**, basisgegevens over onderneming en bestuurder. Gekozen boven BRP; zie de slotnotitie. |
+| Use case | Geef bij een KVK-nummer de geregistreerde organisatie terug aan het domein, voor één verklaard doel. |
+| Ports | De vijf ports als interface. Concrete adapters: NHR-ACL, PDP-client (OPA), FSC-client met sandbox- of test-outway, LDV-emitter (Redpanda-topic), en cache manager (PostgreSQL met TTL). |
+| Policy | OPA draait met één handgeschreven voorbeeldpolicy in Gitea: één allow-regel en één deny-geval. |
+| Log | Verwerkingsevent-schema v0 plus een minimale bevraagbare projectie; een tabelweergave is genoeg. |
+| Tests | Tests die de twee compliance-invarianten vastleggen: deny blokkeert, allow logt. |
+
+**Niet in scope** — even belangrijk om op te schrijven.
+
+1. Afgewerkte interface of NL Design System-schermen, verder dan een dev-harness.
+2. BRP en paden met veel persoonsgegevens. Die gaan naar slice 2, met een door de FG beoordeelde
+   policy.
+3. UBO-data. Het regime van beperkte toegankelijkheid valt buiten deze slice.
+4. De terugmelding-workflow (latere slice), DCAT-export, en Superset-dashboards.
+5. Echte register-endpoints. Alleen sandbox en stubs.
+
+## Definition of Done
+
+- [ ] Een bevraging op KVK-nummer geeft een domein-`Organisatie` terug via de NHR-ACL-adapter, zonder
+      registervocabulaire in het domein (ADR-0001).
+- [ ] De aanroep loopt via de FSC-client naar een sandbox-outway, en niet via een ruwe HTTP-client
+      (ADR-0002).
+- [ ] Er vindt geen bevraging plaats tenzij de PDP allow teruggeeft voor de combinatie rol, doel en
+      grondslag (ADR-0003).
+- [ ] Elke toegestane bevraging stuurt precies één verwerkingsevent naar Redpanda, bevraagbaar in de
+      projectie, zonder opgehaalde waarden (ADR-0005).
+- [ ] Cache-entries dragen een TTL en een subjectsleutel; een purge-aanroep verwijdert ze (ADR-0004).
+- [ ] **De tests op de compliance-invarianten slagen in CI:** (a) PDP-deny betekent geen FSC-aanroep;
+      (b) PDP-allow betekent precies één LDV-event; (c) te ruim gevraagde velden bereiken het domein
+      nooit.
+- [ ] Het geheel draait lokaal uit een gedocumenteerd `compose`- of k3s-manifest met stubs, zonder
+      echte registertoegang.
+- [ ] ADR-0001 tot en met ADR-0005 zijn vanuit de code gelinkt. Eén nieuwe ADR als er in slice 1 een
+      besluit ontstaat.
+
+## Acceptatiedemo (bewijs voor de week-3-toets)
+
+Live: een geslaagde bevraging plus de bijbehorende LDV-regel. Zet daarna de policy op deny en toon
+dezelfde bevraging geweigerd, zonder registeraanroep en zonder data.
+
+Dat contrast *is* de demo.
+
+## Ontvangende Delivery Circle (voorlopig)
+
+De register-reference Delivery Circle. De Handoff-ontvanger krijgt bij de kickoff een naam.
+
+Waarschijnlijke adoptie: de capability-spine wordt het herbruikbare substraat voor de
+register-reference-applicatie.
+
+## Upstream-kandidaten
+
+| Project | Wat wij kunnen bijdragen |
+|---|---|
+| fsc-nlx | Ergonomie van de sandbox en testomgeving, plus documentatie |
+| OPA | Policy-patronen voor het modelleren van Nederlandse grondslagen |
+| OpenMetadata | Later een DCAT-AP-NL exporter; dit verbindt het OpenMetadata-project |
+
+## AVG- en soevereiniteitsoverwegingen
+
+Alleen NHR-basisgegevens, over onderneming en bestuurder, en in slice 1 **gestubd**. Er worden geen
+echte persoonsgegevens verwerkt.
+
+Een FG-review is een voorwaarde voor slice 2, met echte data en BRP. Alle componenten draaien
+zelfgehost op De Werf; OPA-policies en BPMN staan in Gitea.
+
+## Slotnotitie: waarom NHR vóór BRP voor het skeleton
+
+Beide registers bevatten persoonsgegevens, dus geen van beide is "gratis". NHR-basisgegevens over
+onderneming en bestuurder zijn echter minder gevoelig dan BRP-gegevens over inwoners, en er is een
+duidelijker verhaal rond een publieke sandbox.
+
+Zo bewijst slice 1 het *mechanisme*, voordat slice 2 BRP oppakt onder een door de FG beoordeelde
+policy. UBO-data blijft buiten scope tot het toegangsregime is gemodelleerd.
@@ -5,6 +5,40 @@ copy-pasteable walkthrough against a local `make up` stack.

 ---

+## S-26/#162 — the werkbak refreshes itself (ADR-0032)
+
+**Outcome:** a registration that reaches beoordeling while a behandelaar already has the werkbak open
+**appears on its own** — no reload. The page re-reads `GET /behandel/werkbak` every 5 seconds; a
+background refresh swaps the rows in without flashing the loading state, and a transient failure no
+longer strands the view on its error message until someone reloads.
+
+```bash
+# 1. Two windows. Left: the behandel werkbak, already open and idle.
+python3 infra/keycloak/check_realms.py otp   # a code, valid right now
+open http://localhost:8142                   # merel-behandelaar / test123 + that code
+#
+# 2. Right: submit a registration and supply its documents (this is what routes it to Beoordelen).
+open http://localhost:8140                   # jan-burger / test123 → indienen → upload a PDF
+#
+# 3. Watch the left window. Within ~5 seconds the new reference appears in the werkbak — the page was
+#    never reloaded and never left the werkbak.
+#
+# 4. Automated, end to end: the happy path now waits for the werkbak row WITHOUT reloading, so the
+#    absence of the reload IS the assertion.
+make verify-e2e        # → registration.spec: "… → behandelaar goedkeurt → public INGESCHREVEN"
+#
+# 5. Component level (background refresh, failure recovery, teardown):
+pnpm nx test behandel  # → "picks up a newly submitted registration without a reload" (+3 guards)
+```
+
+**The path:** unchanged — portal → BFF `GET /behandel/werkbak` → domain `Werkbak` → Flowable. Only the
+page's cadence is new: `interval(WERKBAK_REFRESH_MS)` scoped to the page with `takeUntilDestroyed()`.
+
+**Not push:** nothing notifies the BFF either, so SSE/WebSockets would poll the domain inside the BFF
+for the same freshness plus connection state — see ADR-0032 for the trade-off and the upgrade path.
+
+---
+
 ## S-19a — approval writes the register record to Objecten (#149, ADR-0028)

 **Outcome:** approving a registration no longer only moves the ZGW zaak to its eindstatus — it also
@@ -140,7 +174,8 @@ zaaktype cache). Store is in-memory: an edit reverts to the configured env on re

 ```bash
 make up
-# 1. Log in as bram-beheerder / test123 → "Default-fill" tab → change a value → Opslaan.
+# 1. Log in as bram-beheerder / test123 + OTP (`python3 infra/keycloak/check_realms.py otp`)
+#    → "Default-fill" tab → change a value → Opslaan.
 open http://localhost:8143/default-fill
 #
 # 2. Automated: the ACL uses the current default-fill per zaak (unit) and the endpoints are behind the
@@ -161,7 +196,8 @@ directly (ADR-0025); managing the default-fill config (S-15b) and MFA (S-15c) co

 ```bash
 make up
-# 1. Log in as bram-beheerder / test123 → the catalogus lists the published zaaktypen.
+# 1. Log in as bram-beheerder / test123 + OTP (`python3 infra/keycloak/check_realms.py otp`)
+#    → the catalogus lists the published zaaktypen.
 open http://localhost:8143
 #
 # 2. Automated (a CI verify-stack e2e): a beheerder logs in and sees BIG-REGISTRATIE.
@@ -304,7 +340,8 @@ make verify-local     # → "OK — a fresh local stack completed the flow with

 # 3. Or by hand in the browser: log in at http://localhost:8140 (jan-burger / test123), submit +
 #    upload a PDF, then approve it in the werkbak at http://localhost:8142 (merel-behandelaar /
-#    test123); it shows as INGESCHREVEN in the openbaar register at http://localhost:8141.
+#    test123 + OTP, see S-15c); it shows as INGESCHREVEN in the openbaar register at
+#    http://localhost:8141.
 ```

 > The zaaktype is discovered by the ACL itself since S-27 (below); `local-seed`'s `acl.env` now
@@ -352,7 +389,7 @@ make verify-e2e          # → login as jan-burger → submit → "ontvangen" co
 open http://localhost:8140
 ```

-> The portal is served same-origin with the BFF (nginx proxies `/self-service` + `/openbaar`), so no
+> The portal is served same-origin with the BFF (Caddy proxies `/self-service` + `/openbaar`), so no
 > CORS; the OIDC authority comes from `/config.json` at runtime. See `docs/frontend-decisions.md`.

 ---
@@ -589,7 +626,7 @@ or **afwijzen** — which also completes the Beoordelen task so the process adva

 ```text
 # 1. Open the behandel portal and log in as a behandelaar (medewerker realm):
-#    http://localhost:8142/   →  merel-behandelaar / test123
+#    http://localhost:8142/   →  merel-behandelaar / test123 + OTP
 #
 # 2. The werkbak lists the registrations awaiting beoordeling (referentie / bsn / status).
 #    Find the reference from the submit confirmation and click "Goedkeuren" on that row.
@@ -812,3 +849,32 @@ make verify-domain     # → "the timed-out registration's zaak was cancelled to
 `POST /annuleringen` → ZGW `resultaten` + `statussen` (Geannuleerd); the aggregate then moves to
 `Verlopen`. The ACL cancels the zaak **before** the aggregate is expired, so a failed ZGW call leaves the
 job for redelivery rather than diverging the two (ADR-0019).
+
+---
+
+## S-15c — MFA on the medewerker realm (#132, ADR-0031)
+
+**Outcome:** staff logins (behandel + beheer portals) need a **second factor**. The medewerker realm
+seeds every medewerker with a TOTP credential, so Keycloak's conditional-OTP step challenges them in
+both the browser flow and the direct grant; a password alone no longer yields a token. `CONFIGURE_TOTP`
+is a default required action, so a medewerker added later must enrol first. Citizen realms (digid,
+eherkenning, eidas) are unchanged — they mock brokers that carry their own assurance.
+
+```bash
+# 1. Manual: log in to the behandel portal. After username + password Keycloak asks for a code.
+python3 infra/keycloak/check_realms.py otp   # a valid code, right now
+open http://localhost:8142                   # merel-behandelaar / test123 + that code
+#
+# 2. Automated: the realm smoke check asserts the password alone is REFUSED, then that
+#    password + TOTP succeeds and still carries the behandelaar role:
+make keycloak-smoke    # → "medewerker  merel-behandelaar  password-only login refused [OK]"
+#
+# 3. End-to-end: every staff login in the e2e goes through the OTP prompt (loginMedewerker):
+make verify-e2e        # → registration.spec (behandelaar approves), catalogus.spec, default-fill.spec
+```
+
+**The path:** the seeded `otp` credential in `infra/keycloak/realms/medewerker-realm.json` activates
+Keycloak's stock conditional-OTP subflow — no custom browser flow. The fixture secret is shared and
+committed on purpose so the checks can compute codes; a real deployment enrols per-user authenticators
+(ADR-0031).
+
@@ -77,11 +77,13 @@ with the submit form (S-08c, #67); any deviation from NL DS will be recorded her

 ## Serving + e2e (S-08d, #68)

- **Served by nginx, same-origin as the BFF.** The compose `self-service` image serves the built app
+- **Served by Caddy, same-origin as the BFF.** The compose `self-service` image serves the built app
  and **reverse-proxies** `/self-service/*` + `/openbaar/*` to the `bff` service. Because the
-  api-client uses **relative URLs**, the browser calls the app's own origin → nginx forwards to the
-  BFF: **no CORS**, and the DigiD token (same-origin) is attached by the interceptor. nginx resolves
-  the BFF at request time (a `resolver` + variable `proxy_pass`) so it starts before the BFF is up.
+  api-client uses **relative URLs**, the browser calls the app's own origin → Caddy forwards to the
+  BFF: **no CORS**, and the DigiD token (same-origin) is attached by the interceptor. Caddy dials
+  the BFF per request through the system resolver, so it starts before the BFF is up, picks up its
+  restarts, and resolves the bare `bff` name on every engine — compose, podman and Kubernetes
+  (ADR-0034; the `Caddyfile` sits next to each app's `Dockerfile`).
 - **Runtime config.** The app fetches `/config.json` before bootstrap (`main.ts`); `appConfig` is a
  factory. The dev default (`public/config.json`) points at `localhost:8180`; the Docker image bakes
  the compose value (`keycloak:8080`). One build, per-environment OIDC authority.
@@ -110,7 +112,7 @@ with the submit form (S-08c, #67); any deviation from NL DS will be recorded her
  `angular-auth-oidc-client`, no interceptor, and no `config.json` — `main.ts` bootstraps `appConfig`
  directly with just `provideHttpClient` + `provideRouter`. This is the deliberate contrast to
  self-service and keeps the app trivially cacheable/CDN-able.
- **Same-origin via nginx, like self-service.** The compose `openbaar` image serves the built app and
+- **Same-origin via Caddy, like self-service.** The compose `openbaar` image serves the built app and
  reverse-proxies `/openbaar` to the BFF; the api-client's relative calls stay same-origin (no CORS).
  Served on `:8141`, health-checked over IPv4 (`127.0.0.1`), no Keycloak dependency.
 - **Public-safe by construction.** The portal only ever sees the BFF's `OpenbaarProjection.PublicView`
@@ -138,7 +140,7 @@ frontend work is the medewerker realm auth and the werkbak/decide page. Wiring r
  **BFF remains the security boundary** (`behandelaar` policy, 401/403 on `/behandel/*`, ADR-0013);
  the frontend role signal is for display/UX, and the werkbak page surfaces a load failure (e.g. a
  403 for a non-behandelaar) rather than swallowing it.
- **Same-origin via nginx, like the other portals.** The compose `behandel` image serves the built
+- **Same-origin via Caddy, like the other portals.** The compose `behandel` image serves the built
  app and reverse-proxies `/behandel` to the BFF (relative calls, no CORS). Served on `:8142`,
  health-checked over IPv4 (`127.0.0.1`), depends on Keycloak for the medewerker realm.
 - **Werkbak = decide-and-refresh.** `WerkbakPage` loads `GET /behandel/werkbak` on open and renders a
@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ should teach.
 - **[Product Requirements](PRD.md)** — what we're building and why.
 - **[ADR-0001: Loose coupling](architecture/adr-0001-loose-coupling.md)** — the
  non-negotiable integration stance; the template for future ADRs.
+- **[FDS architecture](architecture/fds/README.md)** — participating in the Federatief
+  Datastelsel as an afnemer: FDS ADR-0001…0006, the L3 component view, the slice-1 proposal.
+  In Dutch; the strategic framing lives in `Respellion/innovation-lab`.
 - **[Working in Gitea](gitea-workflow.md)** — issues, milestones, branches, PRs.
 - **[CI runbook](runbooks/ci.md)** — the pipeline and the `make ci` local gate.

@@ -245,3 +245,47 @@ the verify-stack check table, and per-spec e2e results (`infra/playwright-summar
 - Getting a report out of the e2e container: Playwright writes `playwright-report.json`
  inside the container; `infra/run-e2e-check.sh` `docker cp`s it back to the host
  (capturing the test exit code first) so the summary step can read it.
+
+---
+
+## 9. `if: always()` does not survive the job being killed — bound the work itself
+
+`if: always()` makes a step run when an *earlier step failed*. It does **not** help when
+the job as a whole is stopped: the run's remaining steps are simply never dispatched.
+
+That is how #161 lost its diagnosis. `verify-stack` entered `make verify-e2e` at 09:48:17
+and the job ended at 10:14:54 — 26½ minutes later, mid-suite. Every step after the e2e
+shows a **0-second `failure`** stamped at that same instant:
+
+```
+14 failure  09:48:17 -> 10:14:54  Self-service e2e (Playwright, login → submit → success)
+15 failure  10:14:54 -> 10:14:54  verify-stack check summary       ← if: always()
+16 failure  10:14:54 -> 10:14:54  e2e spec summary                 ← if: always()
+17 failure  10:14:54 -> 10:14:54  Dump container logs on failure   ← if: failure()
+18 failure  10:14:54 -> 10:14:54  Tear down                        ← if: always()
+```
+
+So the per-spec summary, the container-log dump and the teardown never ran, and the job
+log — which also loses whatever the killed process had buffered — ended at a single `✘`
+line. A job that dies takes its own post-mortem with it.
+
+**Read the step timings, not just the log.** `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/actions/jobs/{id}`
+returns every step with `started_at`/`completed_at`; a row of identical zero-length
+steps at the end means *killed*, not *silent*. (Job ids come from
+`…/actions/runs/{run}/jobs`, and that route returns only the **latest attempt** — a
+re-run hides the failed one, so keep the failing job id from the original report. Logs:
+`…/actions/jobs/{id}/logs`, see also `gitea-ci-logs`.)
+
+**Conventions that follow:**
+
+- **Bound long-running work inside the tool**, where it can still report. Playwright's
+  `globalTimeout` (`tests/e2e/playwright.config.ts`) ends the run, writes the JSON
+  report and exits, so the summary and log-dump steps still get their turn. A
+  `timeout-minutes` on the job would reproduce the very failure above.
+- **Never let an auto-waiting action be the timeout.** Playwright actions (`fill`,
+  `click`) inherit the *test* timeout, not `expect.timeout`, so a missing element costs
+  the full 90 s and reports `locator.fill: Test timeout …` — the symptom. Assert the
+  element visible first with its own budget and a message (`tests/e2e/keycloak-login.ts`).
+- Remember `concurrency.cancel-in-progress: true` in `ci.yaml`: a new push to the same
+  ref, or a re-run, kills the in-flight run the same way. Check `run_attempt` before
+  concluding a job hung.
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ login per realm and asserts the identifying claim:
 | eidas | pierre-dupont | `eidas_id` |
 | medewerker | merel-behandelaar | role `behandelaar` |

+The medewerker row also asserts that the password **alone** is refused — that realm
+enforces MFA (below).
+
 All test users / credentials are in [../synthetic-data.md](../synthetic-data.md).

 ## Notes
@@ -35,3 +38,36 @@ All test users / credentials are in [../synthetic-data.md](../synthetic-data.md)
 - **Image** pinned to `quay.io/keycloak/keycloak:26.1`.
 - Claims are injected by OIDC protocol mappers on `big-portal` (user attribute → token
  claim); `medewerker` roles come through `realm_access.roles`.
+
+## MFA on the medewerker realm (S-15c)
+
+Staff logins (behandel + beheer portals) need a second factor; citizen/company realms
+(digid, eherkenning, eidas) do not. Two halves in `medewerker-realm.json`:
+
+- Every seeded medewerker carries a **TOTP credential** with the fixture secret
+  `BIGMEDEWERKEROTPSEED`, so Keycloak's built-in *conditional OTP* step fires on every
+  login — browser flow (an `#otp` prompt after the password) and direct grant (a `totp`
+  form field) alike.
+- `CONFIGURE_TOTP` is a **default required action**, so any medewerker added later must
+  enrol an authenticator before the first login.
+
+See [../architecture/adr-0031-mfa-on-the-medewerker-realm.md](../architecture/adr-0031-mfa-on-the-medewerker-realm.md).
+
+### Getting a code
+
+```bash
+python3 infra/keycloak/check_realms.py otp   # prints a valid 6-digit code right now
+```
+
+Or enrol a phone once: the secret in base32 is `IJEUOTKFIRCVORKSJNCVET2UKBJUKRKE`
+(`otpauth://totp/medewerker?secret=IJEUOTKFIRCVORKSJNCVET2UKBJUKRKE`). The e2e computes its
+own code in `tests/e2e/medewerker-login.ts`.
+
+**A code is single-use.** Keycloak's `otpPolicyCodeReusable` defaults to false, so it refuses a
+code it has already accepted — a second login as the same medewerker inside the same 30-second
+window fails with `invalid_grant` / *Invalid user credentials*, even though the code is current.
+Nothing to fix in the realm: wait for the next window, or spend the following counter, which is
+what `nextUnusedCounter` in `tests/e2e/medewerker-login.ts` does for back-to-back specs.
+
+**Fixture only.** A shared, committed secret is a demo convenience, never a production
+posture — see the ADR's consequences.
@@ -0,0 +1,370 @@
+# Deploying the stack to a single-node Talos cluster
+
+The Helm chart in `infra/helm/big-reference` is a port of `infra/docker-compose.yml`
+(ADR-0033). This runbook is the walkthrough that was actually used to bring the stack up
+on a Talos VM under virt-manager on a laptop, including the parts that bite.
+
+Compose remains the CI-canonical stack — `make verify`, the acceptance lane and the
+Playwright e2e all still drive it. Kubernetes is a second deployment target.
+
+## 0. What you need
+
+On the laptop, four static binaries, all installable to `~/.local/bin` without root:
+
+```bash
+curl -sSLo ~/.local/bin/talosctl https://github.com/siderolabs/talos/releases/download/v1.14.0/talosctl-linux-amd64
+curl -sSLo ~/.local/bin/kubectl   https://dl.k8s.io/release/v1.37.0/bin/linux/amd64/kubectl
+curl -sSL https://get.helm.sh/helm-v3.16.4-linux-amd64.tar.gz | tar xz -O linux-amd64/helm > ~/.local/bin/helm
+curl -sSL https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/releases/download/v0.20.2/go-containerregistry_Linux_x86_64.tar.gz | tar xz -O crane > ~/.local/bin/crane
+chmod +x ~/.local/bin/{talosctl,kubectl,helm,crane}
+```
+
+Match `talosctl` to the Talos ISO you booted (`talosctl version --insecure -n <ip>` reports
+the server's tag). `crane` is what pushes images to a plain-HTTP registry without a
+root-level Docker daemon change — see §2.
+
+**VM sizing.** 6 vCPU / 10 GB RAM / 27 GB disk runs the whole stack with room to spare
+(measured: ~4.4 GB used, 5.4 GB available with all 29 pods up). 4 GB is not enough. The
+chart sets no resource requests or limits on purpose — on a single node the VM's RAM is the
+only budget there is. Resize a stopped VM with:
+
+```bash
+virsh -c qemu:///system destroy talos      # it's in maintenance mode; nothing is lost
+virsh -c qemu:///system setmaxmem talos 10G --config
+virsh -c qemu:///system setmem    talos 10G --config
+virsh -c qemu:///system setvcpus  talos 6 --config --maximum
+virsh -c qemu:///system setvcpus  talos 6 --config
+```
+
+Two addresses matter throughout:
+
+| Name | Meaning | Example |
+|---|---|---|
+| `TALOS_HOST` | the VM's IP — used by the browser, `talosctl` and `kubectl` | `192.168.122.33` |
+| `K8S_REGISTRY` | `TALOS_HOST:30500` — the in-cluster registry (§2) | `192.168.122.33:30500` |
+
+Find the VM's address with `virsh -c qemu:///system net-dhcp-leases default`.
+
+## 1. Install Talos onto the VM
+
+### The virt-manager trap
+
+virt-manager treats the install ISO as one-shot: on the VM's **first shutdown** it ejects
+the CD and rewrites the boot order to `hd`. A Talos VM booted from `metal-amd64.iso` runs
+entirely in RAM, so the disk is still empty — the next start lands on
+`Boot failed: not a bootable disk`. Put the ISO back before installing:
+
+```bash
+virsh -c qemu:///system change-media talos sda /path/to/metal-amd64.iso --config --insert
+virt-xml -c qemu:///system talos --edit --boot cdrom,hd
+virsh -c qemu:///system start talos
+```
+
+Wait for the maintenance-mode API, then confirm the install disk's device name — on virtio
+it is `/dev/vda`, and Talos's default selector expects `/dev/sda`:
+
+```bash
+talosctl get disks --insecure -n <TALOS_HOST> -e <TALOS_HOST>
+```
+
+### Generate the machine config
+
+Talos 1.14 moved several v1alpha1 fields into their own config documents. In particular
+`machine.install` is now `UnattendedInstallConfig`, and patching the old field is rejected
+with *"UnattendedInstallConfig config is incompatible with v1alpha1 config"*. Write
+`patch.yaml` as a multi-document patch:
+
+```yaml
+machine:
+  certSANs:
+    - 192.168.122.33
+  registries:
+    mirrors:
+      # The in-cluster registry (§2) speaks plain HTTP.
+      "192.168.122.33:30500":
+        endpoints:
+          - http://192.168.122.33:30500
+---
+apiVersion: v1alpha1
+kind: UnattendedInstallConfig
+provisioning:
+  diskSelector:
+    match: disk.dev_path == "/dev/vda"
+```
+
+```bash
+talosctl gen config big https://<TALOS_HOST>:6443 --output-dir ~/.talos/big --config-patch @patch.yaml
+talosctl apply-config --insecure -n <TALOS_HOST> -e <TALOS_HOST> --file ~/.talos/big/controlplane.yaml
+```
+
+Talos installs to the disk and **kexecs straight into the installed system**, so the CD
+boot order doesn't get in the way here. Then point the client at the node and bootstrap:
+
+```bash
+talosctl config merge ~/.talos/big/talosconfig
+talosctl config endpoint <TALOS_HOST>
+talosctl config node <TALOS_HOST>
+talosctl bootstrap                      # wait for `talosctl version` to answer first
+talosctl kubeconfig -f ~/.kube/config
+```
+
+A single-node cluster must run workloads on the control plane, or CoreDNS never schedules:
+
+```bash
+kubectl taint node --all node-role.kubernetes.io/control-plane-
+```
+
+Finally, make a VM restart boot the installed system rather than the ISO (takes effect at
+the next full power cycle):
+
+```bash
+virsh -c qemu:///system change-media talos sda --eject --config
+virt-xml -c qemu:///system talos --edit --boot hd
+```
+
+## 2. A registry the node can pull from
+
+Talos has no Docker daemon and no way to side-load an image, so this repo's images have to
+come from a registry. The registry runs **inside the cluster**, published on NodePort
+30500 (`infra/helm/registry.yaml`):
+
+```bash
+make k8s-registry
+```
+
+Why in-cluster rather than on the laptop: a laptop-side registry needs an inbound port
+opened on firewalld's `libvirt` zone (`sudo firewall-cmd --zone=libvirt --add-port=5000/tcp`),
+which needs root. Pushing from the laptop *to* the node is outbound and always allowed, and
+the node pulls from its own NodePort. If you do open that port, put a registry on the
+laptop instead and point `K8S_REGISTRY` at `<laptop-ip>:5000` — the mirror patch in §1 has
+an entry ready for it.
+
+Its storage is `emptyDir`, so if the registry pod is ever replaced, re-run `make k8s-images`.
+
+## 3. Build and push the images
+
+```bash
+make k8s-images K8S_REGISTRY=<TALOS_HOST>:30500
+```
+
+This builds the nine images with `docker compose build` — same contexts and Dockerfiles as
+compose, no second build definition — then `docker save | crane push --insecure` each one.
+`docker push` is not used: the registry speaks plain HTTP, which the Docker daemon refuses
+without a root-level `insecure-registries` entry, while crane just takes `--insecure`.
+
+## 4. Deploy
+
+```bash
+make k8s-up TALOS_HOST=<TALOS_HOST> K8S_REGISTRY=<TALOS_HOST>:30500
+```
+
+That does two things:
+
+1. `make k8s-seed` — creates the ConfigMaps the chart mounts, from the config files that
+   already live in this repo (`infra/helm/seed-configmaps.sh`): the four
+   `setup_configuration/data.yaml` files, the Keycloak realm exports, the BPMN + DMN, and
+   the two bootstrap scripts. Re-run it after editing any of them.
+2. `helm upgrade --install` of the chart into namespace `big`.
+
+First bring-up takes a few minutes: the four Django services migrate their databases and
+apply their `setup_configuration`, Flowable creates its schema, and the bootstrap Jobs
+deploy the BPMN/DMN, seed the zaaktype and register the NRC abonnement.
+
+```bash
+kubectl -n big get pods -w
+kubectl -n big get jobs        # all four must reach COMPLETIONS 1/1
+```
+
+The Jobs are the stack's wiring; if one is not complete, the flow is broken somewhere
+specific:
+
+| Job | What breaks without it |
+|---|---|
+| `flowable-init` | no `registratie` process, no diploma DMN |
+| `registerrecord-init` | the register has no RegisterRecord objecttype, so writes are refused |
+| `seed-zaaktype` | the ACL can't resolve `BIG-REGISTRATIE`, so no zaak is created |
+| `nrc-subscribe` | register writes never reach the projection — the public register stays empty |
+
+## 5. Use it
+
+### The portals must be reached over `localhost`
+
+The portals' OIDC flow uses PKCE, which needs `crypto.subtle` — and browsers only expose
+that in a **secure context**: HTTPS, or an origin on `localhost`/`127.0.0.1`. A NodePort on
+the VM's IP is neither, so `http://<TALOS_HOST>:30140` fails before it can even build the
+authorize URL:
+
+```
+ERROR TypeError: Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'digest')
+    at t.calcHash → t.generateCodeChallenge → t.createUrlCodeFlowAuthorize
+```
+
+So deploy with `TALOS_HOST=localhost` — which pins Keycloak's issuer and the portals'
+`config.json` authority to `http://localhost:30180` — and forward the browser-facing
+services to those same ports:
+
+```bash
+make k8s-up TALOS_HOST=localhost K8S_REGISTRY=<TALOS_HOST>:30500
+make k8s-portals          # stays in the foreground; Ctrl-C stops all five forwards
+```
+
+| URL (needs `make k8s-portals`) | What |
+|---|---|
+| `http://localhost:30140` | self-service portal (DigiD) |
+| `http://localhost:30141` | openbaar register (anonymous) |
+| `http://localhost:30142` | behandel portal (medewerker) |
+| `http://localhost:30143` | beheer portal (medewerker) |
+| `http://localhost:30180` | Keycloak (admin/admin) |
+
+The port numbers are deliberately the NodePort numbers: Keycloak's issuer is one fixed
+string, so the port the browser uses has to match the one baked into `config.json`.
+
+This is the same mechanism `infra/host-browser.yml` uses for the compose stack (which pins
+`localhost:8180`); only the addresses differ.
+
+### The admin UIs work straight off the NodePorts
+
+These are server-rendered and need no secure context, so they are reachable at the VM's
+address with no forwarding:
+
+| URL | What |
+|---|---|
+| `http://<TALOS_HOST>:30000` | OpenZaak admin (admin/admin) |
+| `http://<TALOS_HOST>:30001` | Open Notificaties admin (admin/admin) |
+| `http://<TALOS_HOST>:30020` / `:30021` | Objecttypen / Objecten admin |
+| `http://<TALOS_HOST>:30080` | BFF (`/health`) |
+| `http://<TALOS_HOST>:30090` | Flowable REST (rest-admin/test) |
+
+### Credentials
+
+Log in with the test users from `docs/synthetic-data.md` (all password `test123`, e.g.
+`jan-burger` for self-service, `merel-behandelaar` for behandel). The `medewerker` realm
+enforces MFA (ADR-0031) — print a current code with
+`python3 infra/keycloak/check_realms.py otp`. Walk the flow in `docs/demo-script.md`.
+
+`TALOS_HOST` is not cosmetic: it pins Keycloak's issuer (`KC_HOSTNAME`) and the portals'
+OIDC authority to the same string, which is what makes a browser token pass the BFF's
+validation (ADR-0010). Change it and you must re-run `make k8s-up` — the chart rolls the
+portals for you, because their `config.json` is a subPath mount and would otherwise keep
+serving the old authority.
+
+### Smoke-test the whole chain without a browser
+
+With the forwards running:
+
+```bash
+TOK=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:30180/realms/digid/protocol/openid-connect/token \
+  -d grant_type=password -d client_id=big-portal \
+  -d username=jan-burger -d password=test123 -d scope=openid | jq -r .access_token)
+
+# through the portal's Caddy, so this also proves the BFF reverse proxy
+curl -s -X POST http://localhost:30140/self-service/registrations \
+  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOK" -H 'Content-Length: 0'
+# → {"registrationId":"…","status":"Ingediend"}
+
+curl -s http://localhost:30141/openbaar/register
+# → [{"id":"…","status":"INGEDIEND","reference":"<the registrationId>"}]
+```
+
+The second call proves the whole Common Ground path: portal → BFF → domain → Flowable →
+ACL → OpenZaak + Objecten → NRC → event-subscriber → projection → openbaar register.
+
+## 6. Keeping the databases (recommended if you iterate on the chart)
+
+By default every database is an `emptyDir`: no CSI driver needed, and the data lives as
+long as the pod. Note what that means in practice — **any** change to a database pod's
+template (an image policy, an env value, a probe) recreates the pod and wipes it. The stack
+then needs its bootstrap re-run:
+
+```bash
+make k8s-reseed TALOS_HOST=... K8S_REGISTRY=...
+```
+
+which re-runs the four Jobs *and* restarts `event-subscriber` + `projection-api`, because
+those two create the projection schema on start and otherwise keep writing to a
+schema-less database (`relation "processed_notifications" does not exist`). For persistence, install Rancher's local-path-provisioner — on Talos it
+must write under `/var` and its namespace needs the privileged Pod Security label:
+
+```yaml
+# kustomization.yaml
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+resources:
+  - github.com/rancher/local-path-provisioner/deploy?ref=v0.0.31
+patches:
+  - patch: |-
+      kind: ConfigMap
+      apiVersion: v1
+      metadata:
+        name: local-path-config
+        namespace: local-path-storage
+      data:
+        config.json: |-
+          { "nodePathMap":[ { "node":"DEFAULT_PATH_FOR_NON_LISTED_NODES", "paths":["/var/local-path-provisioner"] } ] }
+  - patch: |-
+      apiVersion: v1
+      kind: Namespace
+      metadata:
+        name: local-path-storage
+        labels:
+          pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: privileged
+```
+
+```bash
+kubectl apply -k .
+make k8s-up TALOS_HOST=... K8S_REGISTRY=... K8S_SET='--set persistence.storageClass=local-path'
+```
+
+The PVCs carry `helm.sh/resource-policy: keep`, so `make k8s-down` leaves the data behind;
+`make k8s-purge` drops the namespace and with it the volumes.
+
+## 7. Day-to-day
+
+```bash
+make k8s-lint                      # render + schema-check the chart, no cluster needed
+make k8s-portals                   # forward the portals + Keycloak to localhost (browser access)
+make k8s-images K8S_REGISTRY=...   # after changing a service or a portal
+make k8s-up TALOS_HOST=... K8S_REGISTRY=...
+make k8s-seed                      # after editing a data.yaml, a realm export, or the BPMN
+make k8s-reseed TALOS_HOST=... K8S_REGISTRY=...   # re-run the bootstrap Jobs + reset the projection schema
+make k8s-down                      # uninstall, keep the database PVCs
+make k8s-purge                     # uninstall and drop the namespace
+```
+
+This repo's images are pulled with `imagePullPolicy: Always` (the `dev` tag is mutable), so
+`kubectl -n big rollout restart deploy/<name>` after `make k8s-images` picks up a rebuild.
+Upstream images stay `IfNotPresent`: their tags are pinned, and keeping them out of the pod
+template avoids needless churn — a changed template makes a Job unpatchable.
+
+`k8s-reseed` is also the path for *changing* a Job in the chart: a Job's pod template is
+immutable, so `helm upgrade` is rejected with `cannot patch "…" with kind Job`.
+
+## 8. When it doesn't work
+
+| Symptom | Cause |
+|---|---|
+| `Boot failed: not a bootable disk` | virt-manager ejected the install ISO on first shutdown — see §1 |
+| The VM comes back in maintenance mode after a restart | the ISO is still attached and boots first; eject it and set `--boot hd` (§1) |
+| `apply-config` rejects the patch with *"incompatible with v1alpha1"* | Talos ≥1.14 owns that field in its own config document — patch the document, not `machine.*` (§1) |
+| CoreDNS `Pending` forever | the control-plane taint is still on the only node (§1) |
+| `ImagePullBackOff` … `pull QPS exceeded` | transient: the kubelet rate-limits pulls when ~30 pods start at once. It recovers on retry |
+| `ImagePullBackOff` on a `register-referentie/*` image | the registry mirror patch is missing: `talosctl get registriesconfig` |
+| Pod stuck in `ContainerCreating`, event names a ConfigMap | `make k8s-seed` |
+| `seed-zaaktype` retrying | publishing a zaaktype validates the resultaattype against `selectielijst.openzaak.nl`, so this one Job needs outbound internet from the VM (ADR-0006) |
+| `TypeError: Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'digest')` on a portal | not a secure context: `crypto.subtle` is absent on `http://<ip>`. Use `localhost` + `make k8s-portals` (§5) |
+| Login redirects but the portal stays logged out, or the BFF answers 401 | `TALOS_HOST` doesn't match the address in the browser's URL bar — issuer mismatch. Re-run `make k8s-up` with the right value |
+| A portal returns 502 on `/self-service/…` | the BFF is unreachable from the portal pod: check `kubectl -n big get svc bff` and the BFF's own readiness |
+| Public register empty after a submit | usually a wiped `emptyDir` database (§6): `make k8s-reseed`. Confirm with `kubectl -n big logs deploy/event-subscriber \| grep 42P01` |
+| `helm upgrade` fails with `cannot patch … with kind Job` | see §7 — use `make k8s-reseed` |
+| Pods `Evicted` / `OOMKilled` | the VM is too small (§0) |
+| A Job shows `BackoffLimitExceeded` | read it: `kubectl -n big logs job/<name>` |
+
+## What is not ported
+
+- **Observability** (Tempo, Prometheus, Grafana) is defined but disabled — those are built
+  images too, so switching them on means pushing them as well:
+  `K8S_SET='--set workloads.tempo.enabled=true --set workloads.prometheus.enabled=true --set workloads.grafana.enabled=true'`.
+  The .NET services still export OTLP; the exporter fails harmlessly when Tempo is absent.
+- **The verify/e2e lanes.** `make verify*` and the Playwright e2e drive compose, not the
+  chart. The Kubernetes path is verified with §5's smoke test.
+- **Ingress, TLS, and resource requests.** See the ponytail ceiling in ADR-0033.
@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@ All test users share the password **`test123`**.
 | `eidas` | eIDAS (EU) | `pierre-dupont` | `eidas_id` = `FR/NL/AB-1234-5678` |
 | `medewerker` | Internal staff | `merel-behandelaar` | role `behandelaar` |
 | `medewerker` | Internal staff | `tom-teamlead` | roles `behandelaar`, `teamlead` |
+| `medewerker` | Internal staff | `bram-beheerder` | role `beheerder` |
+
+`medewerker` users additionally need a **second factor**: that realm enforces MFA (S-15c,
+ADR-0031). All three share the fixture TOTP secret `BIGMEDEWERKEROTPSEED`; print a current
+code with `python3 infra/keycloak/check_realms.py otp`.

 The identifying claims are injected via OIDC protocol mappers on `big-portal`
 (user-attribute → token claim); `medewerker` roles appear in `realm_access.roles`.
@@ -32,5 +37,8 @@ curl -s -X POST \
  -d username=jan-burger -d password=test123 -d scope=openid | jq -r .access_token
 ```

+For a `medewerker` user, add `-d totp=$(python3 infra/keycloak/check_realms.py otp)` —
+without it the grant is refused with `invalid_grant`.
+
 Decode the JWT payload to see the `bsn` claim. `make keycloak-smoke` checks every realm
 automatically.
@@ -510,7 +510,7 @@ services:
    networks: [cg]

  # ── Portals (S-08/S-09/S-12) ──────────────────────────────────────────────
-  # nginx serves each Angular app and reverse-proxies its endpoint group to the BFF (same-origin).
+  # Caddy serves each Angular app and reverse-proxies its endpoint group to the BFF (same-origin).
  # The images bake config.json with the compose authority (keycloak:8080), which a HOST browser
  # can't resolve — so here we bind-mount a config.json pointing at the host-published localhost:8180
  # (matching KC_HOSTNAME). openbaar is anonymous and needs no config.
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ services:
    ports:
      - "8140:80"
    volumes:
-      - ./local-config/self-service.config.json:/usr/share/nginx/html/config.json:ro,z
+      - ./local-config/self-service.config.json:/usr/share/caddy/config.json:ro,z
    healthcheck:
      test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -q -O /dev/null http://127.0.0.1/ || exit 1"]
      interval: 5s
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ services:
    ports:
      - "8142:80"
    volumes:
-      - ./local-config/behandel.config.json:/usr/share/nginx/html/config.json:ro,z
+      - ./local-config/behandel.config.json:/usr/share/caddy/config.json:ro,z
    healthcheck:
      test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -q -O /dev/null http://127.0.0.1/ || exit 1"]
      interval: 5s
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ services:
    networks: [cg]

  # ── Self-Service portal (S-08d) ────────────────────────────────────────────
-  # nginx serves the Angular app and reverse-proxies /self-service + /openbaar to the BFF
+  # Caddy serves the Angular app and reverse-proxies /self-service + /openbaar to the BFF
  # (same-origin, no CORS). The Playwright e2e drives it inside this network so the DigiD
  # token issuer (keycloak:8080) matches the BFF's authority (ADR-0010).
  self-service:
@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ services:
    ports:
      - "8140:80"
    healthcheck:
-      # 127.0.0.1, not localhost: nginx listens on IPv4 only, but localhost resolves to ::1 first.
+      # 127.0.0.1, not localhost: keeps the check on the interface Caddy is published on.
      test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -q -O /dev/null http://127.0.0.1/ || exit 1"]
      interval: 5s
      timeout: 3s
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ services:
        condition: service_started
    networks: [cg]

-  # The openbaar (public) register portal: nginx serves the Angular app and reverse-proxies
+  # The openbaar (public) register portal: Caddy serves the Angular app and reverse-proxies
  # /openbaar to the BFF. Anonymous — no DigiD, no Keycloak dependency (S-09).
  openbaar:
    build:
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ services:
    ports:
      - "8141:80"
    healthcheck:
-      # 127.0.0.1, not localhost: nginx listens on IPv4 only, but localhost resolves to ::1 first.
+      # 127.0.0.1, not localhost: keeps the check on the interface Caddy is published on.
      test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -q -O /dev/null http://127.0.0.1/ || exit 1"]
      interval: 5s
      timeout: 3s
@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ services:
        condition: service_healthy
    networks: [cg]

-  # The behandel portal: nginx serves the Angular app and reverse-proxies /behandel to the BFF.
+  # The behandel portal: Caddy serves the Angular app and reverse-proxies /behandel to the BFF.
  # Behandelaars log in against the Keycloak medewerker realm (ADR-0013; S-12).
  behandel:
    build:
@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ services:
    ports:
      - "8142:80"
    healthcheck:
-      # 127.0.0.1, not localhost: nginx listens on IPv4 only, but localhost resolves to ::1 first.
+      # 127.0.0.1, not localhost: keeps the check on the interface Caddy is published on.
      test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -q -O /dev/null http://127.0.0.1/ || exit 1"]
      interval: 5s
      timeout: 3s
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ services:
        condition: service_started
    networks: [cg]

-  # The beheer portal: nginx serves the Angular app and reverse-proxies /beheer to the BFF.
+  # The beheer portal: Caddy serves the Angular app and reverse-proxies /beheer to the BFF.
  # Beheerders log in against the Keycloak medewerker realm (same realm as behandel, S-15a).
  beheer:
    build:
@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ services:
    ports:
      - "8143:80"
    healthcheck:
-      # 127.0.0.1, not localhost: nginx listens on IPv4 only, but localhost resolves to ::1 first.
+      # 127.0.0.1, not localhost: keeps the check on the interface Caddy is published on.
      test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -q -O /dev/null http://127.0.0.1/ || exit 1"]
      interval: 5s
      timeout: 3s
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+apiVersion: v2
+name: big-reference
+description: >-
+  The BIG reference stack (Common Ground) on Kubernetes — a port of
+  infra/docker-compose.yml, aimed at a single-node Talos cluster.
+type: application
+version: 0.1.0
+appVersion: dev
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+{{ .Chart.Name }} {{ .Chart.Version }} deployed to namespace {{ .Release.Namespace }}.
+
+Watch it converge (the upstream Django services migrate on first boot, so the
+first bring-up takes a few minutes):
+
+  kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get pods -w
+  kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get jobs
+
+Every bootstrap Job must reach Completions 1/1:
+{{- range $name, $w := .Values.workloads }}
+{{- if and (ne $w.enabled false) $w.job }}
+  - {{ $name }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- end }}
+
+Open in a browser (add {{ .Values.host }} to /etc/hosts if you use a name):
+{{- range $name, $port := .Values.nodePorts }}
+{{- $w := index $.Values.workloads $name }}
+{{- if ne $w.enabled false }}
+  {{ printf "%-16s http://%s:%v" $name $.Values.host $port }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- end }}
+
+Test users are in docs/synthetic-data.md. If a pod is stuck in
+ContainerCreating on a missing ConfigMap, run: make k8s-seed
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+{{/*
+One pod spec for every workload, Deployment and Job alike. The chart is
+values-driven on purpose: `.Values.workloads` is a near-literal transcription of
+infra/docker-compose.yml, so the two stacks can be diffed by eye instead of by
+archaeology. Adding a service is a values edit, not a template edit.
+
+Called as: include "big.podspec" (dict "root" $ "name" $name "w" $w)
+*/}}
+{{- define "big.podspec" -}}
+{{- $root := .root -}}
+{{- $name := .name -}}
+{{- $w := .w -}}
+{{- with $root.Values.imagePullSecrets }}
+imagePullSecrets:
+{{- toYaml . | nindent 2 }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- with $w.waitFor }}
+initContainers:
+  - name: wait-for-deps
+    image: {{ $root.Values.images.busybox }}
+    command:
+      - sh
+      - -c
+      - |
+        for t in {{ join " " . }}; do
+          echo "waiting for $t"
+          until nc -z "${t%:*}" "${t#*:}"; do sleep 2; done
+        done
+{{- end }}
+containers:
+  - name: {{ $name }}
+    image: {{ include "big.image" (dict "root" $root "name" $name "w" $w) }}
+    # Only this repo's images get the configured policy: their `dev` tag is mutable.
+    # Upstream tags are pinned, so IfNotPresent keeps them out of pod-template diffs —
+    # which matters because a changed template makes a Job unpatchable (immutable).
+    imagePullPolicy: {{ if $w.own }}{{ $root.Values.images.pullPolicy }}{{ else }}IfNotPresent{{ end }}
+    {{- if $w.command }}
+    {{- fail (printf "workload %s: use `args`, not `command` — compose's `command:` replaces CMD, but Kubernetes' `command:` replaces the image ENTRYPOINT (postgres would run as root, keycloak would exec `start-dev`)" $name) }}
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- with $w.args }}
+    args:
+{{- toYaml . | nindent 6 }}
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- with $w.envFrom }}
+    envFrom:
+    {{- range . }}
+      - configMapRef:
+          # optional: an env group whose feature is disabled (e.g. otel) simply
+          # isn't rendered, and the pod must still start.
+          name: {{ printf "%s-env" . }}
+          optional: true
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- with $w.env }}
+    env:
+{{- include "big.env" (list $root .) | nindent 6 }}
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- with $w.ports }}
+    ports:
+    {{- range . }}
+      - name: {{ .name }}
+        containerPort: {{ .targetPort | default .port }}
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- with $w.probe }}
+    readinessProbe:
+{{- toYaml . | nindent 6 }}
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- with $w.resources }}
+    resources:
+{{- toYaml . | nindent 6 }}
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- if or $w.files $w.data }}
+    volumeMounts:
+    {{- range $w.files }}
+      - name: {{ .configMap }}
+        mountPath: {{ .mountPath }}
+        {{- with .subPath }}
+        subPath: {{ . }}
+        {{- end }}
+        readOnly: true
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- with $w.data }}
+      - name: data
+        mountPath: {{ .mountPath }}
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+{{- if or $w.files $w.data }}
+volumes:
+{{- range $w.files }}
+  - name: {{ .configMap }}
+    configMap:
+      name: {{ .configMap }}
+      {{- with .defaultMode }}
+      defaultMode: {{ . }}
+      {{- end }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- with $w.data }}
+  - name: data
+    {{- if $root.Values.persistence.storageClass }}
+    persistentVolumeClaim:
+      claimName: {{ $name }}-data
+    {{- else }}
+    # No StorageClass configured: the databases are emptyDir, so the stack needs
+    # no CSI driver to come up. Data then lives as long as the pod does — see
+    # docs/runbooks/kubernetes-talos.md for switching on local-path.
+    emptyDir: {}
+    {{- end }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- end -}}
+
+{{/* Image ref: `own: true` workloads are built from this repo, everything else is upstream. */}}
+{{- define "big.image" -}}
+{{- $root := .root -}}
+{{- $w := .w -}}
+{{- if $w.own -}}
+{{- $ref := printf "%s/%s:%s" $root.Values.images.repositoryPrefix .name $root.Values.images.tag -}}
+{{- with $root.Values.images.registry }}{{ printf "%s/%s" . $ref }}{{ else }}{{ $ref }}{{ end }}
+{{- else -}}
+{{- $w.image -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- end -}}
+
+{{/*
+Env list from a map. Every value is run through `tpl`, so values.yaml can name
+cluster-internal hosts ({{ .Release.Namespace }}) and the node address
+({{ .Values.host }}) without the chart hard-coding either.
+*/}}
+{{- define "big.env" -}}
+{{- $root := index . 0 -}}
+{{- range $k, $v := index . 1 }}
+- name: {{ $k }}
+  value: {{ tpl (toString $v) $root | quote }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- end -}}
+
+{{- define "big.labels" -}}
+app.kubernetes.io/name: {{ .name }}
+app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ .root.Release.Name }}
+app.kubernetes.io/managed-by: Helm
+{{- end -}}
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+{{- /*
+Shared env blocks — the Kubernetes equivalent of the YAML anchors in
+infra/docker-compose.yml (&oz-env, &nrc-env, &objecttypen-env, &objecten-env).
+A workload picks them up with `envFrom`, so the web/celery/init variants of an
+upstream image stay guaranteed-identical, and `kubectl get cm oz-env -o yaml`
+shows what a pod actually got.
+
+The *file* inputs (setup_configuration data.yaml, Keycloak realms, BPMN/DMN, the
+seed scripts) are NOT here: they live in the repo and are turned into ConfigMaps
+by infra/helm/seed-configmaps.sh, exactly as infra/seed-config.sh streams them
+into the compose config volumes. Copying them into the chart would fork them.
+*/ -}}
+{{- range $group, $env := .Values.envGroups }}
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ConfigMap
+metadata:
+  name: {{ $group }}-env
+  labels:
+{{- include "big.labels" (dict "root" $ "name" (printf "%s-env" $group)) | nindent 4 }}
+data:
+{{- range $k, $v := $env }}
+  {{ $k }}: {{ tpl (toString $v) $ | quote }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- /*
+Portal OIDC config. The images bake config.json with the compose authority
+(keycloak:8080), which a browser outside the cluster cannot resolve; these
+ConfigMaps mount over it with the node address Keycloak's issuer is pinned to
+(KC_HOSTNAME below), so the token the browser gets and the issuer the BFF
+discovers are the same string. Same mechanism as infra/host-browser.yml.
+*/ -}}
+{{- range $realm := list "digid" "medewerker" }}
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ConfigMap
+metadata:
+  name: portal-config-{{ $realm }}
+  labels:
+{{- include "big.labels" (dict "root" $ "name" (printf "portal-config-%s" $realm)) | nindent 4 }}
+data:
+  config.json: |
+    { "authority": "{{ printf "http://%s:%v" $.Values.host (index $.Values.nodePorts "keycloak") }}/realms/{{ $realm }}" }
+{{- end }}
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+{{- range $name, $w := .Values.workloads }}
+{{- if and (ne $w.enabled false) (not $w.job) }}
+---
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: {{ $name }}
+  labels:
+{{- include "big.labels" (dict "root" $ "name" $name) | nindent 4 }}
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  # Recreate, not RollingUpdate: single node, ReadWriteOnce volumes, and nothing
+  # here is HA — a second pod would just fight the first for the disk.
+  strategy:
+    type: Recreate
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: {{ $name }}
+      app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ $.Release.Name }}
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      {{- /*
+        A ConfigMap mounted with subPath never picks up updates, so a portal whose
+        config.json content changed has to be rolled. Hashing only the values that
+        render it keeps the churn off the databases — an emptyDir database that is
+        recreated for no reason loses its data (see the runbook §6).
+      */}}
+      {{- range $w.files }}
+      {{- if hasPrefix "portal-config-" .configMap }}
+      annotations:
+        checksum/portal-config: {{ printf "%s|%v" $.Values.host (index $.Values.nodePorts "keycloak") | sha256sum }}
+      {{- end }}
+      {{- end }}
+      labels:
+{{- include "big.labels" (dict "root" $ "name" $name) | nindent 8 }}
+    spec:
+{{- include "big.podspec" (dict "root" $ "name" $name "w" $w) | nindent 6 }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- end }}
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+{{- /*
+The one-shot bootstrap containers from compose (oz-init, nrc-init, flowable-init,
+the *-init setup_configuration runs, the zaaktype seed and the NRC abonnement)
+become Jobs. All of them are idempotent, so ordering is not enforced with hooks:
+each waits for the ports it needs (waitFor) and Kubernetes retries the rest.
+A wiped database is re-seeded by `make k8s-reseed`.
+*/ -}}
+{{- range $name, $w := .Values.workloads }}
+{{- if and (ne $w.enabled false) $w.job }}
+---
+apiVersion: batch/v1
+kind: Job
+metadata:
+  name: {{ $name }}
+  labels:
+{{- include "big.labels" (dict "root" $ "name" $name) | nindent 4 }}
+    app.kubernetes.io/component: init
+spec:
+  backoffLimit: 20
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+{{- include "big.labels" (dict "root" $ "name" $name) | nindent 8 }}
+        app.kubernetes.io/component: init
+    spec:
+      restartPolicy: OnFailure
+{{- include "big.podspec" (dict "root" $ "name" $name "w" $w) | nindent 6 }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- end }}
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+{{- if .Values.persistence.storageClass }}
+{{- range $name, $w := .Values.workloads }}
+{{- if and (ne $w.enabled false) $w.data }}
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
+metadata:
+  name: {{ $name }}-data
+  labels:
+{{- include "big.labels" (dict "root" $ "name" $name) | nindent 4 }}
+  # Keep the databases when the release is uninstalled; `make k8s-purge` drops them.
+  annotations:
+    helm.sh/resource-policy: keep
+spec:
+  accessModes: [ReadWriteOnce]
+  storageClassName: {{ $.Values.persistence.storageClass }}
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      storage: {{ $w.data.size | default "2Gi" }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- end }}
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{{- /*
+Service names are the compose service names, verbatim: the portals' Caddy
+proxies to http://bff:8080 and the upstream setup_configuration files name
+http://openzaak:8000 / http://nrc-web:8000, so in-cluster DNS has to answer to
+exactly those names. Do not rename a workload without checking both.
+
+.Values.nodePorts is the single place a port is published outside the cluster;
+a workload listed there gets a NodePort on its first (only) port.
+*/ -}}
+{{- range $name, $w := .Values.workloads }}
+{{- if and (ne $w.enabled false) $w.ports }}
+{{- $nodePort := index $.Values.nodePorts $name }}
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: {{ $name }}
+  labels:
+{{- include "big.labels" (dict "root" $ "name" $name) | nindent 4 }}
+spec:
+  type: {{ if $nodePort }}NodePort{{ else }}ClusterIP{{ end }}
+  selector:
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: {{ $name }}
+    app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ $.Release.Name }}
+  ports:
+  {{- range $i, $p := $w.ports }}
+    - name: {{ $p.name }}
+      port: {{ $p.port }}
+      targetPort: {{ $p.targetPort | default $p.port }}
+      {{- if and $nodePort (eq $i 0) }}
+      nodePort: {{ $nodePort }}
+      {{- end }}
+  {{- end }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- end }}
@@ -0,0 +1,608 @@
+# Values for the BIG reference stack on Kubernetes.
+#
+# `workloads` is a near-literal transcription of infra/docker-compose.yml — same
+# service names, same images, same env, same one-shots — so the two stacks can be
+# diffed by eye. Read that file's comments for the *why* behind each setting; only
+# the deviations forced by Kubernetes are re-explained here.
+#
+# Every env value is rendered with Helm's `tpl`, so it may use:
+#   {{ .Release.Namespace }}  — for a cluster-internal FQDN
+#   {{ .Values.host }}        — the node address a browser reaches the cluster on
+#
+# Deviations from compose, all of them consequences of the platform:
+#   * The compose stack hands the ACL and the seeds OpenZaak's *container IP*,
+#     because OpenZaak and NRC validate URLs with Django's URLValidator and a
+#     single-label host ("openzaak") is rejected. In Kubernetes the service FQDN
+#     (openzaak.<ns>.svc.cluster.local) is already multi-label, so the IP dance and
+#     the `objecten.local` network alias both disappear.
+#   * `depends_on: service_healthy` becomes a `waitFor` init container (TCP wait)
+#     plus readiness probes. Ordering is otherwise not enforced: every bootstrap
+#     job is idempotent and Kubernetes retries.
+#   * The published ports are NodePorts (see `nodePorts`), not host ports.
+
+# The address a browser outside the cluster uses to reach the node: your Talos
+# VM's IP. It pins Keycloak's issuer and the portals' OIDC authority to one
+# string, so browser tokens and the BFF's discovered issuer agree.
+host: 192.168.122.100
+
+# Set when pulling from a private registry (e.g. the Gitea Container Registry).
+imagePullSecrets: []
+
+images:
+  # Where the images built from THIS repo live. Empty = the bare
+  # `register-referentie/<svc>:dev` names, which only works if the node already
+  # has them. On Talos it never does — point this at a registry the node can
+  # reach (see docs/runbooks/kubernetes-talos.md).
+  registry: ""
+  repositoryPrefix: register-referentie
+  tag: dev
+  # Applies to this repo's images only (see _helpers.tpl). Always, because `dev`
+  # is a mutable tag: with IfNotPresent the node keeps the first image it pulled
+  # and `make k8s-images` would appear to do nothing. The registry is in-cluster,
+  # so a re-pull is local and cheap — but the pods do depend on it being up.
+  pullPolicy: Always
+  busybox: docker.io/library/busybox:stable
+
+persistence:
+  # Empty = every database is an emptyDir, so the stack comes up on a bare
+  # cluster with no CSI driver. Set to a StorageClass (e.g. `local-path`) to keep
+  # the data across pod restarts.
+  storageClass: ""
+
+# The only place a port is published outside the cluster. A workload listed here
+# gets a NodePort on its single port; everything else stays ClusterIP.
+nodePorts:
+  openzaak: 30000
+  nrc-web: 30001
+  objecttypen: 30020
+  objecten: 30021
+  bff: 30080
+  flowable-rest: 30090
+  self-service: 30140
+  openbaar: 30141
+  behandel: 30142
+  beheer: 30143
+  keycloak: 30180
+  grafana: 30300
+
+# ── Shared env blocks (the compose YAML anchors) ────────────────────────────────
+envGroups:
+
+  oz:
+    UWSGI_PROCESSES: "1"
+    UWSGI_THREADS: "2"
+    DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE: openzaak.conf.docker
+    SECRET_KEY: dev-only-not-for-production
+    DB_HOST: oz-db
+    DB_NAME: openzaak
+    DB_USER: openzaak
+    DB_PASSWORD: openzaak
+    IS_HTTPS: "no"
+    ALLOWED_HOSTS: "*"
+    CACHE_DEFAULT: oz-redis:6379/0
+    CACHE_AXES: oz-redis:6379/0
+    CELERY_BROKER_URL: redis://oz-redis:6379/1
+    CELERY_RESULT_BACKEND: redis://oz-redis:6379/1
+    DISABLE_2FA: "true"
+    NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED: "false"
+    OPENZAAK_SUPERUSER_USERNAME: admin
+    DJANGO_SUPERUSER_PASSWORD: admin
+    OPENZAAK_SUPERUSER_EMAIL: admin@localhost
+    RUN_SETUP_CONFIG: "true"
+
+  nrc:
+    UWSGI_PROCESSES: "1"
+    UWSGI_THREADS: "2"
+    DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE: nrc.conf.docker
+    SECRET_KEY: dev-only-not-for-production
+    DB_HOST: nrc-db
+    DB_NAME: opennotificaties
+    DB_USER: opennotificaties
+    DB_PASSWORD: opennotificaties
+    IS_HTTPS: "no"
+    ALLOWED_HOSTS: "*"
+    CACHE_DEFAULT: nrc-redis:6379/0
+    CACHE_AXES: nrc-redis:6379/0
+    CELERY_BROKER_URL: redis://nrc-redis:6379/1
+    CELERY_RESULT_BACKEND: redis://nrc-redis:6379/1
+    DISABLE_2FA: "true"
+    OPENNOTIFICATIES_SUPERUSER_USERNAME: admin
+    DJANGO_SUPERUSER_PASSWORD: admin
+    OPENNOTIFICATIES_SUPERUSER_EMAIL: admin@localhost
+    RUN_SETUP_CONFIG: "true"
+    NOTIFICATION_SEC_INTERVAL: "5"
+
+  objecttypen:
+    UWSGI_PROCESSES: "1"
+    UWSGI_THREADS: "2"
+    DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE: objecttypes.conf.docker
+    SECRET_KEY: dev-only-not-for-production
+    DB_HOST: objecttypen-db
+    DB_NAME: objecttypes
+    DB_USER: objecttypes
+    DB_PASSWORD: objecttypes
+    ALLOWED_HOSTS: "*"
+    CACHE_DEFAULT: objecttypen-redis:6379/0
+    CACHE_AXES: objecttypen-redis:6379/0
+    DISABLE_2FA: "true"
+    OTEL_SDK_DISABLED: "true"
+    RUN_SETUP_CONFIG: "true"
+
+  objecten:
+    UWSGI_PROCESSES: "1"
+    UWSGI_THREADS: "2"
+    DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE: objects.conf.docker
+    SECRET_KEY: dev-only-not-for-production
+    DB_HOST: objecten-db
+    DB_NAME: objects
+    DB_USER: objects
+    DB_PASSWORD: objects
+    ALLOWED_HOSTS: "*"
+    CACHE_DEFAULT: objecten-redis:6379/0
+    CACHE_AXES: objecten-redis:6379/0
+    DISABLE_2FA: "true"
+    OTEL_SDK_DISABLED: "true"
+    CELERY_BROKER_URL: redis://objecten-redis:6379/1
+    CELERY_RESULT_BACKEND: redis://objecten-redis:6379/1
+    NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED: "false"
+    RUN_SETUP_CONFIG: "true"
+
+  # Traces for the .NET services. Always set, like compose: the exporter fails
+  # harmlessly when Tempo is absent (services/*/Program.cs).
+  otel:
+    OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT: http://tempo:4317
+    OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_PROTOCOL: grpc
+
+# ── Workloads ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Per entry: image | own (built here) · args · envFrom (env groups) · env
+# ports · probe (a literal readinessProbe) · files (ConfigMap mounts) · data
+# (a database volume) · waitFor (host:port to wait for) · job · enabled
+#
+# `args` (never `command`) is the compose `command:` equivalent: compose replaces
+# the image's CMD, and so does Kubernetes' `args` — Kubernetes' `command` would
+# replace the ENTRYPOINT instead. The chart fails to render if you use `command`.
+workloads:
+
+  # ── OpenZaak (S-01) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  oz-db:
+    image: docker.io/postgis/postgis:17-3.5
+    args: [postgres, -c, max_connections=300]
+    env:
+      POSTGRES_USER: openzaak
+      POSTGRES_PASSWORD: openzaak
+      POSTGRES_DB: openzaak
+    ports: [{ name: postgres, port: 5432 }]
+    data: { mountPath: /var/lib/postgresql/data, size: 4Gi }
+    probe:
+      exec:
+        command: [sh, -c, "pg_isready -U openzaak -d openzaak && psql -U openzaak -d openzaak -c 'SELECT PostGIS_Version();' -q"]
+      periodSeconds: 5
+
+  oz-redis:
+    image: docker.io/library/redis:7
+    ports: [{ name: redis, port: 6379 }]
+    probe: { tcpSocket: { port: 6379 } }
+  openzaak:
+    image: docker.io/openzaak/open-zaak:1.28.2
+    # setup_configuration first, then the server — in ONE container, on purpose.
+    # Both /setup_configuration.sh and /start.sh run `manage.py migrate`, so a
+    # separate init Job (as compose has, ordered by depends_on) races this pod for
+    # the same database and Django fails with "relation already exists".
+    args: [sh, -c, "/setup_configuration.sh && exec /start.sh"]
+    envFrom: [oz]
+    ports: [{ name: http, port: 8000 }]
+    # /admin/ answers 302 when Django is up — a redirect counts as ready.
+    probe:
+      httpGet: { path: /admin/, port: 8000 }
+      initialDelaySeconds: 30
+      periodSeconds: 10
+      failureThreshold: 30
+    files: [{ configMap: rr-oz-config, mountPath: /app/setup_configuration }]
+    waitFor: [oz-db:5432, oz-redis:6379]
+
+  oz-celery:
+    image: docker.io/openzaak/open-zaak:1.28.2
+    args: [/celery_worker.sh]
+    envFrom: [oz]
+    waitFor: [oz-db:5432, oz-redis:6379]
+
+  # ── Open Notificaties / NRC (S-01-c) ────────────────────────────────────────
+  nrc-db:
+    image: docker.io/postgis/postgis:17-3.5
+    args: [postgres, -c, max_connections=300]
+    env:
+      POSTGRES_USER: opennotificaties
+      POSTGRES_PASSWORD: opennotificaties
+      POSTGRES_DB: opennotificaties
+    ports: [{ name: postgres, port: 5432 }]
+    data: { mountPath: /var/lib/postgresql/data, size: 2Gi }
+    probe:
+      exec: { command: [pg_isready, -U, opennotificaties, -d, opennotificaties] }
+      periodSeconds: 5
+
+  nrc-redis:
+    image: docker.io/library/redis:7
+    ports: [{ name: redis, port: 6379 }]
+    probe: { tcpSocket: { port: 6379 } }
+  nrc-web:
+    image: docker.io/openzaak/open-notificaties:1.16.1
+    # setup_configuration first, then the server — in ONE container, on purpose.
+    # Both /setup_configuration.sh and /start.sh run `manage.py migrate`, so a
+    # separate init Job (as compose has, ordered by depends_on) races this pod for
+    # the same database and Django fails with "relation already exists".
+    args: [sh, -c, "/setup_configuration.sh && exec /start.sh"]
+    envFrom: [nrc]
+    ports: [{ name: http, port: 8000 }]
+    probe:
+      httpGet: { path: /admin/, port: 8000 }
+      initialDelaySeconds: 30
+      periodSeconds: 10
+      failureThreshold: 30
+    files: [{ configMap: rr-nrc-config, mountPath: /app/setup_configuration }]
+    waitFor: [nrc-db:5432, nrc-redis:6379, openzaak:8000]
+
+  nrc-celery:
+    image: docker.io/openzaak/open-notificaties:1.16.1
+    args: [/celery_worker.sh]
+    envFrom: [nrc]
+    waitFor: [nrc-db:5432, nrc-redis:6379]
+
+  # Without beat, notifications are accepted but never delivered (ADR-0007).
+  nrc-beat:
+    image: docker.io/openzaak/open-notificaties:1.16.1
+    args: [/celery_beat.sh]
+    envFrom: [nrc]
+    waitFor: [nrc-db:5432, nrc-redis:6379]
+
+  # ── Keycloak (S-02) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  keycloak:
+    image: quay.io/keycloak/keycloak:26.1
+    args: [start-dev, --import-realm]
+    env:
+      KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_USERNAME: admin
+      KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD: admin
+      KEYCLOAK_ADMIN: admin
+      KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD: admin
+      KC_HEALTH_ENABLED: "true"
+      KC_HTTP_ENABLED: "true"
+      # Pin the issuer to the address the browser uses, and let backchannel calls
+      # keep using keycloak:8080 — the BFF discovers metadata in-cluster and gets
+      # this issuer back, which is what browser tokens carry (infra/host-browser.yml).
+      KC_HOSTNAME: "http://{{ .Values.host }}:{{ index .Values.nodePorts \"keycloak\" }}"
+      KC_HOSTNAME_BACKCHANNEL_DYNAMIC: "true"
+    ports: [{ name: http, port: 8080 }]
+    # TCP, not /health/ready on the management port: nothing here gates on realm
+    # import, and a wrong health path would leave the Service with no endpoints.
+    probe: { tcpSocket: { port: 8080 }, initialDelaySeconds: 15 }
+    files: [{ configMap: rr-kc-realms, mountPath: /opt/keycloak/data/import }]
+
+  # ── Flowable (S-03) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  flowable-db:
+    image: docker.io/library/postgres:16
+    env:
+      POSTGRES_USER: flowable
+      POSTGRES_PASSWORD: flowable
+      POSTGRES_DB: flowable
+    ports: [{ name: postgres, port: 5432 }]
+    data: { mountPath: /var/lib/postgresql/data, size: 2Gi }
+    probe:
+      exec: { command: [pg_isready, -U, flowable, -d, flowable] }
+      periodSeconds: 5
+
+  flowable-rest:
+    image: docker.io/flowable/flowable-rest:latest
+    env:
+      SPRING_DATASOURCE_DRIVER-CLASS-NAME: org.postgresql.Driver
+      SPRING_DATASOURCE_URL: jdbc:postgresql://flowable-db:5432/flowable
+      SPRING_DATASOURCE_USERNAME: flowable
+      SPRING_DATASOURCE_PASSWORD: flowable
+    ports: [{ name: http, port: 8080 }]
+    # Every REST path needs basic auth, so an httpGet probe would read 401 as
+    # not-ready. TCP is the honest signal here.
+    probe: { tcpSocket: { port: 8080 }, initialDelaySeconds: 20 }
+    waitFor: [flowable-db:5432]
+
+  # Deploys the BPMN to the process engine and the DMN to the DMN engine as two
+  # separate deployments — flowable-rest does not cascade one into the other
+  # (S-13, ADR-0016). Idempotent.
+  flowable-init:
+    job: true
+    image: docker.io/curlimages/curl:latest
+    args:
+      - sh
+      - -c
+      - |
+        svc=http://flowable-rest:8080/flowable-rest/service/repository/deployments
+        dmn=http://flowable-rest:8080/flowable-rest/dmn-api/dmn-repository/deployments
+        until curl -sf -u rest-admin:test "$svc" >/dev/null 2>&1; do echo "waiting for flowable-rest..."; sleep 3; done
+        if curl -s -u rest-admin:test "$dmn" | grep -q '"name":"diploma-eligibility.dmn"'; then
+          echo "diploma-eligibility DMN already deployed; skip"
+        else
+          curl -sf -u rest-admin:test -F 'file=@/work/diploma-eligibility.dmn;filename=diploma-eligibility.dmn' "$dmn" >/dev/null && echo "deployed diploma-eligibility DMN"
+        fi
+        if curl -s -u rest-admin:test "$svc?name=registratie" | grep -q '"name":"registratie"'; then
+          echo "registratie BPMN already deployed; skip"
+        else
+          curl -sf -u rest-admin:test -F 'file=@/work/registratie.bpmn;filename=registratie.bpmn' "$svc" >/dev/null && echo "deployed registratie BPMN"
+        fi
+    files: [{ configMap: rr-fl-bpmn, mountPath: /work }]
+    waitFor: [flowable-rest:8080]
+
+  # ── ACL ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  acl:
+    own: true
+    envFrom: [otel]
+    env:
+      OTEL_SERVICE_NAME: acl
+      # The FQDN, not `openzaak`: OpenZaak rejects a single-label host on
+      # zaak-create. It must be the same host the zaaktype was seeded through
+      # (see the seed-zaaktype job) so the URLs stay host-consistent (ADR-0009).
+      Acl__OpenZaak__BaseUrl: "http://openzaak.{{ .Release.Namespace }}.svc.cluster.local:8000/"
+      Acl__OpenZaak__ClientId: big-reference-seed
+      Acl__OpenZaak__Secret: insecure-dev-secret-change-me
+      Acl__Defaults__Bronorganisatie: "517439943"
+      Acl__Defaults__VerantwoordelijkeOrganisatie: "517439943"
+      Acl__Defaults__Vertrouwelijkheidaanduiding: openbaar
+      Acl__Defaults__ZaaktypeIdentificatie: BIG-REGISTRATIE
+      Acl__Defaults__InformatieobjecttypeOmschrijving: Diploma
+      # Objecten reflects the request Host into the object url it returns, and
+      # publishes that url to NRC — which rejects a single-label host. The FQDN
+      # replaces compose's `objecten.local` alias (ADR-0029).
+      Acl__Objecten__BaseUrl: "http://objecten.{{ .Release.Namespace }}.svc.cluster.local:8000/"
+      Acl__Objecten__Token: 1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12345678
+      # Short name on purpose: Objecten only accepts an objecttype URL that
+      # matches the one it was configured with (infra/objecten/setup_configuration
+      # /data.yaml → http://objecttypen:8000/api/v2/).
+      Acl__Objecten__ObjecttypenBaseUrl: http://objecttypen:8000/
+      Acl__Objecten__ObjecttypenToken: 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567
+      Acl__Objecten__ObjecttypeName: RegisterRecord
+    ports: [{ name: http, port: 8080 }]
+    probe: { httpGet: { path: /health, port: 8080 }, periodSeconds: 5 }
+
+  # ── BIG Domain Service (S-05) ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+  domain:
+    own: true
+    envFrom: [otel]
+    env:
+      OTEL_SERVICE_NAME: domain
+      Flowable__BaseUrl: http://flowable-rest:8080/flowable-rest/
+      Flowable__Username: rest-admin
+      Flowable__Password: test
+      Acl__BaseUrl: http://acl:8080/
+    ports: [{ name: http, port: 8080 }]
+    probe: { httpGet: { path: /health, port: 8080 }, periodSeconds: 5 }
+
+  # ── BFF ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  bff:
+    own: true
+    envFrom: [otel]
+    env:
+      OTEL_SERVICE_NAME: bff
+      # In-cluster authority: Keycloak's discovery document returns the pinned
+      # KC_HOSTNAME issuer, which is what browser tokens carry (ADR-0010).
+      Keycloak__Authority: http://keycloak:8080/realms/digid
+      Keycloak__MedewerkerAuthority: http://keycloak:8080/realms/medewerker
+      Downstream__Domain__BaseUrl: http://domain:8080/
+      Downstream__Projection__BaseUrl: http://projection-api:8080/
+      Downstream__Acl__BaseUrl: http://acl:8080/
+    ports: [{ name: http, port: 8080 }]
+    probe: { httpGet: { path: /health, port: 8080 }, periodSeconds: 5 }
+
+  # ── Read projection (S-06) ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  projection-db:
+    image: docker.io/library/postgres:16
+    env:
+      POSTGRES_USER: projection
+      POSTGRES_PASSWORD: projection
+      POSTGRES_DB: projection
+    ports: [{ name: postgres, port: 5432 }]
+    data: { mountPath: /var/lib/postgresql/data, size: 2Gi }
+    probe:
+      exec: { command: [pg_isready, -U, projection, -d, projection] }
+      periodSeconds: 5
+
+  event-subscriber:
+    own: true
+    envFrom: [otel]
+    env:
+      OTEL_SERVICE_NAME: event-subscriber
+      ConnectionStrings__Projection: Host=projection-db;Database=projection;Username=projection;Password=projection
+      Acl__BaseUrl: http://acl:8080/
+      EventSubscriber__Webhook__AuthToken: Bearer big-reference-notifications
+    ports: [{ name: http, port: 8080 }]
+    probe: { httpGet: { path: /health, port: 8080 }, periodSeconds: 5 }
+    # It migrates the projection schema on start and throws if the DB is absent.
+    waitFor: [projection-db:5432]
+
+  projection-api:
+    own: true
+    envFrom: [otel]
+    env:
+      OTEL_SERVICE_NAME: projection-api
+      ConnectionStrings__Projection: Host=projection-db;Database=projection;Username=projection;Password=projection
+    ports: [{ name: http, port: 8080 }]
+    probe: { httpGet: { path: /health, port: 8080 }, periodSeconds: 5 }
+    waitFor: [projection-db:5432]
+
+  # ── Portals (S-08/S-09/S-12/S-15) ───────────────────────────────────────────
+  # Caddy serves the Angular app and reverse-proxies its endpoint group to
+  # http://bff:8080 — hence the Service must stay named `bff`. Caddy resolves that
+  # name through the system resolver, so the DNS search domains apply and no
+  # upstream rewriting is needed here (ADR-0034).
+  self-service:
+    own: true
+    ports: [{ name: http, port: 80 }]
+    probe: { httpGet: { path: /, port: 80 }, periodSeconds: 5 }
+    files:
+      - configMap: portal-config-digid
+        mountPath: /usr/share/caddy/config.json
+        subPath: config.json
+
+  openbaar:
+    own: true
+    ports: [{ name: http, port: 80 }]
+    probe: { httpGet: { path: /, port: 80 }, periodSeconds: 5 }
+
+  behandel:
+    own: true
+    ports: [{ name: http, port: 80 }]
+    probe: { httpGet: { path: /, port: 80 }, periodSeconds: 5 }
+    files:
+      - configMap: portal-config-medewerker
+        mountPath: /usr/share/caddy/config.json
+        subPath: config.json
+
+  beheer:
+    own: true
+    ports: [{ name: http, port: 80 }]
+    probe: { httpGet: { path: /, port: 80 }, periodSeconds: 5 }
+    files:
+      - configMap: portal-config-medewerker
+        mountPath: /usr/share/caddy/config.json
+        subPath: config.json
+
+  # ── Objecttypen API (S-18a) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  objecttypen-db:
+    image: docker.io/library/postgres:17-alpine
+    env:
+      POSTGRES_USER: objecttypes
+      POSTGRES_PASSWORD: objecttypes
+      POSTGRES_DB: objecttypes
+    ports: [{ name: postgres, port: 5432 }]
+    data: { mountPath: /var/lib/postgresql/data, size: 2Gi }
+    probe:
+      exec: { command: [pg_isready, -U, objecttypes] }
+      periodSeconds: 5
+
+  objecttypen-redis:
+    image: docker.io/library/redis:7
+    ports: [{ name: redis, port: 6379 }]
+    probe: { tcpSocket: { port: 6379 } }
+  objecttypen:
+    image: docker.io/maykinmedia/objecttypes-api:3.4.2
+    # setup_configuration first, then the server — in ONE container, on purpose.
+    # Both /setup_configuration.sh and /start.sh run `manage.py migrate`, so a
+    # separate init Job (as compose has, ordered by depends_on) races this pod for
+    # the same database and Django fails with "relation already exists".
+    args: [sh, -c, "/setup_configuration.sh && exec /start.sh"]
+    envFrom: [objecttypen]
+    ports: [{ name: http, port: 8000 }]
+    probe:
+      httpGet: { path: /admin/, port: 8000 }
+      initialDelaySeconds: 30
+      periodSeconds: 10
+      failureThreshold: 30
+    files: [{ configMap: rr-objecttypen-config, mountPath: /app/setup_configuration }]
+    waitFor: [objecttypen-db:5432, objecttypen-redis:6379]
+
+  # The RegisterRecord objecttype + published version, over the API (S-18c,
+  # ADR-0020/ADR-0027). The uuid is pinned — Objecten identifies it by uuid.
+  registerrecord-init:
+    job: true
+    image: docker.io/library/python:3-slim
+    args: [python, /config/register.py]
+    env:
+      OBJECTTYPEN: http://objecttypen:8000
+      OBJECTTYPEN_TOKEN: 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567
+      SCHEMA: /config/registerrecord.schema.json
+    files: [{ configMap: rr-registerrecord-config, mountPath: /config }]
+    waitFor: [objecttypen:8000]
+
+  # ── Objecten API (S-18b) ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  objecten-db:
+    image: docker.io/postgis/postgis:17-3.5
+    env:
+      POSTGRES_USER: objects
+      POSTGRES_PASSWORD: objects
+      POSTGRES_DB: objects
+    ports: [{ name: postgres, port: 5432 }]
+    data: { mountPath: /var/lib/postgresql/data, size: 2Gi }
+    probe:
+      exec: { command: [pg_isready, -U, objects] }
+      periodSeconds: 5
+
+  objecten-redis:
+    image: docker.io/library/redis:7
+    ports: [{ name: redis, port: 6379 }]
+    probe: { tcpSocket: { port: 6379 } }
+  objecten:
+    image: docker.io/maykinmedia/objects-api:3.4.0
+    # setup_configuration first, then the server — in ONE container, on purpose.
+    # Both /setup_configuration.sh and /start.sh run `manage.py migrate`, so a
+    # separate init Job (as compose has, ordered by depends_on) races this pod for
+    # the same database and Django fails with "relation already exists".
+    args: [sh, -c, "/setup_configuration.sh && exec /start.sh"]
+    envFrom: [objecten]
+    ports: [{ name: http, port: 8000 }]
+    probe:
+      httpGet: { path: /admin/, port: 8000 }
+      initialDelaySeconds: 30
+      periodSeconds: 10
+      failureThreshold: 30
+    files: [{ configMap: rr-objecten-config, mountPath: /app/setup_configuration }]
+    waitFor: [objecten-db:5432, objecten-redis:6379, objecttypen:8000]
+
+  # Delivers Objecten's notifications to NRC; without it every register write is
+  # silently undelivered (ADR-0029).
+  objecten-celery:
+    image: docker.io/maykinmedia/objects-api:3.4.0
+    args: [/celery_worker.sh]
+    envFrom: [objecten]
+    waitFor: [objecten-db:5432, objecten-redis:6379]
+
+  # ── Bootstrap the flow, like the local compose stack does (S-B04, ADR-0020) ──
+  # Seeds + publishes the BIG zaaktype through the same FQDN the ACL uses, so the
+  # server-assigned URLs are host-consistent. The ACL then resolves them by
+  # identificatie (S-27, ADR-0021) — nothing is injected back.
+  # Publishing validates the resultaattype against the external Selectielijst
+  # API, so the node needs outbound internet for this one job (ADR-0006).
+  seed-zaaktype:
+    job: true
+    image: docker.io/library/python:3-slim
+    args: [python, /seed/seed_catalogus.py]
+    env:
+      OZ_BASE: "http://openzaak.{{ .Release.Namespace }}.svc.cluster.local:8000"
+      OZ_PUBLISH: "1"
+    files: [{ configMap: rr-seed-scripts, mountPath: /seed }]
+    waitFor: [openzaak:8000]
+
+  # Registers the NRC abonnement on the `objecten` kanaal pointing at the
+  # event-subscriber, so register writes reach the projection (ADR-0030).
+  # Without it the openbaar register stays empty. Restart-safe and idempotent.
+  nrc-subscribe:
+    job: true
+    image: docker.io/library/python:3-slim
+    args: [python, /seed/register-abonnement.py]
+    env:
+      NRC_BASE: http://nrc-web:8000
+      # The script resolves this to an address for the callback URL; the FQDN
+      # resolves to the Service's (stable) ClusterIP, which NRC's URLValidator
+      # accepts — the compose stack uses the container IP for the same reason.
+      SINK_HOST: "event-subscriber.{{ .Release.Namespace }}.svc.cluster.local"
+      SINK_PORT: "8080"
+      SINK_AUTH: Bearer big-reference-notifications
+    files: [{ configMap: rr-seed-scripts, mountPath: /seed }]
+    waitFor: [nrc-web:8000, event-subscriber:8080]
+
+  # ── Observability backplane (S-16a, ADR-0023) ───────────────────────────────
+  # Off by default: these are built images too (config baked in), so switching
+  # them on also means pushing three more images. Enable all three together.
+  tempo:
+    enabled: false
+    own: true
+    args: ["-config.file=/etc/tempo.yaml"]
+    ports: [{ name: otlp, port: 4317 }, { name: http, port: 3200 }]
+
+  prometheus:
+    enabled: false
+    own: true
+    ports: [{ name: http, port: 9090 }]
+
+  grafana:
+    enabled: false
+    own: true
+    env:
+      GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_USER: admin
+      GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD: admin
+      GF_AUTH_ANONYMOUS_ENABLED: "true"
+    ports: [{ name: http, port: 3000 }]
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+# Throwaway in-cluster OCI registry, published on NodePort 30500.
+#
+# Talos has no Docker daemon and no way to side-load an image, so the images built
+# from this repo must come from a registry. This one lives *inside* the cluster on
+# purpose: a registry on the laptop needs an inbound port opened on firewalld's
+# libvirt zone (root), while pushing from the laptop to the node is outbound and
+# always allowed. The node then pulls from its own NodePort.
+#
+# Talos must be told it speaks plain HTTP — see the machine.registries.mirrors
+# patch in docs/runbooks/kubernetes-talos.md. Storage is emptyDir: if this pod is
+# replaced, re-run `make k8s-images`.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Namespace
+metadata:
+  name: registry
+---
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: registry
+  namespace: registry
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  strategy: { type: Recreate }
+  selector:
+    matchLabels: { app: registry }
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels: { app: registry }
+    spec:
+      containers:
+        - name: registry
+          image: docker.io/library/registry:2
+          env:
+            - name: REGISTRY_STORAGE_DELETE_ENABLED
+              value: "true"
+          ports:
+            - containerPort: 5000
+          readinessProbe:
+            httpGet: { path: /v2/, port: 5000 }
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: data
+              mountPath: /var/lib/registry
+      volumes:
+        - name: data
+          emptyDir: {}
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: registry
+  namespace: registry
+spec:
+  type: NodePort
+  selector: { app: registry }
+  ports:
+    - name: http
+      port: 5000
+      targetPort: 5000
+      nodePort: 30500
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+#
+# Turn the repo's config inputs into the ConfigMaps the Helm chart mounts.
+#
+# This is the Kubernetes sibling of infra/seed-config.sh: the upstream Common
+# Ground images are used verbatim and read their config from a mounted directory,
+# so the config has to be handed to the platform out-of-band. Compose gets it via
+# `docker cp` into external volumes; Kubernetes gets it as ConfigMaps created from
+# the files that already live in this repo. Copying those files into the chart
+# would fork them from the compose stack, so we don't.
+#
+# Idempotent: re-run after editing any data.yaml, then `make k8s-reseed`.
+#
+# Usage: seed-configmaps.sh [namespace]      (default: big)
+set -euo pipefail
+
+ns="${1:-big}"
+here="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+repo="$(cd "$here/../.." && pwd)"
+
+kubectl get namespace "$ns" >/dev/null 2>&1 || kubectl create namespace "$ns"
+
+seed() {  # name  <kubectl --from-file args...>
+  local name="$1"; shift
+  kubectl create configmap "$name" -n "$ns" "$@" \
+    --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f - >/dev/null
+  echo "  seeded configmap/$name"
+}
+
+seed rr-oz-config            --from-file="$repo/infra/openzaak/setup_configuration/"
+seed rr-nrc-config           --from-file="$repo/infra/opennotificaties/setup_configuration/"
+seed rr-kc-realms            --from-file="$repo/infra/keycloak/realms/"
+seed rr-objecttypen-config   --from-file="$repo/infra/objecttypen/setup_configuration/"
+seed rr-objecten-config      --from-file="$repo/infra/objecten/setup_configuration/"
+# register.py + the RegisterRecord JSON schema (the __pycache__ dir is skipped:
+# kubectl only takes regular files from a --from-file directory).
+seed rr-registerrecord-config --from-file="$repo/infra/objecttypen-registerrecord/"
+# The BPMN and the DMN are two separate Flowable deployments (S-13, ADR-0016).
+seed rr-fl-bpmn \
+  --from-file="$repo/workflows/registratie.bpmn" \
+  --from-file="$repo/workflows/diploma-eligibility.dmn"
+# The two bootstrap scripts the compose local stack runs as init containers
+# (S-B04, ADR-0020). Stdlib-only, so a plain python image can run them.
+seed rr-seed-scripts \
+  --from-file="$repo/infra/openzaak/seed_catalogus.py" \
+  --from-file="$repo/infra/local/register-abonnement.py"
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# Overlay: make the CI compose stack usable from a HOST browser.
+# Same two mechanisms infra/docker-compose.local.yml already uses — pin Keycloak's issuer to the
+# host-published address, and point each portal's runtime config.json at it. The BFF needs no
+# change: it discovers metadata over keycloak:8080 and the discovered issuer is the pinned
+# localhost:8180, which is what browser tokens carry.
+services:
+  keycloak:
+    environment:
+      KC_HOSTNAME: http://localhost:8180
+      KC_HOSTNAME_BACKCHANNEL_DYNAMIC: "true"
+  self-service:
+    volumes:
+      - ./local-config/self-service.config.json:/usr/share/caddy/config.json:ro,z
+  behandel:
+    volumes:
+      - ./local-config/behandel.config.json:/usr/share/caddy/config.json:ro,z
+  # beheer is the same medewerker realm as behandel, so it reuses behandel's config verbatim.
+  beheer:
+    volumes:
+      - ./local-config/behandel.config.json:/usr/share/caddy/config.json:ro,z
@@ -1,19 +1,25 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
 """Smoke-check the Keycloak realms: each realm's OIDC login works (password grant)
-and returns its expected identifying claim. Stdlib only. Exits non-zero on failure.
+and returns its expected identifying claim. The medewerker realm additionally enforces
+MFA (S-15c), so its login must be refused without a TOTP code. Stdlib only.
+Exits non-zero on failure.
 """
-import base64, json, sys, urllib.error, urllib.parse, urllib.request
+import base64, hashlib, hmac, json, struct, sys, time, urllib.error, urllib.parse, urllib.request

 BASE = "http://localhost:8180"
 CLIENT = "big-portal"
 PWD = "test123"

-# realm, user, claim ("__roles__" => check realm_access.roles), expected-contains
+# Fixture TOTP secret seeded into every medewerker in infra/keycloak/realms/medewerker-realm.json.
+# Keycloak HMACs the raw secret bytes, so no base32 decoding is involved.
+OTP_SECRET = b"BIGMEDEWERKEROTPSEED"
+
+# realm, user, claim ("__roles__" => check realm_access.roles), expected-contains, mfa-enforced
 CHECKS = [
-    ("digid", "jan-burger", "bsn", "123456782"),
-    ("eherkenning", "acme-ondernemer", "kvk", "12345678"),
-    ("eidas", "pierre-dupont", "eidas_id", "FR/NL"),
-    ("medewerker", "merel-behandelaar", "__roles__", "behandelaar"),
+    ("digid", "jan-burger", "bsn", "123456782", False),
+    ("eherkenning", "acme-ondernemer", "kvk", "12345678", False),
+    ("eidas", "pierre-dupont", "eidas_id", "FR/NL", False),
+    ("medewerker", "merel-behandelaar", "__roles__", "behandelaar", True),
 ]


@@ -23,10 +29,17 @@ def decode(jwt):
    return json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(p))


-def grant(realm, user):
+def totp(secret=OTP_SECRET, period=30, digits=6):
+    """RFC 6238 code: HMAC-SHA1 over the 30-second counter, dynamically truncated."""
+    mac = hmac.new(secret, struct.pack(">Q", int(time.time()) // period), hashlib.sha1).digest()
+    o = mac[-1] & 0x0F
+    return str((struct.unpack(">I", mac[o:o + 4])[0] & 0x7FFFFFFF) % 10 ** digits).zfill(digits)
+
+
+def grant(realm, user, **extra):
    data = urllib.parse.urlencode({
        "grant_type": "password", "client_id": CLIENT,
-        "username": user, "password": PWD, "scope": "openid",
+        "username": user, "password": PWD, "scope": "openid", **extra,
    }).encode()
    req = urllib.request.Request(
        f"{BASE}/realms/{realm}/protocol/openid-connect/token", data=data,
@@ -35,11 +48,27 @@ def grant(realm, user):
        return json.loads(r.read())


+def second_factor_refused(realm, user):
+    """The password alone must not yield a token on an MFA-enforced realm."""
+    try:
+        grant(realm, user)
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
+        return e.code in (400, 401)
+    return False
+
+
 def main():
    ok = True
-    for realm, user, claim, expect in CHECKS:
+    for realm, user, claim, expect, mfa in CHECKS:
+        extra = {}
+        if mfa:
+            refused = second_factor_refused(realm, user)
+            ok = ok and refused
+            print(f"{realm:12} {user:18} password-only login refused "
+                  f"[{'OK' if refused else 'MFA NOT ENFORCED'}]")
+            extra = {"totp": totp()}
        try:
-            at = decode(grant(realm, user)["access_token"])
+            at = decode(grant(realm, user, **extra)["access_token"])
            if claim == "__roles__":
                val = at.get("realm_access", {}).get("roles", [])
                good = expect in val
@@ -57,4 +86,9 @@ def main():


 if __name__ == "__main__":
-    main()
+    # `check_realms.py otp` prints a current code for the fixture secret — what a human demoing
+    # the medewerker portals types at Keycloak's OTP prompt (docs/runbooks/keycloak.md).
+    if len(sys.argv) > 1 and sys.argv[1] == "otp":
+        print(totp())
+    else:
+        main()
@@ -2,6 +2,16 @@
  "realm": "medewerker",
  "enabled": true,
  "displayName": "Medewerkers",
+  "requiredActions": [
+    {
+      "alias": "CONFIGURE_TOTP",
+      "name": "Configure OTP",
+      "providerId": "CONFIGURE_TOTP",
+      "enabled": true,
+      "defaultAction": true,
+      "priority": 10
+    }
+  ],
  "roles": {
    "realm": [
      { "name": "behandelaar", "description": "Behandelt registratieaanvragen" },
@@ -43,7 +53,15 @@
      "lastName": "Behandelaar",
      "email": "merel@big.example.nl",
      "emailVerified": true,
-      "credentials": [{ "type": "password", "value": "test123", "temporary": false }],
+      "credentials": [
+        { "type": "password", "value": "test123", "temporary": false },
+        {
+          "type": "otp",
+          "userLabel": "seeded TOTP (fixture)",
+          "secretData": "{\"value\":\"BIGMEDEWERKEROTPSEED\"}",
+          "credentialData": "{\"subType\":\"totp\",\"digits\":6,\"counter\":0,\"period\":30,\"algorithm\":\"HmacSHA1\"}"
+        }
+      ],
      "realmRoles": ["behandelaar"]
    },
    {
@@ -53,7 +71,15 @@
      "lastName": "Teamlead",
      "email": "tom@big.example.nl",
      "emailVerified": true,
-      "credentials": [{ "type": "password", "value": "test123", "temporary": false }],
+      "credentials": [
+        { "type": "password", "value": "test123", "temporary": false },
+        {
+          "type": "otp",
+          "userLabel": "seeded TOTP (fixture)",
+          "secretData": "{\"value\":\"BIGMEDEWERKEROTPSEED\"}",
+          "credentialData": "{\"subType\":\"totp\",\"digits\":6,\"counter\":0,\"period\":30,\"algorithm\":\"HmacSHA1\"}"
+        }
+      ],
      "realmRoles": ["behandelaar", "teamlead"]
    },
    {
@@ -63,7 +89,15 @@
      "lastName": "Beheerder",
      "email": "bram@big.example.nl",
      "emailVerified": true,
-      "credentials": [{ "type": "password", "value": "test123", "temporary": false }],
+      "credentials": [
+        { "type": "password", "value": "test123", "temporary": false },
+        {
+          "type": "otp",
+          "userLabel": "seeded TOTP (fixture)",
+          "secretData": "{\"value\":\"BIGMEDEWERKEROTPSEED\"}",
+          "credentialData": "{\"subType\":\"totp\",\"digits\":6,\"counter\":0,\"period\":30,\"algorithm\":\"HmacSHA1\"}"
+        }
+      ],
      "realmRoles": ["beheerder"]
    }
  ]
@@ -7,10 +7,34 @@ redirects it into $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY. Stdlib only.
 """
 import json
 import os
+import re
 import sys

 STATUS_ICON = {"expected": "✅", "unexpected": "❌", "skipped": "⏭️", "flaky": "⚠️"}

+# A verdict alone still costs a log dive, and a killed or truncated job leaves no log to dive into
+# (#161) — so a failing spec carries its first error into the table. Playwright errors are multi-line
+# with a "Call log:", which a markdown table cell cannot hold, so they are flattened and clipped.
+ERROR_CLIP = 300
+
+
+def first_error(spec):
+    """The first error message across a spec's test results, flattened for one table cell."""
+    for test in spec.get("tests", []):
+        for result in test.get("results", []):
+            for error in result.get("errors", []):
+                message = (error.get("message") or "").strip()
+                if not message:
+                    continue
+                # Strip ANSI colour, collapse to one line, and keep it inside the cell.
+                message = re.sub(r"\x1b\[[0-9;]*m", "", message)
+                message = " ".join(message.split())
+                if len(message) > ERROR_CLIP:
+                    message = message[:ERROR_CLIP - 1].rstrip() + "…"
+                # `|` would end the cell early.
+                return message.replace("|", "\\|")
+    return ""
+

 def walk(suite, out):
    for spec in suite.get("specs", []):
@@ -22,7 +46,8 @@ def walk(suite, out):
                  else "expected" if spec.get("ok", False)
                  else "unexpected")
        out.append({"file": spec.get("file") or suite.get("file") or suite.get("title", ""),
-                    "title": spec.get("title", ""), "status": status})
+                    "title": spec.get("title", ""), "status": status,
+                    "error": first_error(spec) if status in ("unexpected", "flaky") else ""})
    for child in suite.get("suites", []):
        walk(child, out)

@@ -46,10 +71,17 @@ def main(path):
    if not specs:
        print("_No specs ran._")
        return 0
-    print("| Spec | Result |")
-    print("| ---- | :----: |")
-    for s in specs:
-        print(f"| {s['file']} › {s['title']} | {STATUS_ICON.get(s['status'], '❔')} |")
+    # The failure column only earns its width when something failed.
+    if any(s["error"] for s in specs):
+        print("| Spec | Result | Why |")
+        print("| ---- | :----: | --- |")
+        for s in specs:
+            print(f"| {s['file']} › {s['title']} | {STATUS_ICON.get(s['status'], '❔')} | {s['error']} |")
+    else:
+        print("| Spec | Result |")
+        print("| ---- | :----: |")
+        for s in specs:
+            print(f"| {s['file']} › {s['title']} | {STATUS_ICON.get(s['status'], '❔')} |")
    return 0


@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Self-check for infra/playwright-summary.py — stdlib asserts, no framework.
+
+Run: python3 infra/test_playwright_summary.py  (also runs in `make unit`).
+
+A red e2e is only useful if the job summary says WHY it failed: #161 lost a 36-minute
+verify-stack job whose only surviving output was one ✘ line with no assertion detail.
+"""
+import importlib.util
+import io
+import json
+import os
+import tempfile
+from contextlib import redirect_stdout
+
+# The script's filename is not a valid module name, so load it by path.
+spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
+    "playwright_summary",
+    os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), "playwright-summary.py"),
+)
+summary = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+spec.loader.exec_module(summary)
+
+
+def render(report):
+    """Run the renderer over a report dict and return its markdown."""
+    with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile("w", suffix=".json", delete=False) as fh:
+        json.dump(report, fh)
+        path = fh.name
+    try:
+        out = io.StringIO()
+        with redirect_stdout(out):
+            summary.main(path)
+        return out.getvalue()
+    finally:
+        os.unlink(path)
+
+
+def spec_entry(title, status, errors=()):
+    return {
+        "title": title,
+        "file": "catalogus.spec.ts",
+        "ok": status == "expected",
+        "tests": [{"status": status, "results": [{"errors": [{"message": m} for m in errors]}]}],
+    }
+
+
+def test_failing_spec_reports_why():
+    md = render({
+        "stats": {"expected": 4, "unexpected": 1, "flaky": 0, "skipped": 0, "duration": 108_000},
+        "suites": [{"file": "catalogus.spec.ts", "specs": [
+            spec_entry("a beheerder sees the published zaaktypen in the catalogus", "unexpected",
+                       ["locator.fill: Test timeout of 90000ms exceeded.\n"
+                        "Call log:\n  - waiting for locator('#username')\n"]),
+        ]}],
+    })
+    assert "❌" in md, md
+    # The point of the slice: the summary names the cause, not just the verdict.
+    assert "Test timeout of 90000ms exceeded" in md, md
+    assert "waiting for locator('#username')" in md, md
+    # A multi-line Playwright error must not break out of its table row.
+    assert not any(line.startswith("Call log:") for line in md.splitlines()), md
+
+
+def test_real_playwright_error_is_flattened():
+    # A real report's message is multi-line and ANSI-coloured, and embeds the source snippet with
+    # `|` gutters — all three would break the table cell. Shape verified against an actual
+    # @playwright/test 1.61 JSON report.
+    md = render({
+        "stats": {"expected": 0, "unexpected": 1, "flaky": 0, "skipped": 0, "duration": 1_000},
+        "suites": [{"file": "catalogus.spec.ts", "specs": [
+            spec_entry("a beheerder sees the catalogus", "unexpected",
+                       ["Error: expect(locator).toBeVisible() failed\n\n"
+                        "\x1b[2mLocator: \x1b[22mgetByRole('heading')\n"
+                        "  12 |   await login(page);\n> 13 |   await expect(heading).toBeVisible();\n"]),
+        ]}],
+    })
+    row = [line for line in md.splitlines() if line.startswith("| catalogus.spec.ts")][0]
+    assert "\x1b" not in row, row
+    assert "Locator: getByRole('heading')" in row, row
+    # Every literal `|` from the snippet gutters is escaped, so the row keeps exactly 3 cells.
+    assert row.count("|") - row.count("\\|") == 4, row
+
+
+def test_passing_run_stays_quiet():
+    md = render({
+        "stats": {"expected": 1, "unexpected": 0, "flaky": 0, "skipped": 0, "duration": 5_000},
+        "suites": [{"file": "catalogus.spec.ts",
+                    "specs": [spec_entry("a beheerder sees the catalogus", "expected")]}],
+    })
+    assert "✅" in md, md
+    assert "timeout" not in md.lower(), md
+
+
+def test_missing_report_is_not_a_crash():
+    out = io.StringIO()
+    with redirect_stdout(out):
+        rc = summary.main("/nonexistent/playwright-report.json")
+    assert rc == 0
+    assert "did not reach the e2e step" in out.getvalue()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    for name, fn in sorted(globals().items()):
+        if name.startswith("test_") and callable(fn):
+            fn()
+            print(f"  ok  {name}")
+    print("playwright-summary self-check passed")
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Self-check for the portals' Caddyfiles — stdlib asserts, no framework.
+
+Run: python3 infra/test_portal_caddyfiles.py  (also runs in `make unit`).
+
+Each portal serves its Angular app and reverse-proxies *its own* BFF endpoint group
+same-origin, so the browser never sees CORS and the DigiD token rides along (ADR-0010).
+The four files are near-identical, which makes a copy-paste slip cheap to introduce and
+expensive to find: proxying another portal's group hands a behandelaar's browser an
+endpoint its token isn't for, and the failure shows up as a 401 three services away.
+
+What is asserted per portal: it proxies exactly its own groups to the BFF service, and it
+falls back to index.html so Angular's client-side routes survive a deep link / refresh.
+"""
+import os
+import re
+
+APPS = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), "..", "apps")
+
+# The self-service portal also renders the public register (S-09), so it proxies both.
+EXPECTED = {
+    "self-service": {"/self-service/*", "/openbaar/*"},
+    "openbaar": {"/openbaar/*"},
+    "behandel": {"/behandel/*"},
+    "beheer": {"/beheer/*"},
+}
+ALL_GROUPS = {g for groups in EXPECTED.values() for g in groups}
+
+
+def caddyfile(app):
+    with open(os.path.join(APPS, app, "Caddyfile")) as fh:
+        return fh.read()
+
+
+def proxied_groups(text):
+    """The path groups routed to the BFF: `handle <path> { reverse_proxy bff:8080 }`."""
+    return {
+        m.group(1)
+        for m in re.finditer(r"handle\s+(\S+)\s*\{[^}]*reverse_proxy\s+bff:8080", text)
+    }
+
+
+def test_each_portal_proxies_exactly_its_own_endpoint_groups():
+    for app, expected in EXPECTED.items():
+        got = proxied_groups(caddyfile(app))
+        assert got == expected, f"{app}: proxies {got or '{}'}, expected {expected}"
+
+
+def test_no_portal_proxies_another_portals_group():
+    for app, expected in EXPECTED.items():
+        strays = proxied_groups(caddyfile(app)) & (ALL_GROUPS - expected)
+        assert not strays, f"{app}: proxies another portal's group {strays}"
+
+
+def test_every_portal_falls_back_to_index_html():
+    """Angular routes client-side: an unknown path must serve the app, not a 404."""
+    for app in EXPECTED:
+        text = caddyfile(app)
+        assert "try_files {path} /index.html" in text, f"{app}: no SPA fallback"
+        assert "file_server" in text, f"{app}: nothing serves the built app"
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    for name, fn in sorted(globals().items()):
+        if name.startswith("test_") and callable(fn):
+            fn()
+            print(f"  ok  {name}")
+    print("portal Caddyfile self-check passed")
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ export interface DigiadAuthOptions {
  redirectUrl: string;
  /**
   * Route prefixes whose requests get the bearer token attached. The api-client calls the BFF with
-   * **relative** URLs (same-origin via the nginx proxy), so these must be relative path prefixes
+   * **relative** URLs (same-origin via the Caddy proxy), so these must be relative path prefixes
   * (e.g. `/self-service/`) — angular-auth-oidc-client matches `req.url.startsWith(route)`, and a
   * relative `req.url` never starts with an absolute origin.
   */
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ export interface MedewerkerAuthOptions {
  redirectUrl: string;
  /**
   * Route prefixes whose requests get the bearer token attached. The api-client calls the BFF with
-   * **relative** URLs (same-origin via the nginx proxy), so these must be relative path prefixes
+   * **relative** URLs (same-origin via the Caddy proxy), so these must be relative path prefixes
   * (e.g. `/behandel/`) — angular-auth-oidc-client matches `req.url.startsWith(route)`, and a
   * relative `req.url` never starts with an absolute origin.
   */
@@ -32,6 +32,17 @@ nav:
      - "ADR-0008: Read projection store": architecture/adr-0008-read-projection-store.md
      - "ADR-0009: External-task job worker": architecture/adr-0009-external-task-job-worker.md
      - "ADR-0010: BFF OIDC validation": architecture/adr-0010-bff-oidc.md
+  - FDS-architectuur:
+      - Overzicht: architecture/fds/README.md
+      - Componentview (L3): architecture/fds/c4-component-view.md
+      - "Slice 1: walking skeleton": architecture/fds/slice-1-proposal.md
+      - "FDS ADR-0001: ACL op elke registergrens": architecture/fds/adr/0001-acl-at-every-register-boundary.md
+      - "FDS ADR-0002: FSC voor connectiviteit": architecture/fds/adr/0002-fsc-for-connectivity.md
+      - "FDS ADR-0003: PBAC via OPA": architecture/fds/adr/0003-pbac-via-opa.md
+      - "FDS ADR-0004: Begrensde cache": architecture/fds/adr/0004-bounded-cache.md
+      - "FDS ADR-0005: Verwerkingenlog via events": architecture/fds/adr/0005-ldv-verwerkingenlog.md
+      - "FDS ADR-0006: Modulegrens en hergebruik": architecture/fds/adr/0006-module-boundary-and-reuse.md
+      - "FDS ADR-template": architecture/fds/adr/template.md
  - Working in Gitea: gitea-workflow.md
  - Frontend decisions: frontend-decisions.md
  - Demo script: demo-script.md
@@ -42,7 +53,11 @@ markdown_extensions:
  - admonition
  - toc:
      permalink: true
-  - pymdownx.superfences
+  - pymdownx.superfences:
+      custom_fences:
+        - name: mermaid
+          class: mermaid
+          format: !!python/name:pymdownx.superfences.fence_code_format

 # Many docs referenced by PRD.md land in later slices; don't fail the build on them.
 validation:
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import { expect, test } from '@playwright/test';
+import { loginMedewerker } from './keycloak-login';

 // S-15a walking skeleton: a beheerder logs in to the beheer portal (medewerker realm) and sees the
 // read-only ZTC catalogus. The verify stack seeds and publishes the BIG-REGISTRATIE zaaktype (the
@@ -7,10 +8,9 @@ import { expect, test } from '@playwright/test';
 test('a beheerder sees the published zaaktypen in the catalogus', async ({ page }) => {
  await page.goto('http://beheer/');

-  // The beheer portal redirects to the Keycloak medewerker realm login (same realm as behandel).
-  await page.locator('#username').fill('bram-beheerder');
-  await page.locator('#password').fill('test123');
-  await page.locator('#kc-login').click();
+  // The beheer portal redirects to the Keycloak medewerker realm login (same realm as behandel),
+  // which enforces MFA: password, then a TOTP code.
+  await loginMedewerker(page, 'bram-beheerder');

  await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: /Catalogus/i })).toBeVisible();

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import { expect, test } from '@playwright/test';
+import { loginMedewerker } from './keycloak-login';

 // S-15b: a beheerder edits the ACL default-fill in the beheer portal and gets a saved confirmation.
 // Runs against the shared verify stack; it edits + saves (the ACL store is in-memory, ADR-0026) and
@@ -6,10 +7,8 @@ import { expect, test } from '@playwright/test';
 test('a beheerder edits and saves the default-fill', async ({ page }) => {
  await page.goto('http://beheer/');

-  // Keycloak medewerker-realm login (same realm as behandel).
-  await page.locator('#username').fill('bram-beheerder');
-  await page.locator('#password').fill('test123');
-  await page.locator('#kc-login').click();
+  // Keycloak medewerker-realm login (same realm as behandel) — password + enforced TOTP.
+  await loginMedewerker(page, 'bram-beheerder');

  await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: /Catalogus/i })).toBeVisible();

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+import { expect, test } from '@playwright/test';
+import { OTP_PERIOD_MS, nextUnusedCounter } from './keycloak-login';
+
+// Pure check of the TOTP counter guard in loginMedewerker — no browser, no stack. Keycloak refuses
+// a code it has already accepted (its otpPolicyCodeReusable defaults to false), so two logins as
+// the same medewerker inside one 30-second window must not spend the same counter twice (#132).
+test('a login never spends a TOTP counter this medewerker already used', () => {
+  const now = 3 * OTP_PERIOD_MS + 1_000; // 1 second into counter 3
+
+  expect(nextUnusedCounter(now, -1)).toBe(3); // nothing spent yet → the current counter
+  expect(nextUnusedCounter(now, 3)).toBe(4); // the current counter is spent → the next one
+  expect(nextUnusedCounter(now, 4)).toBe(5); // two logins already in this window → the one after
+  expect(nextUnusedCounter(now + OTP_PERIOD_MS, 3)).toBe(4); // window moved on → current again
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+import { createHmac } from 'node:crypto';
+import { readFileSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { expect, type Page } from '@playwright/test';
+
+// Every portal login in the suite goes through this module — citizen realms (mock DigiD) and the
+// medewerker realm alike — so the shared Keycloak form handling lives in exactly one place.
+
+// The medewerker realm enforces MFA (S-15c), so a staff login is two steps: password, then a TOTP
+// code. The realm export seeds every medewerker with this fixture secret — Keycloak HMACs the raw
+// secret bytes — so the e2e can compute a valid code instead of enrolling an authenticator.
+const OTP_SECRET = 'BIGMEDEWERKEROTPSEED';
+
+export const OTP_PERIOD_MS = 30_000;
+
+/**
+ * How long a Keycloak form gets to appear. Generous enough for a cold first browser launch and a
+ * loaded stack, far short of the 90-second test timeout an auto-waiting action would otherwise eat.
+ */
+const FORM_TIMEOUT_MS = 20_000;
+const FORM_NEVER_APPEARED =
+  'the Keycloak login form never appeared — the portal did not reach Keycloak (check its ' +
+  'config.json fetch and the OIDC discovery on the authority it was built with)';
+const OTP_NEVER_APPEARED =
+  'the Keycloak OTP form never appeared — the password step did not complete (check the ' +
+  'medewerker realm seeded this user with both a password and a TOTP credential)';
+
+// RFC 6238 TOTP: HMAC-SHA1 over the 30-second counter, dynamically truncated to 6 digits.
+export function totp(secret = OTP_SECRET, at = Date.now()): string {
+  const counter = Buffer.alloc(8);
+  counter.writeBigUInt64BE(BigInt(Math.floor(at / OTP_PERIOD_MS)));
+  const mac = createHmac('sha1', secret).update(counter).digest();
+  const offset = mac[mac.length - 1] & 0x0f;
+  return String((mac.readUInt32BE(offset) & 0x7fffffff) % 1_000_000).padStart(6, '0');
+}
+
+// Keycloak refuses a TOTP code it has already accepted (its otpPolicyCodeReusable defaults to
+// false), so two logins as the same medewerker inside one 30-second window would both submit the
+// same code and the second is rejected. Spend the first counter this medewerker has left.
+export function nextUnusedCounter(now: number, spent: number): number {
+  return Math.max(Math.floor(now / OTP_PERIOD_MS), spent + 1);
+}
+
+// The spent counter lives on disk rather than in module state: Playwright starts a fresh worker
+// process for a retry, which would otherwise forget it and resubmit the rejected code.
+function spendCounter(username: string): number {
+  const file = join(tmpdir(), `otp-counter-${username}`);
+  let spent = -1;
+  try {
+    spent = Number(readFileSync(file, 'utf8')) || -1;
+  } catch {
+    // first login as this medewerker in this run
+  }
+  const counter = nextUnusedCounter(Date.now(), spent);
+  writeFileSync(file, String(counter));
+  return counter;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Fill Keycloak's login form. Every portal is guarded, so the first navigation redirects here; the
+ * form ids are stable across themes.
+ *
+ * The form is asserted visible *before* it is filled. A portal that never reaches Keycloak — its
+ * runtime `config.json` fetch or the OIDC discovery behind `authorize()` failed, so it never
+ * bootstrapped and shows a blank page (main.ts only logs to the console) — would otherwise leave
+ * `fill()` auto-waiting until the whole test times out: 90 seconds spent to report
+ * `locator.fill: Test timeout of 90000ms exceeded`, naming the symptom and not the cause. That is
+ * how #161's catalogus.spec burned 1.8 minutes. This fails in a quarter of the time and says which
+ * step never happened.
+ */
+async function submitPassword(page: Page, username: string): Promise<void> {
+  await expect(page.locator('#username'), FORM_NEVER_APPEARED).toBeVisible({ timeout: FORM_TIMEOUT_MS });
+  await page.locator('#username').fill(username);
+  await page.locator('#password').fill('test123');
+  await page.locator('#kc-login').click();
+}
+
+/** A citizen login on a mock-DigiD realm — no second factor (ADR-0031). */
+export async function loginBurger(page: Page, username: string): Promise<void> {
+  await submitPassword(page, username);
+}
+
+/** A staff login on the medewerker realm: password, then the enforced TOTP second factor. */
+export async function loginMedewerker(page: Page, username: string): Promise<void> {
+  await submitPassword(page, username);
+
+  // Keycloak's conditional-OTP step. Same reasoning as the password form above: assert it arrived
+  // rather than letting `fill()` swallow the test timeout.
+  await expect(page.locator('#otp'), OTP_NEVER_APPEARED).toBeVisible({ timeout: FORM_TIMEOUT_MS });
+
+  // Wait out the rest of the window if the counter we may spend is still in the future; Keycloak's
+  // lookAheadWindow would accept the code a moment early, but only by one counter — waiting keeps a
+  // third login in the same window valid too.
+  const counter = spendCounter(username);
+  await page.waitForTimeout(Math.max(0, counter * OTP_PERIOD_MS - Date.now()));
+  await page.locator('#otp').fill(totp(OTP_SECRET, counter * OTP_PERIOD_MS));
+  await page.locator('#kc-login').click();
+}
@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ export default defineConfig({
  timeout: 90_000,
  expect: { timeout: 15_000 },
  retries: 1,
+  // Bound the whole run, not just each test (#161). A wedged suite used to run until CI killed the
+  // job — which also killed the `if: always()` steps that would have said why: the per-spec summary
+  // and the container-log dump never ran, leaving a 36-minute job whose entire surviving output was
+  // one ✘ line. On `globalTimeout` Playwright stops and *reports*, so the JSON report is written and
+  // those steps still run. Generous over the ~1-minute suite: this is a backstop, not a budget.
+  globalTimeout: 12 * 60_000,
  // Run the specs serially. Each spec drives a full `channel: 'chromium'` browser, and the e2e
  // shares an 8 GB runner with the entire compose stack (OpenZaak, NRC, Keycloak, Flowable, 4×
  // Postgres, every service + 3 portals). Two parallel browsers exhaust memory and the renderer is
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import { expect, request, test } from '@playwright/test';
+import { loginBurger, loginMedewerker } from './keycloak-login';

 // Walking-skeleton happy path (S-08d + S-09 + S-09b + S-12 + S-10a + S-19b-2): a zorgprofessional
 // logs in via mock DigiD and submits through the self-service portal → BFF → domain; the entry
@@ -22,9 +23,7 @@ test('DigiD submit → public INGEDIEND → documenten → behandelaar goedkeurt
  // checks submit as jan-burger (bsn 123456782) before the e2e runs on the shared stack, and
  // resume-on-load (S-26) would otherwise restore one of those on login — so each self-service spec
  // uses a dedicated citizen no other actor touches.
-  await page.locator('#username').fill('emma-burger');
-  await page.locator('#password').fill('test123');
-  await page.locator('#kc-login').click();
+  await loginBurger(page, 'emma-burger');

  // Back on the portal, authenticated.
  await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: /Zelfservice/i })).toBeVisible();
@@ -58,12 +57,32 @@ test('DigiD submit → public INGEDIEND → documenten → behandelaar goedkeurt
  await expect(staff.getByRole('row', { name: reference }).getByRole('cell', { name: 'INGEDIEND' }))
    .toBeVisible();

+  // A behandelaar opens the behandel-portal werkbak and approves the registration (goedkeuren) — the
+  // S-12 flow that replaces the temporary admin endpoint. The staff tab switches to the medewerker
+  // realm (a different Keycloak realm than the citizen's digid session).
+  //
+  // The werkbak is opened BEFORE the citizen supplies the documents that route the registration to
+  // Beoordelen, so its row cannot be there at page load: the only thing that can deliver it to this
+  // already-open page is the werkbak refreshing itself (S-26/#162, ADR-0032). This spec used to
+  // `staff.reload()` in a poll loop here; the absence of that reload is the live-refresh assertion.
+  await staff.goto('http://behandel/');
+  // That realm enforces MFA (S-15c), so the behandelaar logs in with password + TOTP.
+  await loginMedewerker(staff, 'merel-behandelaar');
+
+  await expect(staff.getByRole('heading', { name: /Werkbak/i })).toBeVisible();
+
+  // Target the decide button by reference (not a generic "Goedkeuren"): the shared verify stack holds
+  // other open tasks, so a positional match could act on someone else's registration.
+  const goedkeuren = staff.getByRole('button', { name: `Goedkeuren ${reference}` });
+  await expect(goedkeuren, 'the registration is not awaiting beoordeling yet').toBeHidden();
+
  // Provide the documents the registration is waiting for (S-10a), on the still-open self-service tab.
  // The process parks at WachtOpDocumenten only after the zaak is opened; the INGEDIEND row above proves
  // the zaak exists — so the OpenZaak worker has completed and the process is now at the wait — which is
  // why we supply the documents here rather than right after submit, when the trigger would race the
  // wait and no-op. (S-10b turns this into a real file upload; here it is the trigger that unblocks
  // beoordeling.)
+  await page.bringToFront();
  await page.setInputFiles('#diploma', {
    name: 'diploma.pdf',
    mimeType: 'application/pdf',
@@ -72,30 +91,14 @@ test('DigiD submit → public INGEDIEND → documenten → behandelaar goedkeurt
  await page.getByRole('button', { name: /documenten aanleveren/i }).click();
  await expect(page.getByText(/documenten zijn aangeleverd/i)).toBeVisible();

-  // A behandelaar picks the registration up in the behandel-portal werkbak and approves it (goedkeuren)
-  // — the S-12 flow that replaces the temporary admin endpoint. The staff tab switches to the
-  // medewerker realm (a different Keycloak realm than the citizen's digid session).
-  await staff.goto('http://behandel/');
-  await staff.locator('#username').fill('merel-behandelaar');
-  await staff.locator('#password').fill('test123');
-  await staff.locator('#kc-login').click();
-
-  await expect(staff.getByRole('heading', { name: /Werkbak/i })).toBeVisible();
-
-  // The registration reaches the Beoordelen user task only after its documents are provided (above), so
-  // it appears in the werkbak asynchronously — reload until this reference's row shows up. Target the
-  // decide button by reference (not a generic "Goedkeuren"): the shared verify stack holds other open
-  // tasks, so a positional match could act on someone else's registration.
-  const goedkeuren = staff.getByRole('button', { name: `Goedkeuren ${reference}` });
-  await expect
-    .poll(async () => {
-      await staff.reload();
-      return goedkeuren.count();
-    }, { timeout: 30_000, intervals: [1_000, 2_000, 3_000, 5_000] })
-    .toBeGreaterThan(0);
+  // Back to the werkbak — untouched since login, never reloaded. The row arrives on its own once the
+  // DMN routes the registration to Beoordelen. (Foregrounded so Chromium doesn't throttle the page's
+  // refresh timer as a hidden tab.)
+  await staff.bringToFront();
+  await expect(goedkeuren).toBeVisible({ timeout: 30_000 });

  // Click and wait for the decide POST to finish (204) BEFORE leaving the page. `click()` only
-  // dispatches the request; navigating away immediately cancels it in flight (nginx logs a 499) and
+  // dispatches the request; navigating away immediately cancels it in flight (the proxy logs a client-cancelled request) and
  // the decision never reaches the domain — so the registration would stay INGEDIEND.
  const decided = staff.waitForResponse(
    (r) =>
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import { expect, test } from '@playwright/test';
+import { loginBurger } from './keycloak-login';

 // S-26: a zorgprofessional submits, then reloads the self-service portal. On load the portal asks the
 // BFF for the caller's current open registration (owner-scoped by the DigiD token's bsn) and restores
@@ -9,9 +10,7 @@ test('DigiD submit → reload → self-service restores the existing registratio
  // Its own DigiD user (like every self-service spec): on the shared verify stack, resume-on-load
  // (S-26) restores any open registration for the bsn, so each spec uses a dedicated citizen that no
  // other spec or verify-* check touches. This one in particular leaves an open registration.
-  await page.locator('#username').fill('sanne-burger');
-  await page.locator('#password').fill('test123');
-  await page.locator('#kc-login').click();
+  await loginBurger(page, 'sanne-burger');

  await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: /Zelfservice/i })).toBeVisible();
  await page.getByRole('button', { name: /indienen/i }).click();
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import { expect, test } from '@playwright/test';
+import { loginBurger } from './keycloak-login';

 // S-11 (Flow 3): a zorgprofessional logs in via mock DigiD, submits a registration, then withdraws
 // it ("trek aanvraag in") from the self-service portal. The withdrawal goes portal → BFF (owner-
@@ -10,9 +11,7 @@ test('DigiD submit → trek aanvraag in → self-service confirms ingetrokken',

  // Its own DigiD user — isolated from the verify-* checks (jan-burger/123456782) so resume-on-load
  // (S-26) can't restore someone else's registration on the shared stack.
-  await page.locator('#username').fill('lars-burger');
-  await page.locator('#password').fill('test123');
-  await page.locator('#kc-login').click();
+  await loginBurger(page, 'lars-burger');

  await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: /Zelfservice/i })).toBeVisible();